Report 155

Treaties tabled on 11 August and 12 August 2015

Australia’s denunciation of the Convention relating to International Exhibitions, and Protocol of Signature (Paris, 22 November 1928)

Australia’s ratification of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement (Beijing, 29 June 2015)
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Membership of the Committee

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Mr Angus Taylor MP \( (\text{from 15/10/2015}) \)

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Mr Ken O’Dowd MP  
The Hon Melissa Parke MP  
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Mr Brett Whiteley MP

Senator Chris Back  
Senator David Fawcett  
Senator the Hon David Johnston \( (\text{from 12/10/2015}) \)  
Senator Sue Lines  
Senator the Hon Joe Ludwig  
Senator James McGrath \( (\text{until 12/10/2015}) \)  
Senator Glenn Sterle  
Senator Peter Whish-Wilson
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Secretary Lynley Ducker
Inquiry Secretary Dr Narelle McGlusky
Senior Researcher Kevin Bodel
Researcher Elizabeth Shaw
Researcher Belynda Zolotto
Administrative Officer Cathy Rouland
Resolution of Appointment

The Resolution of Appointment of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties allows it to inquire into and report on:

a) matters arising from treaties and related National Interest Analyses and proposed treaty actions and related Explanatory Statements presented or deemed to be presented to the Parliament;

b) any question relating to a treaty or other international instrument, whether or not negotiated to completion, referred to the committee by:

   (i) either House of the Parliament;

   (ii) a Minister; or

   (iii) such other matters as may be referred to the committee by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and on such conditions as the Minister may prescribe.
# List of abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
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List of recommendations

2 Australia’s Denunciation of the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions and Protocol of Signature

Recommendation 1

The Committee supports Australia’s denunciation of the Convention relating to International Exhibitions and Protocol of Signature and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.

3 Australia’s ratification of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement

Recommendation 2

The Committee supports Australia’s ratification of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.
Introduction

Purpose of the report

1.1 This report contains the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties’ review of two treaty actions:
   - Australia’s denunciation of the Convention relating to International Exhibitions, and Protocol of Signature, tabled on 11 August 2015; and
   - Australia’s ratification of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement, tabled on 12 August 2015.

1.2 The Committee’s resolution of appointment empowers it to inquire into any treaty to which Australia has become a signatory, on the treaty being tabled in Parliament.

1.3 The treaties, and matters arising from them, are evaluated to ensure that ratification is in the national interest, and that unintended or negative effects on Australians will not arise.

1.4 Prior to tabling, major treaty actions are subject to a National Interest Analysis (NIA), prepared by the Government. This document considers arguments for and against the treaty, outlines the treaty obligations and any regulatory or financial implications, and reports the results of consultations undertaken with State and Territory Governments, Federal and State and Territory agencies, and with industry or non-government organisations.

1.5 A Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) may accompany the NIA. The RIS provides an account of the regulatory impact of the treaty action where adoption of the treaty will involve a change in the regulatory environment for Australian business. The treaties under consideration in this report did not require a RIS.
1.6 The Committee takes account of these documents in its examination of the treaty text, in addition to other evidence taken during the inquiry program.

1.7 A copy of the treaties and associated documentation may be obtained from the Committee Secretariat or accessed through the Committee’s website at:


**Conduct of the Committee’s review**

1.8 The treaty actions reviewed in this report were advertised on the Committee’s website from the dates of tabling. The Committee invited written submissions. The Committee also invited all State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and the Presiding Officers of each Parliament to lodge submissions.

1.9 The Committee held a public hearing on the two tabled treaties on 14 September 2015 in Canberra.

1.10 The transcript of evidence from the public hearing may be obtained from the Committee Secretariat or accessed through the Committee’s website under the treaties’ tabling date, either 11 August 2015 or 12 August 2015.

1.11 A list of witnesses who appeared at the public hearing is at Appendix A.
Australia’s Denunciation of the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions and Protocol of Signature

Introduction

2.1 The proposed treaty action will denounce Australia’s ratification of the Convention relating to International Exhibitions and Protocol of Signature (the Convention). The Convention was concluded on 22 November 1928, signed by Australia in 1935, and entered into force for Australia on 27 October 1973.

Background

2.2 According to the National Interest Analysis (NIA), the purpose of the Convention is to provide a formal basis for the process of holding international exhibitions.\(^1\)

2.3 International conventions, known as ‘World Expos’, have generally been held every five years, with the most recent occurring in Shanghai 2010, and one currently being held in Milan. In addition to these World Expos, smaller ‘International Specialised Expos’ are generally held in the intervening years, for example in Zaragoza in 2008 and Brisbane in 1988.\(^2\)

2.4 The Convention establishes the International Exhibitions Bureau (BIE), regulates the frequency at which international exhibitions occur, and defines the rights and responsibilities of participants.\(^3\)

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2 NIA, paras 5 and 7.

3 NIA, para 4.
Overview and national interest summary

2.5 Membership of the BIE entitles Australia to vote on which country will host an exhibition.\(^4\) As summarised by a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) representative, ‘essentially membership provides the opportunity to contribute to a decision-making process on the selection of future hosts’.\(^5\)

2.6 The NIA points out that Australia has not hosted a World Expo, despite being one of 167 member countries, which comes at an annual cost of $25,000 in membership fees.\(^6\)

2.7 While denouncing the Convention would result in Australia withdrawing from the BIE and losing membership rights, it would not prevent Australia from participating in World Expos, as non-member countries are able to attend BIE-convened exhibitions.

2.8 The Convention also allows for non-members to host an exhibition. However, the NIA notes that in practice this is extremely unlikely, as member states are unlikely to vote for a non-member state.\(^7\)

2.9 The NIA states that should Australia wish to host an exhibition in future, it would be relatively easy to re-join the Bureau under Article 35 of the Convention. The Committee heard that this involves a simple process undertaken through the BIE and the reinstatement of membership fees.\(^8\)

Reasons for Australia to take the proposed treaty action

2.10 The NIA suggests that denunciation of the Convention and resultant actions reflect the broader policy position of assessing Australia’s participation in exhibitions on a case-by-case basis, including the conduct of a cost-benefit analysis. As outlined by a DFAT representative:

…withdrawal from the convention removes the onus or the presumption on Australia to participate and puts Australia in the position of assessing each expo on its merits.\(^9\)

2.11 Given the high cost of participating in exhibitions, Australian Government policy is to participate only where a strong economic link exists with the

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4 NIA, para 9.
5 Mr Robert Tranter, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy and Communications Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 1.
6 NIA, paras 7 and 8.
7 NIA, paras 9 and 10.
8 Mr Tranter, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 1.
9 Mr Tranter, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 1.
host country, when compelling business benefits are possible and when a majority of the financial support is provided by the private sector.\textsuperscript{10}

2.12 DFAT representatives told the committee that denunciation from the Convention would not reflect badly on Australia; other countries, including the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada, are not currently members of the BIE\textsuperscript{11} and ‘there is a pattern by states of being judicious in participation’.\textsuperscript{12}

**Obligations**

2.13 Denunciation of the Convention will not result in any new obligations. Under Article 37 of the Convention, Australia’s current obligations will continue until one year after notification is given and the denunciation takes effect.\textsuperscript{13}

**Implementation**

2.14 The NIA notes that no changes to legislation will be required to denounce the Convention, despite the fact that it is referred to in Regulation 2.2 of the *Patents Regulations 1991*.\textsuperscript{14}

**Costs**

2.15 Denunciation of the Convention will result in a saving of $25,000 per year, which Australia currently pays in annual membership fees for the Bureau.

2.16 Denunciation also removes the presumption of attendance at international exhibitions, which comes at significant cost. For example, the Australian Government spent $73 million on participation at the 2010 Shanghai exhibition and $37.5 million for the 2005 Aichi exhibition.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{10} NIA, para 13.
\textsuperscript{11} NIA, para 14.
\textsuperscript{12} Mr Tranter, DFAT, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{13} NIA, para 15.
\textsuperscript{14} NIA, para 4.
\textsuperscript{15} Mr Tranter, DFAT, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 1.
Conclusion

2.17 The Committee supports Australia’s denunciation of the Convention relating to International Exhibitions and Protocol of Signature and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.

Recommendation 1

2.18 The Committee supports Australia’s denunciation of the Convention relating to International Exhibitions and Protocol of Signature and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.
Australia’s ratification of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement

Introduction

3.1 The proposed treaty action is to ratify the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement (AIIB Articles) and establish Australia as a founding member of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (the AIIB). Australia signed the AIIB Articles in Beijing on 29 June 2015.

Overview

3.2 The AIIB Articles will, at the point at which they enter into force, commence the operations of the AIIB. The purpose of the AIIB is to:

- foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors; and
- promote regional cooperation in addressing development challenges by working with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions.

3.3 A primary goal of the AIIB is to address infrastructure funding needs that are not being met by existing international financial institutions and private investment sources.


2 AIIB Articles, Article 1.

3 AIIB Articles, Article 1.

4 Mr Chris Legg, Chief Negotiator, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Taskforce, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 3.
3.4 The National Interest Analysis [2015] ATNIA 13 (NIA) advises that Australia intends to have an active membership in the AIIB and contribute both financially and to the new bank’s governance.\(^5\)

3.5 The Australian initial shareholding in the AIIB will be $US 3,691,200,000 (or 3.7 per cent of the $US 100 billion capital stock).\(^6\) Twenty per cent of this, or $US 738,240,000, will be paid-in capital that Australia pays to the bank in five equal instalments over five years.\(^7\) The remainder is callable capital that would be called on by the Bank, if needed, to meet its liabilities.\(^8\)

### Reasons for Australia to take the proposed treaty action

3.6 The NIA states that the AIIB has the potential to be a major regional institution that will deliver substantial new infrastructure in the region. Treasury representatives highlighted the estimated multi-trillion dollar shortfall for infrastructure spending in Asia, and suggested that increased spending on infrastructure is needed for the region to fulfil its economic potential.\(^9\) The NIA concludes that new infrastructure will drive economic growth and jobs, and provide opportunities for Australian trade and business.\(^10\)

3.7 If Australia has an active role in the Bank, it may also provide an opportunity to build stronger links with other anticipated member States.\(^11\) It will also ensure Australia is part of an important addition to the multilateral framework in the region, as explained by a Treasury representative:

> … the largest shareholder will be our largest trading partner and a very important player in the region, and [the AIIB] therefore has the potential to play an important role in shaping the leadership of countries in the region through multilateralism. Australia would see that as a good thing — that we have a multilateral approach to supporting infrastructure in the region…\(^12\)

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5 NIA, para 10.
6 AIIB Articles, Schedule A.
7 NIA, paras 36 and 37.
8 AIIB Articles, Article 20.
9 Mr Legg, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 3.
10 NIA, para 9.
11 NIA, para 10.
12 Mr Legg, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 3.
3.8 Australia’s financial exposure will be limited to the amount already committed, and callable capital will not be drawn on unless extreme circumstances arise. Treasury representatives advised that the AIIB’s sound financial, lending and risk management policies would protect Australia’s financial investment.13

3.9 Australian businesses will be able to compete for contracts on Bank-funded projects. The NIA advises that the Bank will have a policy of open procurement.14

3.10 Australia may withdraw from the AIIB at any time by providing a minimum of six months’ notice in writing. Australia’s shares would be repurchased at the value of the time of withdrawal, although Australia would remain liable for all obligations that existed at the time when the notice of withdrawal was provided.15

3.11 Although no projects have been identified, the NIA advises that the AIIB is likely to focus its efforts on developing countries with significant infrastructure gaps.16 It is therefore unlikely that Australia will be a recipient of AIIB funding for a major infrastructure project.

**AIIB’s role and purpose**

3.12 The Bank has the following four functions:

- to promote investment for development purposes, in particular for infrastructure;
- to utilise the resources at its disposal for financing development in the region, having special regard to the needs of less developed members;
- to encourage private investment in projects, and to supplement private investment on reasonable terms and conditions; and
- to undertake such other activities and services to further its functions.17

3.13 According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Treasury, the AIIB will differ from and complement existing multilateral development banks, which are not meeting demand for infrastructure projects in Asia.18

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13 Mr Legg, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 6.
14 NIA para 13.
15 NIA paras 46, 48.
16 NIA, para 14.
17 AIIB Articles, Article 2.
18 Mr Legg, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 3.
3.14 For example, while the Asian Development Bank invests in infrastructure in the region, it has a broader mandate and more diverse aims. The AIIB will not seek to directly influence social development or policy and will:

… focus on projects which have the potential to make a big difference quickly to economic capacity and connectivity in the region.\textsuperscript{19}

It is anticipated that this targeted approach will assist the AIIB to address infrastructure funding gaps.\textsuperscript{20}

3.15 The AIIB will reflect the growing role of emerging market economies in the region and will allow these countries more influence; encouraging greater investment and participation. The Committee heard that existing multilateral institutions may not adequately represent emerging nations. This can undermine the relevance of those institutions and reduce the willingness of emerging countries to fully participate.\textsuperscript{21}

3.16 The AIIB may also be better placed to encourage private sector investment, as explained by the a Treasury representative:

We expect this bank will focus much more on supporting private sector investment than is done by some of the other players, and that will be a plus. There is clearly a large amount of private sector financing potentially available if particular risks associated with that can be dealt with in a targeted way—and we would see this bank as a way of doing that.\textsuperscript{22}

The Committee was told that some private sector investors find engagement with existing international financial institutions difficult, and that the AIIB is in a position to foster better collaboration with the private sector.\textsuperscript{23}

**Governance and operational processes**

3.17 The AIIB will be governed by a Board of Governors, with each member appointing one Governor and Alternate Governor to represent that member on the Board. The Board of Governors exercises all powers of the AIIB.\textsuperscript{24} Most matters are decided on a simple majority, \textsuperscript{25} with major

\textsuperscript{19} Mr Legg, The Treasury, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{20} Ms Natasha Smith, First Assistant Secretary, Multilateral Development Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{21} Mr Legg, The Treasury, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{22} Mr Legg, The Treasury, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{23} Mr Legg, The Treasury, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{24} AIIB Articles, Article 22 and 23.
\textsuperscript{25} AIIB Article, Article 28.
operational and financial policies and delegation decisions requiring a Super Majority (two-thirds of Governors representing at least 75 per cent of the total voting power).\(^{26}\)

3.18 Voting power on the Board is calculated by a combination of:

- basic votes (12 per cent of the total number of votes, shared equally among members);
- share votes (equal to the number of shares held by the member); and
- Founding Member votes (600 additional votes for each Founding Member).\(^{27}\)

3.19 The result of the vote structure is that members with the most shares have the largest voting power. However the Committee heard that, at around 15 per cent, the AIIB’s proportion of fixed votes not determined by financial share is relatively high compared to other international financial institutions, including the World Bank. The AIIB’s share structure therefore:

> … tends to dilute the voice of the larger countries and increase the voice of the smaller countries to ensure there is some balance between weight and democracy…\(^{28}\)

3.20 There will also be a 12-person Board of Directors, with nine Directors elected by regional members, and three elected by non-regional members. The Board of Directors is responsible for the general operations of the bank and will make decisions on a simple majority vote.\(^{29}\) Directors are able to cast the votes of the Governor who elected that Director, and also the votes of any Governors who have assigned their votes to that Director.\(^{30}\)

3.21 The Board of Directors can also delegate operational decisions to management. Decisions to delegate powers will require a 75 per cent vote of the Board of Directors.\(^{31}\)

3.22 According to a Treasury representative, the power to delegate to management will increase efficiency and was an outcome desired by Australian negotiators. Delegation will result in:

> … a non-resident board that holds management accountable but does not try to micromanage the institution. We want the board to

\(^{26}\) AIIB Article, Article 26 and 28.

\(^{27}\) AIIB Article, Article 28.

\(^{28}\) Mr Legg, The Treasury, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 4.

\(^{29}\) AIIB Article, Article 26.

\(^{30}\) AIIB Article, Article 28 and Schedule B.

\(^{31}\) Mr Legg, The Treasury, *Committee Hansard*, 14 September 2015, p. 5.
have clear authority over the operations, but to be able to delegate them.\textsuperscript{32}

3.23 Major operational policies, such as those that relate to environmental, human rights and labour protections, will require a Super Majority 75 per cent vote from the Board of Directors. Treasury representatives are satisfied that this governance framework will ensure quality policies that adhere to international standards.\textsuperscript{33}

3.24 The AIIB’s approach to safeguards and standards will be principles-based, rather than strictly regulatory. This approach is based on the experience and evolving practices of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and is expected to lower transactional costs, especially for small borrowers.\textsuperscript{34}

3.25 The NIA advises that Australia is negotiating to lead a constituency of regional members, which would be able to secure a seat on the Board of Directors.\textsuperscript{35} If successful, this position should allow Australia to influence decisions made by the AIIB.

3.26 The staffing structure of the AIIB is yet to be determined. Negotiators expect a relatively small staff, based on preferences expressed by the Secretary General of the Bank’s Multilateral Interim Secretariat.\textsuperscript{36}

### Membership

3.27 There are 57 Prospective Founding Members, who may become Founding Members after ratification of the Agreement and contribution of the initial subscriptions to the authorised capital stock. Thirty-seven are regional members, including Australia, and twenty are non-regional members. Fifty of these members signed the Articles at Beijing on 29 June 2015.

3.28 Regional members will contribute 75 per cent of the stock, and non-regional members 25 per cent. The ten largest subscribers are:\textsuperscript{37}

- China \hspace{1em} 29.8%
- India \hspace{1em} 8.4%
- Russia \hspace{1em} 6.6%
- Germany \hspace{1em} 4.5%

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\textsuperscript{32} Mr Legg, The Treasury, \textit{Committee Hansard}, 14 September 2015, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{33} Mr Legg, The Treasury, \textit{Committee Hansard}, 14 September 2015, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{34} Mr Legg, The Treasury, \textit{Committee Hansard}, 14 September 2015, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{35} NIA, para 16.
\textsuperscript{36} Mr Legg, The Treasury, \textit{Committee Hansard}, 14 September 2015, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{37} AIIB Articles, Schedule A.
• Korea 3.8%
• Australia 3.7%
• Indonesia 3.4%
• France 3.4%
• Brazil 3.1%
• United Kingdom 3.1%.

**Timing and entry into force**

3.29 Australia participated in negotiations of the Articles as one of the 57 Prospective Founding Member states, and signed the Articles on 29 June 2015. 38 The AIIB Articles will enter into force, and the AIIB will commence, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by at least ten signatories whose total initial subscriptions comprise not less than 50 per cent of the total subscriptions. 39 The NIA states that this is likely to occur before the end of 2015.

3.30 The NIA advises that it is important that Australia becomes a founding member or joins the bank shortly after commencement. Membership before or shortly after commencement has a number of benefits. Founding or early membership would give Australia the opportunity to influence key decisions made in the AIIB’s formation: 40

> The articles have been agreed, but there will be other governance documents that can only be approved by the Board of Directors once the Board of Directors is established. There will be operational policies, which are being discussed now by chief negotiators but will only be approved once the Board of Directors is established by the Board of Governors. And if we think this institution is important—and we do—then we would like to be there to shape those policies, and we can only do that by being there when the institution starts or as soon as possible thereafter. 41

Founding membership would reflect Australia’s position in the region, and would signal the importance Australia attaches to the AIIB and multilateral approaches to infrastructure development in the region. 42

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38 NIA para 7.
39 AIIB Articles, Article 59.
40 NIA, para 4.
41 Mr Legg, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 3.
42 Mr Legg, The Treasury, Committee Hansard, 14 September 2015, p. 3.
Founding membership also grants 600 founding member votes, which will increase Australia’s total voting share.

**Obligations**

3.31 The NIA sets out financial, governance, and privileges and immunities obligations arising from the AIIB Articles.\(^{43}\)

3.32 Privileges and immunities obligations are placed on each member.\(^{44}\) Each member must ensure that in its own territory the AIIB has immunity from every form of legal process (except in connection with the exercise of its powers to raise funds, guarantee obligations or to buy and sell securities).\(^{45}\) The member must also ensure the AIIB has:

- immunity of its property and assets from search and confiscation;\(^{46}\)
- inviolability of its archives and documents;\(^{47}\)
- freedom of property and assets from restrictions and regulations;\(^{48}\)
- immunity of all officials and employees from legal process for acts performed in an official capacity;\(^{49}\)
- the same immunity of officials and employees from immigration and registration requirements as are granted to officials and employees of State members;\(^{50}\) and
- the same treatment for official communications of the Bank as is given to official communications of State members.\(^{51}\)

3.33 The AIIB is also exempt from taxation and customs duties, including salaries and expenses paid to Directors and officers of the AIIB.\(^{52}\) The Articles allow a member to declare that it retains the right to tax salaries paid by the AIIB to its own citizens. Australia intends to lodge such a declaration.\(^{53}\)

\(^{43}\) NIA, paras 17 to 31.
\(^{44}\) AIIB Article, Chapter IX.
\(^{45}\) AIIB Article, Article 46.
\(^{46}\) AIIB Article, Article 47.
\(^{47}\) AIIB Article, Article 47.
\(^{48}\) AIIB Article, Article 48.
\(^{49}\) AIIB Article, Article 50.
\(^{50}\) AIIB Article, Article 50.
\(^{51}\) AIIB Article, Article 49.
\(^{52}\) AIIB Article, Article 51.
\(^{53}\) NIA, paras 5 and 30.
Implementation

Enabling domestic legislation is required to implement Australia’s obligations under the Articles.54 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Bill 2015 (the Bill) was introduced to the House of Representatives on 13 August 2015 and to the Senate on 7 September 2015. It contains four main clauses:

- allowing Australia to make payments to the Bank as a share subscription;55
- allowing the Minister to issue promissory notes to the Bank;56
- an appropriation for the payments and promissory notes;57 and
- providing for regulations to confer privileges and immunities on officers of the Bank.58

Costs

3.34 The Australian initial shareholding in the bank will $US 3,691,200,000 (or 3.7 per cent of the $US 100 billion capital stock).59 Twenty per cent of this, or $US 738,240,000, will be paid-in capital that Australia pays to the bank in five equal instalments over five years.60 The remainder is callable capital that would be called on by the Bank, if needed, to meet its liabilities.61

3.35 Payments to the AIIB will not be funded from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade aid budget because the payments are not classified as official development assistance. Treasury will administer the payments on behalf of the Australian Government.62

3.36 There are no anticipated regulatory impacts or compliance costs to Australian businesses or individuals arising out of this treaty action.63

54 NIA, para 32.
55 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Bill 2015 (the Bill), clause 5.
56 The Bill, clause 6.
57 The Bill, clause 7.
58 The Bill, clause 18.
59 AIIB Article, Schedule A.
60 NIA, paras 36 and 37.
61 AIIB Article, Article 20.
62 NIA, para 40.
63 NIA, para 39.
Conclusion

3.37 The Committee supports Australia’s ratification of the *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement* and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.

Recommendation 2

3.38 The Committee supports Australia’s ratification of the *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement* and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.

Mr Angus Taylor MP
Chair
15 October 2015
**Additional Comments**—The Australian Greens

**Environmental and Social Impacts**

The Australian Greens believe that the Australian government’s membership of the AIIB should be contingent on the establishment of strong environmental and human rights standards. *Article 13 – Operating Principles* of the Articles of Agreement states:

4. The Bank shall ensure that each of its operations complies with the Bank’s operational and financial policies, including without limitation, policies addressing environmental and social impacts.

The 22 May 2015 Report on the Articles of Agreement states that these policies “should be based on international best practices”. However, it is not clear if such policies have yet been drafted and/or if they have been circulated, considered or approved by members.

**Recommendation:**

The Government uses its diplomatic influence to secure standards for labour rights, environmental preservation and the protection of local communities that face displacement from large projects.

**Recommendation:**

The Government withdraws from the AIIB if policies addressing environmental and social impacts required by Article 13 of the Articles of Agreements are breached.

**Governance and Operational Processes**

The Australian Greens are concerned that employees of the AIIB will be provided immunity from prosecution for misconduct under domestic law, particularly in
relation to bribery and corruption. The committee report states that members of the AIIB must provide:

Immunity of all officials and employees from legal process for acts performed in an official capacity.

It is unclear what mechanisms are available to sanction employees of the bank for any misconduct in relation to their employment. It is also unclear whether the immunity provisions in relation to the conduct of employees relate to bribery or other corrupt conduct. And, it is unclear what, if any, standards the bank will apply in relation to its employees.

The immunity of AIIB employees is particularly concerning given that, regrettably, many countries in the Asian region which are likely to be the recipients of investment from the bank are plagued by corruption.

**Recommendation:**

The Government uses its diplomatic influence to secure standards for conduct by employees of the AIIB that are based on international best practices.

Senator Peter Whish-Wilson
Appendix A - Witnesses

Monday, 14 September 2015 – Canberra

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Mrs Lou Anderson, Director, Advocacy, Events and Outreach Section
Ms Beth Delaney, Acting Assistant Secretary, Banks and Funds Branch
Ms Natasha Smith, First Assistant Secretary, Multilateral Development Division
Mr Robert Tranter, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy and Communications Division

The Treasury

Mr James Chisholm, Alternate Chief Negotiator – AIIB Taskforce
Mr Chris Legg, Chief Negotiator – AIIB Taskforce