THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION
OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Project No 12

Payment of Costs in Criminal Cases

WORKING PAPER

MARCH 1972
INTRODUCTION

The Law Reform Committee has been asked to review the law relating to the payment of costs in criminal cases.

The Committee has now completed its first consideration of the matter and issues this working paper. The paper does not necessarily represent the final views of the Committee.

Comments and criticisms are invited. The Committee requests that they be submitted by 22 May 1972.

Copies of the paper are being forwarded to –

The Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court,
The Judges of the District Court,
The Law Society,
The Magistrates Institute,
The Law School,
The Solicitor General,
The Crown Law Department,
The Commissioner of Police,
Other Law Reform Commissions and Committees with which this Committee is in correspondence.

A notice has been placed in The West Australian inviting those interested to obtain a copy of this paper.

The research material on which this paper is based is at the offices of the Committee and will be made available on request.
ANALYSIS OF WORKING PAPER

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. "To consider whether any alteration is desirable in the law relating to payment of costs to persons acquitted in prosecutions for criminal offences".

2. Although these terms refer only to the costs of persons acquitted, the legislation in some other jurisdictions provides for the payment of costs by those who are convicted, and some of the statements reported in the press (see The West Australian 15th April, 1971) as having been made by the Premier Mr. Tonkin could be interpreted to indicate that he had in mind that the accused also could be made liable for costs. The Committee has therefore dealt with this aspect of the question as well (see paragraphs 46 to 48 below).

PRESENT LAW AND PRACTICE IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Summary trials

3. In summary trials the court is given a general discretion by the Justices Act 1902-1971, ss.151 and 152, to order the complainant to pay the accused his costs if the complaint is dismissed and to order the accused to pay the complainant's costs if the accused is convicted.

4. This general discretion is modified by several statutes which grant immunity (including immunity from costs of unsuccessful prosecutions) to officials carrying out their duties under them. For example, the Health Act 1911-1970, s.365; the Road and Air Transport Commission Act 1966-1970, s.61; and the Traffic Act 1919-1971, s.72 (as to which see Hitchins v. Martin [1964] W.A.R. 144 and Gibbons v. Oliver [1969] W.A.R. 112).

5. The general discretion is further modified by the established practice under which costs are not awarded against the police (for amplification see the Appendix).

6. Subject to these exceptions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, costs are normally awarded against unsuccessful complainants, even if they are officers of local authorities or statutory bodies acting in the course of their official duties, though, in such cases, the authority or body concerned generally pays the costs.
7. On appeals from summary trials either by way of appeal or by way of order to review, the appellate court is empowered to make such order as to costs as it deems just (Justices Act 1902-1971, ss.190 & 206) but no order for costs may be made against a justice or a police officer (ibid., s.219). However, if on an appeal by a police officer the decision appealed against is confirmed, or if not confirmed, has involved a point of law of exceptional importance, the court may allow costs (to be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund) to the defendant (respondent) (ibid., s. 219).

Trials on indictment

8. There are no statutory provisions for awarding costs to an accused person discharged after committal proceedings and in fact no awards of costs are made in such cases.


Other legislation

10. Under s.14 of the Suitors' Fund Act 1964-1971, the accused may be granted out of the Fund any additional costs incurred by reason of an adjournment through no fault of his own, or by reason of a new trial because the proceedings were rendered abortive or were discontinued through no fault of his own, or because the new trial was ordered as a consequence of his winning an appeal on a point of law.

Under s.12A, which was inserted in 1971, the accused may also be paid, out of the Fund, appeal costs as approved by the court (l) where, on appeal against a conviction for an indictable offence, the conviction is quashed without a new trial being ordered, and (2) where, on appeal on a point of law, the appeal succeeds. Note that (2) applies to cases in which the court would, but for the provisions of some other Act or law, have rendered costs to be paid by the respondent. See also ss.10 and 11 of the same Act.
Legal aid and costs in criminal cases

11. The *Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967-1969* established the Legal Assistance Fund to be administered by the Law Society, which is made responsible for providing legal advice and legal aid as determined by the Society (see s.14 and Part V, ss.33 to 50 of the Act) and the *Legal Assistance Rules 1971* (Government Gazette, No.40 of 26 May 1971, pp. 1761-1769). The questions arising from the relationship of legal assistance to costs in criminal cases are dealt with in paragraph 49 below.

**THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM**

12. On numerous occasions over the past few years there have been demands for reform. In 1965 the Parliamentary Country Party passed a resolution that it was a grievous injustice that an acquitted person was not compensated and urging that this state of affairs be not permitted to continue. In September 1967 the Country Women's Association of Western Australia (Inc.) wrote to the Minister for Justice requesting that all costs incurred by persons who are acquitted be paid by the Crown. *The West Australian* and its correspondents have on several occasions urged that costs be paid to such persons.

13. The Law Society supports the view that successful defendants to certain types of prosecution (particularly, but not exclusively, traffic prosecutions) should be awarded costs against the prosecution authority (see the letter to *The West Australian* of 5th February 1972 by the President of the Society, Mr. P.F. Brinsden, Q.C.).

14. A number of lawyers have individually expressed concern at the virtual impossibility of obtaining an order for costs in favour of an acquitted person.

**THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS**

15. Statutes dealing with costs in criminal cases have been enacted in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and New South Wales. The position in the other Australian States and Territories is broadly similar to that existing in Western Australia except that the Supreme Court of South Australia has recently held that the practice referred to in paragraph 5 above...
was "wrong in principle and ought to be abandoned" (*Hamdorf v. Riddle* [1971] S.A.S.R. 398 at 401).

**United Kingdom**

16. In the United Kingdom, the *Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1952* which consolidated and amended earlier statutes dealing with costs and which itself has been amended, provides for the awarding of costs by magistrates' courts. The *Courts Act 1971* provides for the awarding of costs by the new Crown Court, which took the place of the assizes and quarter sessions. The courts are given a wide discretion and may order either that the costs be paid between parties or out of money appropriated by Parliament.

17. In a practice direction made by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1959 under the *Costs in Criminal Cases Act*, which presumably would also apply to the award of costs by the new Crown Court, it was stressed that -

"The discretion is in terms completely unfettered, and there is no presumption one way or the other as to the manner of its exercise."

The statement continued -

"In a statement issued on March 24, 1952, this court, while emphasising that every case should be considered on its merits, said that it was only in exceptional cases that costs should be awarded. That statement referred to a circular issued by the Lord Chief Justice after consultation with the Judges of the Queen's Bench Division, approving a Home Office circular issued in connexion with s.44 of the *Criminal Justice Act, 1948*, now replaced by the section above referred to. While no attempt was there made to catalogue the exceptional cases in which costs might be awarded, such illustrations as were given were cases where the prosecution could be said to be in some way at fault. On the other hand a suggestion has been canvassed that the mere fact of an acquittal should carry with it the expectation that the discretion would be exercised in favour of the acquitted person. Were either of these views correct, the effect would be to impose a fetter on the exercise of the absolute discretion conferred by the statute. As we have said, there is no presumption one way or the other as to its exercise. Each case must be considered on its own facts as a whole and costs may and should be awarded in all cases where the court thinks it right to do so. It is impossible to catalogue all the factors which should be weighed. Clearly, however, matters such as whether the prosecution have acted unreasonably in starting or continuing proceedings and whether the accused by his conduct has in effect brought the proceedings, or their continuation, on himself, are among the matters to be taken into consideration. On the other hand the court desires to make it plain that they entirely dissociate themselves from the view that the judge is entitled to base his refusal to award costs on the ground
that he thinks that the verdict of the jury was perverse or unduly benevolent. The mere fact that the judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury is no more a ground for refusing to award costs to the acquitted person than the mere fact of his acquittal is a ground for awarding them."


18. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, has also issued a direction on the quantum of costs to be paid to an acquitted person. Once the judge has exercised his discretion in favour of making an award, the "proper approach " said Lord Parker C.J., speaking for the court, "is to assume the defendant to be of adequate but not abundant means and to ask oneself whether the expenses were such as a sensible solicitor in the light of his then knowledge would consider reasonable to incur in the interests of his client, the defendant" ([1968] 1 ALL E.R.778).

19. The statutory provisions in the United Kingdom also empower the courts to order a convicted person to pay the whole or a part of the prosecution costs including the costs of preliminary committal proceedings. There must however, be evidence of an accused's ability to pay before an order is made (see R. v. Pottage (1922) 17 Cr. App. R. 33) and imprisonment may not be ordered in default of payment (see R. v. McCluskey (1921) 15 Cr. App. R. 148). See also R. v. Davis [1962] 1 ALL E.R. 490 (reduction of amount by Court of Criminal Appeal); R. v. Simmonds and others [1967] 2 ALL E.R. 399 (matters to be considered in ordering costs when there are several accused) and R. v. Judd [1971] 1 ALL E.R. 127 and R. v. Gaston [1971] J. ALL E.R. 128 (length of sentence and means to be taken into account before making order).

New Zealand


21. The Act gives all courts exercising jurisdiction in criminal cases a wide discretion to grant costs to accused persons who have been acquitted and even to convicted persons in special circumstances when argument on a difficult point of law has arisen. There are no presumptions for or against the granting of costs. The courts, in the case of acquittals, are directed (by s.5) to "have regard to all the relevant circumstances and in particular (where appropriate) to -
(a) whether the prosecution acted in good faith in bringing and continuing the proceedings;

(b) whether at the commencement of the proceedings the prosecution had sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defendant in the absence of contrary evidence;

(c) whether the prosecution took proper steps to investigate any matter coming into its which suggested that the defendant might not be guilty;

(d) whether generally the investigation into the offence was conducted in a reasonable and proper manner;

(e) whether the evidence as a whole would support a finding of guilt but the information was dismissed on a technical point;

(f) whether the information was dismissed because the defendant established (either by the evidence of witnesses called by him or by the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise) that he was not guilty;

(g) whether the behaviour of the defendant in relation to the acts or omissions on which the charge was based and to the investigation and proceedings was such that a sum should be paid towards the costs of his defence”.

The Act binds the Crown (s.3) and if the prosecution was conducted by or on behalf of the Crown the accused's costs are payable "out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose” (s. 7).

22. The Act also empowers the court to order a convicted person "to pay such sum as it thinks just and reasonable towards the costs of the prosecution " (s. 4).
23. The Committee has been informed that the courts in New Zealand seem reluctant to award costs to acquitted persons. This statement appears to be supported by the low cost of operating the scheme (see para. 45 below).

New South Wales

24. New South Wales in 1967 enacted the *Costs in Criminal Cases Act*. The Act empowers the court to grant a person who has been acquitted, whether on summary trial or on indictment, or after an appeal has been quashed, a certificate as to costs, but only if the court is satisfied that -

"(a) if the prosecution had, before the proceedings were instituted, been in possession of evidence of all the relevant facts, it would not have been reasonable to institute the proceedings; and

(b) any act or omission of the defendant that contributed, or might have contributed, to the institution or continuation of the proceedings was reasonable in the circumstances."

The Act was amended in 1971 to enable an applicant for a certificate to adduce evidence of further relevant facts not established in the original proceedings. The amendment also sets out the methods by which the prosecution may challenge such evidence.

25. Upon being granted a certificate, the accused can apply to the Under Secretary of Justice for payment of his costs out of the Consolidated Fund. The Under Secretary is required to report to the Treasurer who has the final decision as to whether or not payment is made.

26. The Act does not provide for orders for costs to be made against the accused.

South Australia

27. In South Australia though the provisions are similar to what they are in Western Australia, the practice regarding costs in summary trials has recently changed as a result of the case of *Hamdorf v. Riddle* [1971] S.A.S.R. 398. In this case the Full Court while accepting
that in summary trials there was a "deeply rooted" (p.401) practice "whereby costs are ordered against unsuccessful defendants almost as a matter of course while costs are only ordered against unsuccessful complainants, at all events those complainants who happen to be police officers, in unusual circumstances, such as, for example, if the police have acted unreasonably in laying or proceeding with the complaint" (pp. 399-400) nevertheless concluded that it was "wrong in principle and ought to be abandoned" (p.401). The Court recognised that in criminal trials on indictment "neither party pays costs to the other no matter what the result of the proceedings" (p.402) but pointed out that s.77(1) of the South Australian Justices Act 1921-1969 (sections 151 and 152 of the Western Australian Justices Act 1902-1971 are to the same effect) gives the court a discretionary power to award costs to successful complainants or successful defendants. The Court then went on to say (at p.402) that courts of summary jurisdiction should "in a general way, exercise their discretion as to costs in the way in which it is exercised in the trial of a civil action, but without discriminating between the costs of successful complainants and successful defendants at least to any greater extent than the civil courts distinguish between the costs of successful plaintiffs and successful defendants. In those courts, indeed, a successful defendant is less often deprived of his costs than a successful plaintiff because he did not initiate the proceedings and was brought to the court irrespective of his will, and in most cases against it".

28. The Court rejected the argument that, if costs were awarded as of course against the police, they would hesitate to bring prosecutions and said (at p.400) -

"...it is not possible to think in 1971 that a police officer who was a complainant in a court of summary jurisdiction would be left to pay out of his own pocket any costs ordered against him... unless, perhaps, his action was extraordinary... We think that the fear that the police will refrain from bringing charges that ought to be brought, if they run the risk of having to pay costs if they lose, is fanciful and does less then justice to the State or the police, and, even if it were better founded than we think it is, it would, in our view, afford no justification for the practice in question".

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

29. In so far as the criminal courts are used by private citizens to settle their disputes the present statutory provisions and practice are adequate.

30. On principle it may be argued that costs should not be awarded personally against officers of the Crown or the police and other statutory authorities acting pursuant to a duty to
lay complaints and prosecute (and see Berry v. British Transport Commission [1961] 3 ALL E.R. 65). If costs are to be paid to accused persons in such cases they should be awarded to be paid out of State funds or the funds of the authority concerned.

31. Under the present system, on a criminal charge, the issue precisely before the court is not whether the accused is innocent but whether the prosecution has proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The system does not draw any distinction between an innocent accused and an accused whose guilt has not been proven. In the Committee's view a system of awarding costs to accused persons which tended to create such a distinction and in effect introduced degrees of "not guilty", should, if possible, be avoided.

32. In some cases the real issue is not whether the accused is guilty or not guilty, but whether he is guilty of the offence charged or some lesser offence. The defence may in fact be directed essentially to obtaining a verdict on a lesser offence (see Criminal Code, ss.594-596A, 601; and note also wide powers of amendment under the Justices Act, s.46). This could occur for example when the accused charged with wilful murder has indicated to the prosecution that he would be willing to plead guilty to manslaughter. If after the trial on the wilful murder charge, a verdict of manslaughter is returned, it may be argued that the defence has succeeded, and that the accused should be entitled to the costs incurred in defending the more serious charge.

33. In devising a statutory scheme for the awarding of costs in criminal cases, consideration should be given to -

(a) whether the costs should be awarded as of course or whether they should be left in the discretion of the court; and

(b) whether the provisions should apply to all offences or whether they should be limited to particular types of offences or particular types of circumstances.

34. If the costs are to be left in the discretion of the court, the further question arises as to whether the discretion should be -

(a) unfettered, as in the United Kingdom; or
(b) with directions that the court should have regard to certain circumstances, as in New Zealand (see paragraph 21 above); or

(c) subject to conditions, as in New South Wales (see paragraph 24 above); or

(d) along the lines laid down for the awarding of costs in civil cases (see W.A. R.S.C. Order 66, rule 1, also the U.K. *Supreme Court Practice* (1970), Pt. 1 p.824) - i.e. the court will order that the accused against whom a charge has been dismissed, recover his costs unless of opinion that his conduct before or after the commencement of the case has resulted in costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred, in which event it may deprive him of part of his costs.

35. If discretion is to be given to the courts of summary jurisdiction in Western Australia, care will need to be taken to ensure that the statutory provisions prevail against established practice (see paras. 5 and 27 above). Consideration would need to be given as well to the provisions granting immunity in respect of costs in prosecutions under certain statutes (eg. the *Traffic Act*, s.72). (Note also *Justices Act*, s.219 but see provisions of *Suitors’ Fund Act*, s.12A in para. 10 above).

36. The provisions relating to costs (whether granted as of course or subject to the court's discretion) could be made to apply -

(a) on every indictable charge tried on indictment; or
(b) on every indictable charge, whether tried on indictment or summarily; or
(c) on every indictable charge, and every summary charge where the offence is punishable by imprisonment; or
(d) on every charge.

37. As an alternative to the granting of costs for particular types of offences, they could be granted in particular circumstances, for example -

(a) if the complainant adduces no evidence at the hearing;
(b) if the Attorney General files a *nolle prosequi* or the prosecution withdraws the complaint;

(c) if the judge directs an acquittal;

(d) if the court decides there is no case to answer;

(e) if a new trial is ordered (but c.f. *Suitors' Fund Act 1964-1971*, para. 10 above);

(f) if the prosecution does not appear at the hearing of an appeal.

38. Whatever scheme is adopted, if it was thought that sufficient funds would not be available, the payment could be limited to a proportion or percentage of the costs.

**TENTATIVE VIEWS OF THE COMMITTEE**

39. At this stage the Committee is of the view that ideally an accused should be awarded his costs on every charge on which there is no conviction but that this right of the accused should be subject to the discretion of the court limited along the lines laid down for the awarding of costs in civil cases (see para. 34(d) above).

40. If the financial burden to implement such a scheme is too much for the State to bear, the scheme could be varied either by limiting the offences to which the scheme was to apply or by allowing only for a lower scale of costs or a prescribed percentage of the costs in all cases or by both limiting the offences and allowing a lower scale or percentage of costs in such cases. In the Committee's view, at this stage, it would be preferable, if insufficient finances are available, to limit the scheme in the first instance to indictable offences.

**Financial burden to the State**

41. The financial burden the State would have to bear if costs are to be awarded in accordance with any of the schemes suggested in paragraphs 34, 36 and 37 above cannot be precisely estimated. However, in paragraph 43 below, the Committee has endeavoured to
provide a general idea of the possible financial burden based on the limited statistical material available and on several assumptions. It should also be borne in mind that if costs are awarded to accused persons, more charges will probably be defended.

42. The assumptions referred to in the previous paragraph are -

(1) that each charge referred to in the statistics involved a separate trial (this is manifestly, not so, but the assumption has been made to allow for any increase in defended cases, cases in which two counsel may be allowed, etc.);

(2) that the accused is represented in each case in which he is acquitted;

(3) that the average time for each case tried on indictment is two days (one and a half days for the trial and half for the preliminary committal proceedings);

(4) that the average time for each case tried summarily is half a day; and

(5) that the costs of an accused are $200 for each day in court (and see para 18 above).

43. The possible annual financial burden will be as follows -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Offence</th>
<th>Number In which no conviction</th>
<th>Length of trial at $200 a day</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tried on indictment</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>two days</td>
<td>$24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indictable offences tried summarily</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>half day</td>
<td>$ 2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary offences punishable with imprisonment</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>half day</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other summary offences</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>half day</td>
<td>$105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$161,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES: 1. Only those offences for which the accused is not at present entitled to costs have been included. "

2. The above figures are estimates only based on material supplied to the Committee in 1970 by the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, and supplemented by figures obtained from a limited survey of Perth Courts.

3. Costs are likely to be higher before any scheme comes into operation, and may even be higher now.

44. In addition, some provision will have to be made for costs arising from successful appeals and, if the suggestion in para. 32 is to be proceeded with, for costs in cases in which convictions are of offences lesser than the offences charged. The Committee has no statistical data on either of these matters.

Cost of schemes in other jurisdictions

45. In New South Wales and New Zealand the financial burden imposed by the schemes adopted has not been great possibly partly because of the nature of the schemes themselves. On the information available to us the annual cost to the Government of the scheme in New South Wales was $1,255.50 for 1969 and $758 for 1970. In New Zealand the expenditure was $1,154 for 1969/70 and $1,306 for 1970/71. No figures are available for the United Kingdom.

Costs against the accused

46. It may be arguable that if an accused is to be paid his costs when the prosecution fails, he should have to pay the prosecution costs if the prosecution succeeds, and the statutes in England and New Zealand make provision for payment of costs by the accused.

47. The large majority of accused persons would of course not have the means to pay the prosecution costs (and see para. 19 above). Orders for costs against only the accused persons who could afford to pay them could be regarded as an additional and unjust penalty.

48. The Committee has no strong feeling on the issue though, on balance, it is of the view that provision should not be made for orders to be made against accused persons.
Costs and legal aid

49. A large number of accused persons receive legal aid. Consequently a substantial amount of the money paid to successful defendants for costs in criminal cases will find its way into the legal aid fund. The more extensive the scheme adopted (see para. 36 above) the greater this amount will be. As a result the legal aid scheme will be able to provide more extensive aid and this will come closer to achieving the ideal that every accused person has a right to legal representation when prosecuted by the State.
APPENDIX

Practice relating to costs against the Police

Extract from an opinion of the Solicitor General to the Under Secretary for Law, dated 22 March 1962.

"(1) Magistrates, when dismissing a complaint, have the power to award costs against the complainant whether he is a Police or other public officer or a private complainant. (Justices Act, s.152, Kavanagh v. Herbig and Others (1907) 9 W.A.L.R. 121).

(2) It appears from Fennedy Allen, On the Justices Acts, 3rd ed., p.516 that the practice in some other States is that costs will not be granted against a "public officer" who has not been guilty of improper conduct in making the complaint, but in Western Australia costs are normally awarded against an unsuccessful complainant who is an officer of a local authority or other statutory body, even when the officer is acting in the course of his official duties.

(3) In the case of Police officers, however, in order not to deter or discourage them from carrying out their proper functions and duties, the practice in this State (as in some other States, and I believe fully accepted by the Legal Profession) has been for Magistrates not to award costs against a Police officer on the dismissal of his complaint where the complaint is made in pursuance of official duties and is not laid "wantonly and contrary to justice"; and this practice is followed even in those rare cases where a Magistrate is convinced of the innocence of the defendant, but it also appears that the Police officer acted properly, on the information before him, in laying the complaint.

(4) In some of these rare cases, the Government, on application made by or on behalf of the defendant, has made an *ex gratia* payment to recompense the defendant any reasonable legal costs incurred, but while each such case is considered on its own merits, I do not think any *ex gratia* payment has been made unless the Bench has recommended it (either directly or by clear implication) or the innocence of the defendant has later been established beyond doubt. Any other practice would seem to me to have the following unfortunate incidents -
(a) It would soon become the practice for successful defendants to seek reimbursement of legal costs, and unless such reimbursement should be made automatically in all cases, the Government would be faced with the rather impossible task of making decisions on the merits of each case on the materials before the Government, without seeing the witnesses or hearing their evidence and cross-examination. Governments are not as well equipped as Courts to determine the weight to be given to the evidence of witnesses. If reimbursement to successful defendants should be made automatically, not would considerable expense be involved, but many quite undeserving defendants would be reimbursed.

(b) A reimbursement of costs in some cases and not in others must often involve a slur on the Police evidence in the former cases and some inference or stigma against the defendants in the latter cases.

(5) I understand that the Police, in fairness to defendants, and jealous of the privilege which the Courts have extended to Police complainants on the matter of costs, normally require the complaint to be made by a private complainant wherever the case has not been investigated by the Police or it is not clearly the duty of the Police to make the complaint. However, while no distinction in principle is made by the Police between traffic and other offences, in practice, the Police prosecute for traffic offences only on the complaint of a Police officer.