Project No 32

Immunity of Suit Between Husband and Wife

WORKING PAPER

JUNE 1973
INTRODUCTION

The Law Reform Commission has been asked to consider and report on the law as to the immunity of suit between husband and wife.

The Commission having completed its first consideration of the matter now issues this working paper. The paper does not necessarily represent the final views of the Commission.

Comments and criticisms are invited. The Commission requests that they be submitted by 31 August 1973.

Copies of the paper are being sent to the –

Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court
Judges of the District Court
Law Society
Magistrates' Institute
Law School
Solicitor General
Under Secretary for Law
Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust
Citizens Advice Bureau of W.A.
Community Welfare Department
Law Reform Commissions and Committees with which this Commission is in correspondence.

The Commission may add to this list.

A notice has been placed in *The West Australian* inviting anyone interested to obtain a copy of the paper.

The research material on which the paper is based is at the offices of the Commission and will be made available on request.
TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To consider and report on the law as to the immunity of suit between husband and wife.

PRESENT LAW IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA

2. The only area where the right of one spouse to sue the other is restricted is in tort. The law in this respect is that, subject to the exceptions listed in the next paragraph, no husband or wife is entitled to sue the other for a tort (s.12 of the Married Women's Property Act 1892). Immunity from suit for a tort committed during marriage remains after the marriage has been terminated (Salaman v. Salaman [1923] N.Z.L.R. 300).

3. There are three statutory exceptions to this immunity -

   (a) section 12 of the Married Women's Property Act 1892 gives the wife a remedy in tort against her husband for the protection and security of her property;

   (b) section 6A of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943, as inserted by a 1966 amendment, provides in substance that, where a person causes or contributes to bodily injury to his or her spouse by negligence in the use of a motor vehicle and that person is insured under the Act, the injured spouse has the same right of action in respect of that injury as if they were not husband and wife;

   (c) section 55(1) of the Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 enables either party to sue the other while a decree of judicial separation is in operation.

THE LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ELSEWHERE

4. Immunity of suit in tort between husband and wife has been abolished in –
5. In all the above jurisdictions, except Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, the court has been given a discretion to stay an action in tort between a husband and wife if no substantial benefit would accrue to either party from continuation of the proceedings or if the issue could more conveniently be dealt with on an application under statutory provisions which are equivalent to s.17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1892 of this State. Under this section, a Judge of the Supreme Court may decide any question between husband and wife as to ownership or possession of property.

6. The Ontario Law Reform Commission in its Report on Family Law, Part I, Torts (Department of Justice, 1969, Ch. III) has recommended the abolition of immunity in tort between husband and wife, without the inclusion of a stay of proceedings provision. A similar recommendation has also been made by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission in its report on The Abolition of Inter Spousal Immunity in Tort (Report No. 10, 1972).

DISCUSSION AND PROVISIONAL VIEWS

7. Historically, immunity of suit in tort was based on the legal concept that husband and wife are one person. This concept has long since disappeared from the law. Reasons which may be advanced nowadays for retaining immunity are –

(a) that giving the spouses a right to sue each other in tort could harm domestic relations;
(b) that, where insurance is involved, collusion between the spouses could occur, resulting in fraudulent claims.

8. Neither reason is convincing. The fact that one spouse wants to sue the other is evidence that, except where insurance is involved, there is little domestic harmony to preserve. In any case, as Fleming in *The Law of Torts* (4th ed., 1971, p.592) points out, this reason was never credited with sufficient weight for the law to prohibit actions between parent and child. In regard to the fear of collusion in insurance claims, it should be noted that the Legislature has already given a spouse a right to sue the other for an injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident, where the real object of the spouse is to claim against the Insurance Fund (see paragraph 3(b) above).

9. The present law discriminates against husbands. Under s.12 of the *Married Women's Property Act* a wife can sue her husband in respect of her own property but a husband has no similar right in respect of his. Furthermore, since a right to sue for a tort has been held to be "property" (*Curtis v. Wilcox* [1948] 2 K.B. 474; [1948] 2 All E.R. 573), a wife is also entitled to sue her husband for a tort committed before marriage. A husband has no similar right.

10. Immunity of suit in tort can also be unjust to third parties. This is because under s.7 of the *Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors' Contribution) Act 1947*, one tortfeasor can claim contribution from another only if the latter is capable of being sued by the person to whom the wrong has been done (and see *Chant v. Read* [1939] 2 K.B. 346; [1939] 2 All E.R. 286). Thus, except in the situations referred to in paragraph 3 above, a third party jointly responsible with the husband for injury to the wife can be sued by the wife for the full amount of her loss, but will not be able to claim contribution from the husband.

11. In the Commission's view immunity of action between spouses in tort should be abolished.

12. The Commission suggests that it should be unnecessary to empower the court to stay proceedings (see paragraph 5 above). Under the present law the court cannot restrain proceedings by a wife against her husband for protection of her own property, nor can it restrain proceedings in an action between spouses for breach of contract. There seems no reason why actions in tort should be treated differently.
13. It should be noted that complete abolition of immunity of suit in tort between spouses could indirectly widen a spouse's right to claim against the Insurance Fund under the *Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act*, unless the Act was specially amended to counteract this result.