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Editors --- "Isagani A Cruz and Cesar S Europa v Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Budget and Management, and the Chair and Commission of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples - Case Summary" [2002] AUIndigLawRpr 63; (2002) 7(4) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 42

Court and Tribunal Decisions - Philippines

Isagani A Cruz and Cesar S Europa v Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Budget and Management, and the Chair and Commission of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines (Davide CJ, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Santiago and De Leon JJ)

6 December 2000

Constitutionality of Republic Act No 8371 — doctrine of jura regalia — scope of native title – Indigenous use of natural resources

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No 8371 (RA 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (1997) (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). They challenged the legislation on the grounds that it amounted to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein.

Held:

1. Per Davide CJ, Kapunan, Besillo, Quisumbug and Santiago JJ (Mendoza J dissenting): Petitioners, as citizens, possess the ‘public rights’ to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concession covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well settled that a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through implementation of an unconstitutional statute, and by necessity, they may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds. The petitioners therefore have standing. Severino v Governor General 16 Phil 366 (1910) considered. Tanada v Tuvera 136 SCRA 374, 383 (1989) cited. Garcia v Board of Investments 177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989) cited. Oposa v Factoran 224 SCRA 792 (1993) cited.

2. Per Davide CJ, Kapunan, Besillo, Quisumbug, Santiago and Puno JJ (Panganiban, Vitug, Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon JJ dissenting): The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. The doctrine of native title applies only to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. Cariño v Insular Government 41 Phil 935 (1909) applied.

3. Per Davide CJ, Kapunan, Besillo, Quisumbug and Santiago JJ (Panganiban, Vitug, Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon JJ dissenting): The text of s 1, art XII of the 1935 Constitution, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It expressly provides that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other natural resources by the State is ‘subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions’. The ‘existing rights’ that were intended to be protected must, per force, include the right of ownership by Indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. Moreover, s 5, art XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to ‘protect the rights of Indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands’. That provision cannot, by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically ss 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the Indigenous peoples over ancestral lands.

4. Per Davide CJ, Kapunan, Besillo, Quisumbug, Santiago and Puno JJ: Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the Indigenous peoples ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of the Indigenous peoples in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this ‘ownership’ is expressly defined and limited in s 7(a) and does not mention ownership to minerals, coals, wildlife, flora and fauna in traditional hunting grounds, fish in traditional fishing grounds, forest or timber in the sacred places, and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. The IPRA does not therefore violate the Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources, as declared in s 2, art XII of the 1987 Constitution.

5. Per Davide CJ, Kapunan, Besillo, Quisumbug, Santiago and Puno JJ: The IPRA provides that Indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and in the profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources. The statute also grants them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. This does not violate s 2, art XII of the 1987 Constitution.

6. Per Puno J: Section 1, Pt II, Rule III of the Rules Implementing the IPRA, which provides that Indigenous peoples have rights of ownership over natural resources goes beyond the parameters of s 7(a) of the IPRA and is therefore unconstitutional. ?