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'The New Australian Privacy Landscape' ([2001] CyberLRes 9) - [2001] PrivLRes 3
Waters (2001)
The New Australian
Privacy Landscape
UNSW Continuing
Legal Education Seminar
Wednesday 14 March
2001
Part 1: Introduction
and Overview new Australian privacy laws in an international context
Nigel Waters, Pacific
Privacy Pty Ltd and Convenor, Australian Privacy Charter Council
With increasing globalisation of e-commerce, privacy protection is rapidly becoming
a transnational issue. As we do more and more of our transactions on-line, and
as organizations contract out more and more functions often offshore - we
can no longer protect our privacy with purely domestic laws. Also, even where
privacy regulations address wholly domestic activities, the standards expected
are drawn form comparative international experience.
Australian privacy laws have long been influenced by overseas jurisdictions
and international agreements. The Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 expressly references
both the 1980 Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article
17).
During the 1990 s, much of the debate about extension of the Privacy Act to
the private sector revolved around the perceived adequacy of Australian law
in the context of the European Union s data protection Directive. This Directive,
developed in the early 1990s, enacted in 1995 and taking effect in 1998,
requires all EU member states to have consistent privacy laws. Those laws must
contain trans-border data flow provisions which control the export of personal
data to third countries outside the EU. The basic principle is that export will
only be allowed if either the third country has adequate laws or if specific
protection arrangements are put in place for the specific transfer eg: by
contract. The EU has issued successive waves of guidance about how these provisions
will work in practice
[1]. Also, in
2000, the EU Commission reached agreement with the US government about a so-called
Safe Harbour arrangement for transfer of personal data from Europe to the US.
This provided for a largely self-regulatory scheme of privacy protection to
be considered adequate for the purposes of the Directive and EU laws. The Safe
Harbour agreement has been widely criticized, not only by privacy advocates
but also by the EU Parliament and the Article 29 Working Group of EU Data Protection
Commissioners. It is seen as an essentially political compromise necessitated
by the American economic dominance, and cannot necessarily be taken as a model
for application elsewhere in the world. New Zealand has already moved to amend
its 1993 Privacy Act to include a trans-border data flow provision and to address
other weaknesses that might prevent it being judged inadequate. Hong Kong s
forward thinking in 1995 when enacting its Personal Data (Privacy ) Ordinance
means that it already well placed to be found adequate as the EI works its
way through assessments of its trading partners.
[2]
The debate over privacy laws in New South Wales and Victoria also referenced
the EU Directive. Although the resulting laws in both States only apply to the
public sector, and therefore have less need to meet international standards,
consistency and avoidance of a patchwork of differential regulation were seen
as important. The Victorian Information Privacy Act 2000 seeks to achieve this
objective by adopting the Privacy Commissioner s National Privacy Principles,
and its success will therefore depend on how adequate those principles are judged
to be. The NSW government, by adopting its own version of the principles, must
be judged separately.
How adequate will the new Australian privacy laws be in meeting the international
standards? Part 2 of this paper attempts to answer this question with a detailed
analysis.
Before doing so however, it should be noted that the long term future of privacy
protection goes well beyond the relatively simple adoption of internationally
recognized privacy principles. These principles are still a good foundation
for good housekeeping and for giving individuals remedies for deliberate
or inadvertent breaches. But the principles alone do not address the more significant
privacy issues facing modern society. These are the threshold issues about how
much personal data we allow to be collected in the first place, including such
highly sensitive data as our genetic makeup; and the extent to which we allow
other public and private interests to override individuals privacy preferences.
Traditional collection, use and disclosure principles only go so far in dealing
with the private sector s assertions of a freedom to communicate as part of
a competitive market economy. Neither do they in themselves provide the answers
to a range of important public policy questions. These include:
- How far do we allow individuals to opt out of uses of health care data which
could both improve their own health and that of others, and reduce the cost
of health care to the community?
- What limits do we place on the powers of law enforcement agencies to access
otherwise private data, including the content of our communications, when
faced with evidence that such access can reduce crime and increase safety?
- How much cross-matching of data do we allow for the purposes of administering
welfare programs efficiently, when we know that there are disbenefits not
only in terms of loss of privacy but also in erroneous suspicions, leading
to unwarranted harassment and discrimination.
These and other questions require both new policy and analytical tools, such
as privacy impact assessment of new initiatives; and in some cases new technological
tools for privacy protection, such as software agents that allow for anonymous
or pseudonymous transactions. The issues are the same worldwide, and we increasingly
look to shared experience and shared solutions. Australia is belatedly catching
up with Europe and nearer neighbours New Zealand and Hong Kong in respect of
statutory information privacy protection. Can we be more pioneering in our approach
to the wider and in some ways more significant issues of privacy policy?
Part 2: Adequacy
of Australian Privacy Laws in relation to the European Union Directive
For the purposes of this analysis in this paper, it is convenient to consider
four broad sectors, between which the level and type of privacy protection currently
varies considerably:
- The public sector government departments and agencies and state owned
businesses.
- Consumer Credit reporting
- Telecommunications
- The rest of the private sector
Each of these sectors will be dealt with separately, applying the EU criteria
to assess adequacy of protection. Some of the explanation of legal processes
and mechanisms given in the first section (public sector) will be applicable
to the others, and cross references will be made where appropriate to avoid
repetition.
The
Public Sector
Scope
of Regulation and Overview
Until the new amendments take effect in December 2001, the Commonwealth Privacy
Act 1988 primarily covers the activities of federal government departments and
agencies, subjecting them to a set of Information Privacy Principles based on
the OECD Guidelines, and the supervision of a Privacy Commissioner.
[3]
The Act was subsequently amended in 1989-1991 to add functions relating to special
rules for data-matching and the national health identification number.
In the ACT, Territory government agencies are subject to the Commonwealth Privacy
Act, and there is also a separate law covering the handling of health information
in both the public and private sectors (Health Records (Access and Privacy)
Act 1997).
While both New South Wales and Queensland have had statutory Privacy Committees
with an Ombudsman complaint handling function, the only State to currently have
a fully fledged data protection law is New South Wales (NSW), which passed the
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act in 1998. The NSW Act, which
came fully into effect in most respects on 1 July 2000, applies to most government
agencies, but not to state owned corporations and there are also major exemptions
which will be discussed later. There is a NSW Privacy Commissioner
[4]
with powers of investigation, while complaints of alleged breaches of the Information
Protection Principles are dealt with either by the Commissioner, who can attempt
to conciliate, or by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, which can make binding
orders including for compensation of up to $40,000.
In Victoria, the Information Privacy Act was passed in late 2000 and commences
in September 2001. The Victorian Act is more comprehensive than the NSW Act,
having fewer exemptions, and covering state owned enterprises. There will be
a Victorian Privacy Commissioner with strong powers including the issue of compliance
notices, and complaints, if not conciliated, can be decided by the Victorian
Civil and Administrative Tribunal which can make binding orders, including for
compensation of up to $100,000. A separate Health Records Bill was introduced
into the Victorian Parliament in 2000 and is expected to pass in 2001. It contains
similar complaints and enforcement arrangements to the Information Privacy Act,
with the Health Services Commissioner playing an equivalent role to that of
the Privacy Commissioner.
South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia have all adopted versions of
Information Privacy Principles as administrative instructions to their departments
and agencies, but these do not have the force of law and there are no supervisory
or enforcement mechanisms (South Australia has a part time Privacy Committee
with some advisory and ombudsman functions).
Exemptions
and restrictions
Exemptions from the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts are of two types -
complete exemptions for specified agencies, and exemptions for specified activities
or types of data.
Commonwealth
Under the Commonwealth Privacy Act, there is a relatively short list of completely
exempt agencies which includes intelligence agencies, parliamentary departments,
and some government business enterprises.
[5]
The Courts are exempt for information relating to their judicial functions.
Contractors in general are not subject directly to the Act, although eligible
employment agencies are. However, in order to comply with the security principle
(see below), agencies need to bind contractors with contractual terms to observe
the privacy principles.
The Commonwealth Act provides a mechanism for waivers from the application of
one or more of the principles through a Public Interest Determination by the
Privacy Commissioner. However the process involved is complex and transparent
and any such Determinations are subject to disallowance by Parliament. As a
result, only a handful of Determinations have been made in the eleven years
of the Act's operation, mostly for specific and non-controversial matters.
The application of the Act is complicated by the fact that most of the principles
apply to
records containing personal information - not to the information
itself. The definition of record confirms that documents, databases and photographs
are all covered, but an important exemption is provided by the exclusion from
the definition of "generally available publications"
[6].
This means that the Act cannot address the serious privacy issues that arise
from the secondary use of public registers. Some laws governing individual public
registers already contain limited privacy protections such as restrictions on
direct marketing uses and facilities for suppression for individuals at risk,
and there is a growing debate at both Commonwealth and State level about the
need for more general rules on use of public registers. The exemption also creates
a risk of deliberate circumvention of privacy controls by a policy decision
to publish personal information.
Another definitional problem is that "personal information" may not include
data such as e-mail addresses or phone numbers which are typically used as surrogate
identifiers and which can be used to interact with individuals even if the user
is unaware of the holders true identity.
[13]
A significant exemption is that only citizens and permanent residents have the
right to seek correction (rectification) of personal information.
[14]
This contrasts with the application of all the other principles and all other
rights under the Act to any individual, whatever their nationality or place
of residence.
There is provision in the Act for 'waivers' from the application of the IPPs,
going beyond any of the statutory exemptions already discussed above. The Privacy
Act contains a mechanism for the Privacy Commissioner to make a Public Interest
Determination allowing a derogation from the IPPs.
[15]
Determinations are subject to an elaborate and public consultation process and
are subject to disallowance by Parliament.
New South Wales (NSW)
Under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998, a number of
major state government agencies are exempted from some or all of the principles.
These include the Police and other law enforcement and investigative agencies
(these are quite broadly defined) in respect of their operational functions.
All state owned corporations are completely exempt, as are courts, tribunals
and Royal Commissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.
Contractors providing data services are directly subject to the Act.
The NSW Act provides for agencies to receive further exemptions by means of
either a Code of Practice or a Direction by the Privacy Commissioner (both of
which have to be approved by the Minister, but not by Parliament). These can
weaken (but not increase) the level of protection. Several Codes of Practice
and Directions have already been approved, creating further exemptions
[16].
The Act applies directly to personal information, but generally available publications
are exempt
Victoria
The Information Privacy Act applies to most public sector agencies and other
bodies. Courts and tribunals are exempt in respect of their judicial functions,
and law enforcement agencies are exempt from some of the principles but only
where non-compliance is considered necessary on reasonable grounds.
Contractors to public sector agencies are directly subject to the Act.
The Act applies directly to personal information, but generally available publications
are exempt. Health information (broadly defined) is excluded, but is covered
by the separate Health Records Bill.
The provision in the Information Privacy Act for Codes of Practice expressly
rules out Codes which set less stringent standards than the statutory principles,
and there is no other mechanism in the Act for further waivers or exemptions
other than provision for a government Order exempting an organization where
it is covered by an alternative statutory scheme.
Purpose
Limitation Principle
The Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts include purpose limitation principles
which are very similar, and which address the same objective as Articles 6(1)(b)
and 7 of the EU Directive. They all adopt the approach of allowing collection
only where lawful and necessary, and then separately restricting use and disclosure
[17].
The basic principle in all three laws is that personal information should only
be used or disclosed for the primary or original purpose of collection. Use
and disclosure for secondary purposes is only permitted:
- With the consent of the individual (similar to Article 7(a) although none
of the laws require consent to be unambiguous, and this leaves considerable
scope for interpretation);
- For related purposes (arguably similar to Article 6(1)(b) (not incompatible),
and 7(b), although the wording of the Australian provisions varies considerably
both between jurisdictions and between use and disclosure, leaving considerable
scope for generous interpretations of what is a related purpose)
- To avoid serious and imminent harm (similar to Article 7(d) and Article
13(1)(g))
- Where authorized or required by law (this is a wider exception than the
criterion of legal obligation in Article 7(c) of the Directive)
- In a range of public interest circumstances (broadly similar to those in
Article 7(e) and Article 13(1)(a)-(f))
The way in which Australian laws deal with purpose limitation in respect of
sensitive data is considered separately below.
Data
Quality Principle
The Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts include
one or more data quality principles
[18].
These mostly impose the same requirements as Article 6(1)(c) & (d), although
there are differences. The Commonwealth Act omits 'adequate and not excessive'
and, somewhat confusingly, places 'accuracy' in the correction principle, although
apparently applying it to all stages of information handling. The Victorian
Act omits 'adequate, relevant and not excessive', while the NSW Act has the
full set of criteria from Article 6.
All three laws also include, under the security
principle, a principle of 'keeping no longer than necessary'
[19]
imposing a similar requirement to Article 6(1)(e).
Transparency
Principle
The Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts include transparency and openness under
two separate principles. A notice principle
[20]
requires organizations to inform individuals when they are collecting information
about certain matters, broadly similar to those in Articles 10 & 11. A separate
openness principle
[21] requires
organisations to make publicly available general information about their handling
of personal information.
There are some significant differences in the detail of these requirements.
Unlike the NSW and Victorian Acts, the Commonwealth Act does not expressly require
individuals to be notified of the identity of the collector; of access and correction
rights, and of any consequences of not supplying information. Both the Commonwealth
and NSW Acts only apply the notice requirement where an organization is collecting
directly from an individual (the Article 10 situation), whereas the Victorian
Act applies a similar obligation where information is collected indirectly (equivalent
to Article 11).
The Commonwealth and NSW Acts provide for publication of a Personal Information
Digest by the respective Privacy Commissioners giving general information about
the personal information holdings of agencies
[22].
Under the Commonwealth Act, publication is mandatory, but there has been relatively
little use of the hard copy Digest published annually. Under the NSW Act, the
Commissioner has a discretion to publish a Digest, but has no immediate plans
to do so.
Rights
of Access, Rectification and Opposition
Access & Correction
The Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts include rights of access and correction.
In all three cases, this principle is complicated by interaction with existing
Freedom of Information laws which even before the enactment of privacy laws
gave individuals a right of access and correction to information held by government
agencies.
The approach taken by the privacy laws is to create separate rights
[23]
but to defer to the FoI laws for the implementation of those rights. The Commonwealth
Privacy Act adds a further ground for correction (relevance), but limits the
correction right to Australian citizens and permanent residents.
[24]
All three privacy laws provide additionally for individuals to add 'challenges'
to their files where correction is inappropriate, and the NSW Act also provides
for third party recipients of information to be notified of corrections or challenges,
where practicable.
The FoI laws contain a number of exemptions or grounds for withholding access
or refusing correction, which are either designed to protect the privacy of
third parties or directed towards important public interests of the kind acknowledged
in Articles 12 &13. (The Victorian Act includes a detailed list of exemptions,
and access and correction mechanisms to apply to contracted service providers
who are not already subject to FoI). There is a constant public debate about
the exemptions, which many critics argue provide too many grounds for public
servants and governments to withhold access, and is subject to abuse which undermines
the objective of the access right.
Rights of Opposition
The right to object to particular types of processing, established by Article
14 of the EU Directive, is not provided in the Australian laws governing the
public sector. None of the laws provides for the right to object generally as
in Article 14(a), although it is likely that in most public sector contexts
either an express legal authority, or one of the Article 13 exemptions would
override any expectation of a right to object. The right of opposition to direct
marketing (Article 14(b)) arguably has limited application to the public sector
and is not provided in any of the three Acts. However, following a well publicized
controversy in June 2000, the Commonwealth government has agreed to amend the
legislation setting up an Australian Business Register to give individual registrants
an 'opt-out' from direct marketing uses.
More generally, there is considerable debate about the direct marketing uses
of personal information in public register information. The NSW Act has specific
provisions relating to public registers
[25]
and these include a right for individuals to have details suppressed if their
safety or well being is at risk (this right already exists in relation to some
specific registers), but a desire to avoid direct marketing would not satisfy
this test. The Victorian government is currently studying the public register
issue.
Security
Principle
The Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Acts all include a security principle
[26]
which imposes the same general requirement as Articles 16 & 17.
Sensitive
Data
The Commonwealth Act contains no special provisions in relation to sensitive
data other than the government issued tax file number which is subject to a
separate and restrictive regime. However, other Commonwealth laws contain specific
privacy rules relating to old criminal convictions
[27],
and data held for the purposes of the Medicare and Pharmaceutical Benefits Schemes
[28].
The Privacy Commissioner has a supervisory role in relation to these separate
regimes.
The NSW Act includes a specific sensitive data principle
[29]
which imposes tighter conditions on the disclosure (but not collection or use)
of certain categories of personal information, being:
- ethnic or racial origin;
- political opinions;
- religious or philosophical beliefs;
- trade union membership;
- health, and
- sexual activities.
This list includes all of the categories in Article 8.
Disclosure is generally permitted only to prevent a serious or imminent threat
to life or health, but a number of the exemptions apply, including express consent;
where authorized or required by law; where reasonably necessary for law enforcement;
and in certain circumstances for health care or treatment.
The Victorian Act also has a sensitive data principle which applies to collection
(but not use or disclosure) of personal information about:
- racial or ethnic origin;
- political opinions;
- membership of a political association;
- religious beliefs or affiliations;
- philosophical beliefs;
- membership of a professional or trade association;
- membership of a trade union;
- sexual preferences or practices, and
- criminal record
This list includes all of the categories in Article 8 (except health which is
covered separately - see below). However, because the principle only restricts
collection, then provided an organization has bona fide grounds for collecting
sensitive information, there are no additional constraints on what it can be
used for or who it can be given to, beyond those applying generally under the
use and disclosure principle
[30].
The grounds under which sensitive information can be collected include: consent;
required by law; serious and imminent threat to life or health; incapacity for
consent; legal defence; and research.
Note: In Victoria, health information (which is broadly defined) is excluded
from the definition of personal information and therefore from the scope of
the Information Privacy Act, but is to be protected by a separate law - set
out in the Health Records Bill 2000.
The Victorian Act also contains a specific principle concerning unique identifiers
[31]
designed to provide a safeguard against the creation of a single identifier
that could be used to crossmatch data across all government departments.
Onward
Transfers
The Commonwealth Act, which predates the EU Directive, contains no specific
provisions relating to onward transfers to other jurisdictions, although advocates
have argued that the security principle
[32]
might require a data 'exporter' to take reasonable steps to ensure that personal
information was not misused in the hands of a recipient. The government does
not appear to be proposing any amendments to accompany its private sector privacy
Bill (see below) which would apply an onward transfer restriction to Commonwealth
agencies. Any transfers of personal data to a Commonwealth agency will not therefore
be able to meet the criteria expected in relation to the Directive's onward
transfer provisions.
The NSW and Victorian Acts both expressly address the issue of onward transfer
in an attempt to meet the requirements of the Directive.
Under the NSW Act, the 'Special restrictions' principle
[33]
which deals with sensitive data also prohibits public sector agencies from disclosing
personal information outside the State unless either a relevant privacy law
is in force, or the disclosure is permitted under a privacy Code of Practice.
The Privacy Commissioner is required to develop a Code concerning onward transfers
by 1 July 2001. He can also issue determinations as to which laws in other jurisdictions
qualify as having a relevant privacy law in force.
The extent to which this provision meets the criteria expected in relation to
the Directive's onward transfer provisions will depend on the content of the
Code and/or basis of any determinations by the Commissioner.
Many of the general exemptions apply to this onward transfer principle - so
that it does not restrict transfers which are reasonably necessary for law enforcement;
authorized or required by law; or with the express consent of the individual,
or made by specified investigative agencies
[34].
The Victorian Act adopts the onward transfer principle
[35]
developed by the Privacy Commissioner to put limits on the flow of information
outside Victoria. An organisation is only allowed to transfer personal information
outside Victoria if it reasonably believes the recipient is subject to a law,
or other binding obligation, which imposes restrictions on the use of that information
that are substantially similar to the information privacy principles.
Personal information may also be transferred with the individual's consent or
if the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract. If consent of
the individual cannot practically be obtained, the organisation can only transfer
the information if it is for the benefit of the individual and if the individual
would be likely to give the consent.
As there are few exemptions from any of the principles, this provision in the
Victorian Act would seem to satisfy the criteria expected in relation to the
Directive's onward transfer provisions, but only if there is some mechanism
for giving rulings or guidance on what constitutes an adequate level of protection
in other jurisdictions. The Act gives the Privacy Commissioner a function of
publishing model terms for a contract or arrangement with a recipient of personal
information being transferred by the organisation outside Victoria
[36].
But there is no express provision for more general guidance on adequacy.
Independent
investigation and adjudication of complaints
Under the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian laws, complaints are investigated
by the Privacy Commissioner.
[37]
All three Privacy Commissioners are appointed as statutory officers with a high
degree of theoretical independence from government
[38].
They are appointed for fixed terms and can only be removed from office on very
serious grounds such as misbehaviour or incapacity. The Victorian Act follows
the same model
[39]. All three jurisdictions
have final adjudication of complaints being by courts or tribunals which are
even more independent.
[40]
In all cases, the Commissioner's resources are provided through a sponsoring
government department and they are subject to a range of budgetary and other
pressures which have led at times to their effective independence being questioned.
But this is no different from the situation in most countries, and Australian
jurisdictions have not only a strong tradition of respect for the independence
of statutory officers but also a highly developed system of administrative law
which would allow any 'suspect' decisions to be challenged.
The remedies available to individuals whose privacy rights are infringed include,
in all three jurisdictions, directions to perform specified actions, and the
possibility of compensation for loss or damage (capped at $40,000 in NSW and
$100,000 in Victoria). There is an emphasis in all three laws on conciliation
and mediated settlements. Under the Commonwealth law there have been many such
settlements, some including payment of compensation, but only a handful of formal
determinations. The NSW and Victorian schemes are too new to have any 'case
law'.
The complaints handling and enforcement aspects of the three statutory public
sector privacy regimes generally appear to meet the standards envisaged in Articles
22-24 and 28 of the EU Directive, in respect of judicial remedies, compensation,
sanctions and supervision. (But see comments below in relation to the recent
private sector amendments to the federal law concerning defects in enforcement
which may become more obvious with private sector application).
Consumer
Credit Reporting
Scope
of Regulation and Overview
The Commonwealth government legislated for privacy protection in consumer credit
reporting in 1989, by means of an amendment to the Privacy Act 1988, introducing
a new part (Part IIIA). The detailed statutory provisions are supplemented by
a Code of Conduct and several Determinations issued by the Privacy Commissioner,
which have the force of law as subordinate legislation endorsed by the Parliament.
The Credit Reporting regime relies on definitions of credit provider, consumer
credit to apply to a business activity rather than to any specified organizations,
although credit reporting agencies are also defined and subject to additional
rules. Although Part IIIA and the Code of Conduct do not exactly follow the
normal sequence of information privacy principles, they cover the same ground
with rules on collection, storage, use and disclosure, and rights of access
and correction. The Credit reporting regime is subject to the same supervisory
and enforcement mechanisms as the public sector principles, with the Privacy
Commissioner able to audit, investigate complaints, and make orders which are
enforceable through the Federal Court.
Exemptions
and restrictions
Within the narrowly defined area of consumer credit reporting covered by the
Privacy Act, there are few exemptions and restrictions on the operation of the
law. Hire arrangements are considered as credit even where payment is made in
advance, if the value of the goods is greater than the hire fee. Purely commercial
credit reporting is not covered but there are complex rules about the interaction
of information about personal creditworthiness and commercial lending practice.
Some agents of credit providers, including both sales agents and legal advisers,
are treated as though they were credit providers while handling personal information
for their 'principal', but others - such as debt collectors, are not and can
obtain access only to certain specified information even when recovering debts
for a credit provider client.
The effect of the 'boundaries' of this jurisdiction depend on whether it is
seen as imposing stricter privacy protection than applies elsewhere, or as permitting
use of personal information which would otherwise be 'off-limits'. In the context
of an otherwise unregulated private sector (the position for the last ten years),
the former view is more accurate. Once privacy law applies to the rest of the
private sector (see below) it may be more accurate to see the boundaries as
conferring benefits - authorizing membership of an exclusive 'club' with privileged
access to personal information without the express consent of individuals (although
credit assessment would most likely be considered a related purpose under the
normal application of privacy principles).
Purpose
Limitation Principle
Part IIIA of the Privacy Act strictly limits access to personal credit information
to businesses that are credit providers
[41],
and restricts both the use and further disclosure of that information to purposes
associated directly with assessment of creditworthiness
[42]
Data
Quality Principle
Credit reporting agencies and credit providers are required to take reasonable
steps to ensure that personal information they hold is accurate, up-to-date,
complete and not misleading.
[43]
The Code of Conduct specifies steps that must be taken to assist in meeting
this requirement.
[44]
Transparency
Principle
The main means of implementing this principle in consumer credit reporting is
an indirect requirement on credit providers to notify applicants for credit
about disclosure to a credit reporting agency and subsequent implications.
[45]
Although the Act and Code of Conduct do not spell out notice requirements, they
make it impossible for consumer credit reporting to operate unless individuals
have been given quite detailed information. This is generally provided by means
of versions of standard wording agreed between the Privacy Commissioner and
industry representatives.
[46]
Some of these notices take the form of 'consent for disclosure' to be signed
by individuals when applying for credit, but as they are effectively a condition
of credit, and applicants cannot decline to allow disclosure, they are more
accurately described as providing notice rather than obtaining consent.
Credit providers are also required to give individuals additional information
if they refuse them credit on the basis of a credit report. This information
includes reference to the individual's right of access and rectification
Rights
of Access, Rectification and Opposition
Access & Correction
The Privacy Act provides individuals with a right of access to credit information
files held by credit reporting agencies and to credit reports held by credit
providers or reporting agencies
[47].
The Act and Code of Conduct contain detailed provisions relating to correction
of inaccurate data.
In relation to credit information files, the dominant reporting agency has a
well established system for handling requests for access and correction which
is periodically audited by the Privacy Commissioner and appears to work well,
dealing with many thousands of requests each year.
Rights of Opposition
There are no specific rights of 'opposition' in Part IIIA or the Code but the
issue of 'secondary' direct marketing does not arise as it is not a permitted
use of credit information files or credit reports in the first place - although
'primary' direct marketing in relation to credit (eg other loans that might
be of interest) is arguably permitted.
[48]
Security
Principle
The Act requires credit reporting agencies and credit providers to take reasonable
steps to ensure that personal information they hold is protected by reasonable
security safeguards.
[49]
Sensitive
Data
The Act expressly prohibits credit information files from containing information
about
- Political, social or religious beliefs or affiliations;
- Criminal record;
- Medical history or physical handicaps;
- Race, ethnic origins or national origins
- Sexual preferences or practices; and
- Lifestyle, character or reputation.[50]
Onward
Transfers
The Act pre-dates express consideration of the onward transfer issue, but the
security provision does require credit reporting agencies and credit providers
to take reasonable steps to ensure that security standards are maintained when
contracting out any service.
[51]
Provided any disclosures are lawful under the general disclosure provisions
of Part IIIA, it makes no difference currently whether they are to organizations
within or outside Australia. However, under the proposed general private sector
amendments to the Act, credit reporting agencies and credit providers will have
to comply with the onward transfer principle (see below) as well as with all
of the credit specific provisions.
Independent
investigation and adjudication of complaints
The same processes and machinery applies to credit reporting as to the public
sector jurisdiction (see above
[52]).
The only difference in terms of enforcement and remedies is that Part IIIA also
contains some offence provisions. It is a criminal offence, for instance, to
make an unauthorized use or disclosure
[53]
(fines of up to $150,000), to give a false or misleading credit report
[54]
(fine of up to $75,000), or to obtain unauthorized access
[55]
(fine of up to $30,000).
The complaints handling and enforcement aspects of the credit reporting privacy
regime meet the standards envisaged in Articles 22-24 and 28 of the EU Directive,
in respect of judicial remedies, compensation, sanctions and supervision.
Telecommunications
Scope
of Regulation and Overview
The Telecommunications Act 1997, which set up a more diverse and de-regulated
telecommunications market, requires telecommunications providers to comply with
use and disclosure rules modelled on those in the Privacy Act (which used to
apply to the state owned telco).
The Act also provides for industry developed Codes of Practice to be given statutory
force, and two privacy codes, a general one including all of the information
privacy principles and a specific code for calling number display have been
developed. In 2000, these Codes were registered by the Australian Communications
Authority (ACA)
[56] and are now
binding on all participants in the industry (carriers and service providers).
Individual complaints about breaches of the Code rules are handled by an industry
funded Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO), while complaints about breaches
of a more systemic nature, or of the underlying law, can be taken to the Australian
Communications Industry Forum (ACIF - which developed the Codes) or to the ACA.
Exemptions
and restrictions
The provisions of the Telecommunications Act apply to carriers and carriage
service providers. These are technical definitions which in practice pick up
most of the main providers of telecommunications services, including operators
of fixed and mobile telephone networks, re-sellers, and Internet service or
access providers (ISPs or IAPs). However, dealers and agents (for instance those
selling mobile telephone services on behalf of the service operators) and Internet
content providers are not covered.
Purpose
Limitation Principle
The Telecommunications Act itself has since 1997 incorporated use and disclosure
limitations modeled on Information Privacy Principles 10 & 11 of the Privacy
Act.
[57] However, there was no statutory
equivalent of the 'fair and lawful collection' principle. Since May 2000, all
telecommunications carriers and carriage service providers have been required
to comply with a complete set of information privacy principles - the National
Privacy Principles (NPPs)
[58], which
include 'fair and lawful collection (Rule 5). They also support the use and
disclosure limitations and conditions in the Act.
[59]
Rules 6 & 7 are a hybrid version of IPPs 10 & 11; NPP 2, and the Telecommunications
Act provisions, which because they mostly set a higher standard, negates some
of the criticisms of NPP 2 (see the section on the general private sector amendments
below).
These rules are consistent with Articles 6 & 7 of the EU Directive.
However, unlike NPP 2, there are no special protections for health data in Rules
6 & 7. (see under sensitive data below in this section), and the special
conditions applying to direct marketing only apply to use, not disclosure (see
under rights of opposition below in this section).
Special provisions relating to collection, use and disclosure of Calling Number
Display information are contained in a separate Industry Code which has also
been registered by the ACA and is therefore now binding on all telecommunications
providers.
[60]
Data
Quality Principle
Rule 8 of the binding Industry Code repeats National Privacy Principle 3 which
requires organizations to take reasonable steps to make sure that the personal
information it collects, uses or discloses is accurate, complete and up-to-date.
This is consistent with Article 6(d) of the EU Directive.
Transparency
Principle
Rule 10 of the binding Industry Code repeats National Privacy Principle 5 (Openness)
and requires telecommunications providers to be open about their management
of personal information. Rule 5 is a version of NPP 1 and includes a requirement
to give notice of various matters when collecting personal data. These rules
are consistent with Articles 10 & 11 of the EU Directive.
Rights
of Access, Rectification and Opposition
Access & Correction
Rule 11 of the binding Industry Code repeats National Privacy Principle 6, with
some minor variations to reflect the telecommunications environment and specific
provisions in the Telecommunications Act. To all intents and purposes it provides
the same access and correction rights, exemptions and processes, as NPP6.
These rules are consistent with Article 12 of the EU Directive.
Rights of Opposition
Rule 6 includes special conditions where personal information is intended for
use for direct marketing, and provides for individuals to be offered an 'opt-out'
opportunity
[61], but only where
the intended use is not part of the original purpose of collection or directly
related and within the reasonable expectation of the individual. There is no
equivalent provision in Rule 7 in relation to disclosure for direct marketing,
which could take place without the individual's consent, or any opportunity
for them to opt-out. These rules therefore only partly provide the protection
envisaged by Article 14 of the EU Directive.
Security
Principle
Rule 9 of the binding Industry Code repeats National Privacy Principle 4 verbatim.
This is consistent with Articles 16 & 17 of the EU Directive.
Sensitive
Data
Rule 15 of the binding Industry Code is a simplified version of National Privacy
Principle 12 which only limits collection of the sensitive data categories.
There are no special restrictions or conditions on the use or disclosure of
sensitive data - even health data, as the special provisions of NPP 2 are not
carried over into Rules 6 & 7 (see above). There is therefore no equivalent
in the telecommunications privacy regime to Article 8 of the EU Directive.
Onward
Transfers
Rule 14 repeats the Transborder data flow National Principle (NPP 9) in its
entirety. This is discussed in the next section.
Independent
investigation and adjudication of complaints
The telecommunications regulatory regime relies largely on self-regulation.
Registration of the CPI and CND Codes has however brought into effect the safety
net enforcement provisions of the Telecommunications Act and allows the ACA
to issue warnings and directions in the event of persistent or serious breaches
of the Codes. Failure to comply with a direction can incur civil penalties
Complaints about breaches of the Code will however initially be investigated
by the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) an industry appointed and
funded body which nevertheless meets most of the standards of independence and
autonomy generally regarded as necessary for a credible self-regulatory complaints
scheme.
[62] All telecommunications
providers are required by law to join the TIO scheme and there are over 850
members.
The TIO has since its inception been able to handle complaints about breaches
of privacy - initially by reference to the Privacy Act IPPs which used to apply
to the government owned Telstra corporation. The TIO will now use the new registered
privacy Codes as the standard against which complaints will be assessed. The
TIO can make binding determinations including awards of compensation where appropriate
of up to $10,000 and can recommend payments of up to $50,000.
Unauthorised uses or disclosures of personal data in breach of Part 13 are criminal
offences punishable by up to 2 years imprisonment.
The complaints handling and enforcement aspects of the telecommunications privacy
regime meet many of the standards envisaged in Articles 22-24 and 28 of the
EU Directive, except that there is no provision for remedies to be enforced
by a constitutionally independent judiciary, and the supervisory responsibilities
are somewhat fragmented between ACIF, the ACA and the TIO.
It is however expected that the Code on Customer Personal Information will be
submitted for approval by the Privacy Commissioner under the new general private
sector legislation
[63]. If this
happens, then depending on what role for the Privacy Commissioner is envisaged,
the complaints handling and enforcement and supervisory aspects of the telecommunications
regime may come into line with those applying more generally (see below).
The
rest of the Private Sector
Scope
of Regulation and Overview
Until recently, the remainder of the private sector, outside consumer credit
reporting and telecommunications, has been statutorily subject only to some
very specific privacy rules relating to the use of the federal government tax
file number (under the Privacy Act 1988) and to the old criminal convictions
(under the Crimes Act).
Private businesses providing services under contract to government agencies
may have been subject to contractual provisions relating to privacy. The federal
Privacy Commissioner has taken the view that this is a requirement under the
security principle of the 1988 Act and has issued model contractual clauses
for use by Commonwealth agencies. The NSW Privacy Commissioner has issued similar
advice.
Some sectors have taken the initiative and developed voluntary codes of practice
incorporating some or all of the National Privacy Principles (NPPs). These principles
were developed by the Privacy Commissioner through a consultative process between
1997 and 1999 as a template for self regulation (during this period the federal
government s position was to favour self-regulation over statutory controls).
The main Codes of Practice are as follows:
Direct Marketing Code of Practice
This was developed by the Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA) and
includes the full set of National Privacy Principles (1998 version). It also
has a code administration committee and process for dealing with complaints
from consumers about breaches of the Code. Although consumer and privacy groups
have been critical of some aspects of the Code, it was approved in 1999 by the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) as being sufficiently
in the public interest to outweigh its anti-competitive effect. Adoption of
the Code of Practice is a condition of membership of ADMA.
General
Insurance Industry Information Privacy Principles
This scheme, launched in 1998, incorporates all of the National Privacy Principles
(1998 version) except for the anonymity principle, and has a supervisory and
complaint handling mechanism through a privacy compliance committee of the existing
insurance industry complaint body. Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Ltd. General
insurers have been invited to adopt the principles and implement them no later
than August 2000, but to date only some 30 insurers, representing less than
10% of general insurance business, have done so. Many insurers have taken the
view that they will await the forthcoming legislation.
Internet
Industry Association Code of Practice
The Internet Industry Association (IIA) has developed a Code of Practice which
contains both general privacy principles and specific rules relating to unsolicited
e-mail (spam). Although the privacy section, which incorporates the National
Privacy Principles, has been settled since 1998, it is only recommended by IIA
for voluntary adoption by members, and there is as yet no supervisory or complaint
handling machinery.
The new legislation.
In December 1999 the federal government announced that it would now legislate
for private sector privacy. After another round of consultation, in April 2000
a Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill was introduced into Parliament. It
was referred to a House of Representatives Committee (HoR Committee) which reported
in July, recommending several significant changes
[64].
Two Senate Committees also examined the legislation and also made suggestions
for changes
[65]. The legislation
was finally enacted in December 2000 with only relatively minor amendments.
The scheme of the Act is expressly intended to meet international concerns and
obligations.
[66] One specific way
in which it seeks to meet this objective is by provision for extra-territorial
effect. The Actl provides for the law to apply to acts or practices engaged
in outside Australia by organizations subject to Australian law, including non-resident
organizations carrying on business in Australia in respect of personal information
collected or held in Australia.
[67]
The same clause also provides for the Privacy Commissioner to take action overseas
to investigate complaints. While this is a generally helpful provision, it is
limited to information about Australian citizens or permanent residents. This
means that the Act would not apply to data about foreigners transferred out
of Australia, and undermines significantly the effectiveness of the onward transfer
principle (NPP9) discussed below.
The definitional problems which apply under the existing Privacy Act (discussed
above under public sector - scope and overview) are extended by the amendments
to the private sector. They include the concept of a record, the exclusion of
generally available publications (expressly extended by the new amendments by
the addition of 'however published'
[68],
which increases the risk of abuse) and the uncertain application of the Act
to e-mail addresses.
The amendments only apply some of the National Principles to information collected
before the commencement of the legislation. Those principles dealing with collection
(NPPs 1,10 and part of 3) and use (NPP2) and access (NPP6); and the anonymity
principle (NPP8) apply only to information collected, or transactions, after
commencement. The other principles apply to all information whenever it was
collected.
[69]
The legislation will commence on 22 December 2001 (12 months after receiving
the Royal Assent
[70]. Small businesses
are granted a further twelve months to comply with some principles.
[71]
Exemptions
and restrictions
Exemptions from the new private sector regime under the Commonwealth Act are
of two types - exemptions (mostly conditional) for specified organizations,
and exemptions for specified activities.
There is an unconditional exemption for state owned government business enterprises.
[72]
Given the exemption for state owned corporations in the NSW Act this leaves
most state owned enterprises in the country without any statutory privacy controls
(although the Victorian Act covers theirs).
There is a conditional exemption for small businesses defined as those with
an annual turnover of less than $3 million.
[73]
According to the government, this will have the effect of exempting over 1 million
or 94% of all businesses
[74]. The
exemption is conditional on the business not holding health information other
than as part of employee records, and not collecting or disclosing personal
information for a consideration. All small businesses are given an extra 12
months to comply. As the HoR Committee Report noted, the exemption is quite
complex and may be very difficult to apply in practice. The report recommended
that otherwise exempt small businesses be allowed to opt-in, but accepts the
government's arguments for a broad exemption. The government accepted the opt-in
proposal
[75].
There is a conditional exemption from the collection and disclosure principles
for 'related bodies corporate'.
[76]
This would have the effect of allowing (non-sensitive) personal information
to be transferred between different businesses entities that are related through
ownership without the normal application of the notice requirements and use
and disclosure limitations, provided it did not exceed individuals' reasonable
expectations. Critics of the then Bill suggested that this could be a major
loophole through which corporate groups could evade the purpose limitation objective,
and could even act as an incentive, in combination with the small business exemption,
for structuring of business groups expressly to weaken the effect of the privacy
law.
[77]
There is a conditional exemption for employee records, broadly defined
[78].
The HoR Report rejected the government's contention that sufficient protection
was contained in workplace relations legislation, and recommended a significant
narrowing of the exemption.
[79]
The government refused to accept any changes to this exemption, but has established
a working party to look at the issue of privacy protection for employee records.
There is a conditional exemption for media organizations in the course of journalism.
Journalism is very broadly defined (essentially covering any activity with the
aim of publication) and was the subject of critical submissions to the HoR Committee.
The Committee's report stops short of recommending limits to the exemption but
does suggest it be made subject to a code, and that it be kept under review.
The government accepted this suggestion.
[80]
There is an exemption for political acts and practices
[81]
which means that none of the Principles will apply to political parties, their
volunteers and contractors, or to elected representatives. The HoR Committee
recommended that some conditions be placed on this exemption but this was not
accepted by the government and the exemption passed unaltered.
There is also an uncontroversial exemption for individuals undertaking activities
'other than in the course of business' designed to exempt processing for personal,
family or household affairs.
[82]
Contractors to Commonwealth and State agencies are exempted from the private
sector National Privacy Principles (NPPs) in relation to those records for which
they are contractually bound to observe the public sector IPPs or state equivalents
(see above)
[83]. A contractor to
the Commonwealth which is a small business otherwise exempt from the NPPs remains
covered by the Act in relation to the IPPs.
[84]
The discussion of the principles which follows takes the default National Privacy
Principles as the standard with which all organizations will have to comply
under the legislation. This is not strictly correct in that organisations can
apply for approval of Codes of Practice. However, any Code must either incorporate
the National Privacy principles or 'set out obligations that, overall, are at
least the equivalent of all the obligations set out in [the NPPs]'.
[85]
On the assumption that the Privacy Commissioner will not approve any Code that
set out lesser standards (he/she could be judicially reviewed if he/she did
so), it is safe to refer to the NPPs throughout the remainder of this paper.
There is however provision in the legislation for 'waivers' from the application
of the NPPs, going beyond any of the statutory exemptions already discussed
above. As noted in the Public Sector section of this paper, the existing Privacy
Act contains a mechanism for the Privacy Commissioner to make a Public Interest
Determination allowing a derogation from the IPPs. Under the private sector
amendments, this mechanism is extended to the NPPs, and a new facility is introduced
for temporary determinations, pending consideration of a full Determination.
[86]
Full determinations are subject to an elaborate and public consultation process
and both full and temporary determinations are subject to disallowance by Parliament.
Purpose
Limitation Principle
The Act will require private sector organizations that are not exempt to comply
with the National Privacy Principles (NPPs) (from December 2001). NPPs 1 &
2 between them cover the purpose limitation principle by requiring collection
of personal information to be necessary and by fair and lawful means
[87],
and by placing limits and conditions on use and disclosure.
[88]
These provisions are broadly consistent with Articles 6 & 7 of the Directive,
but with at least two significant differences.
NPP 2 arguably goes further than Articles 6 & 7 in allowing unconditional
processing (use and disclosure) for the 'primary' purpose of collection and
'related purposes within the reasonable expectation of the individual'.
[89]
The 'exceptions' in the rest of the principle only apply to 'secondary' purposes.
The related purpose exception in particular appears much broader than the 'not
incompatible' in Article 6.1(b).
One of the secondary use/disclosure exceptions in NPP 2 is where the use/disclosure
is 'required or authorized by or under law' - similar to that in IPPs 10 &
11 in the public sector regime. As already noted, this is a wider exception
than the criteria in Article 7 of the Directive
[90]
Both the banking and health sectors claim in debate that they are already subject
to strict common law duties of confidentiality. While this duty provides useful
support to a non-disclosure principle, it does not apply to internal uses, and
even to some external transfers for the purposes of the organization. The common
law duty is also limited to information which is inherently confidential - and
the courts have defined this much more narrowly than the scope of personal information
with which privacy laws are concerned.
Data
Quality Principle
NPP 4 requires organizations to take reasonable steps to make sure that the
personal information it collects, uses or discloses is accurate, complete and
up-to-date. This is consistent with Article 6(d) of the Directive, but omits
the additional requirement in 6(c) for 'adequate, relevant and not excessive'.
It could be argued that the requirement of 'necessity' for purpose in NPP1 automatically
ensures relevance, but it is interesting to note that relevance is included
in the equivalent IPP for Commonwealth public sector agencies
[91],
and in the NSW Act, which also includes 'adequate' and 'not excessive'.
[92]
Transparency
Principle
National Privacy Principle 5 (Openness) requires organizations to be open about
their management of personal information. NPP 1 includes a requirement to give
notice of various matters when collecting personal data. These provisions are
consistent with Articles 10 & 11 of the EU Directive, although there has
been some criticism of the discretion to notify after collection where notification
prior or at the time of collection is not practicable.
[93]
Rights
of Access, Rectification and Opposition
Access & Correction
NPP 6 provides a right of access for individuals to personal information about
themselves and a right of correction, subject to various exceptions. Both the
rights and the exceptions are broadly consistent with the equivalent provisions
in Articles 12 & 13 of the EU Directive. However, the Act now expressly
extends the limitation of the correction right to Australian citizens and permanent
residents, referred to already in the public sector section, to NPP6
[94],
thereby leaving citizens of other countries no opportunity for remedies for
breaches of this Principle.
There is no express provision encouraging organizations to provide as much information
as possible, even where an exception is claimed, by severing or selectively
deleting the withheld information. Case law under Freedom of Information Acts,
which has been the mechanism for delivering the access right in the public sector,
has clearly established that this is required. It has been suggested that private
sector organizations are more likely to use an exception as an excuse for total
withholding, and that a statutory requirement to provide as much information
as possible would be desirable.
Rights of Opposition
NPP 2.1(c) provides for a partial right of opposition to direct marketing, by
requiring organizations to offer individuals an opt-out. However, this provision
only applies where the use for direct marketing is not part of the primary purpose
or 'directly related and within the individual's reasonable expectations'.
[95]
This means that in practice, there will be many direct marketing activities
where individuals do not have to be offered an opt-out opportunity.
It remains unclear whether the omission of 'disclosure' from NPP 2.1(c) works
to the advantage or disadvantage of individuals. On one view, it means that
disclosure for direct marketing (eg sale of lists) has to satisfy one of the
other exceptions in NPP 2 - such as consent (NPP2.1(b)). On another view, which
sees 2.1(c) as an 'extra' condition, then there is never a statutory requirement
to offer an opt-out from disclosure, and organizations are free to make it part
of their primary purpose or try to influence their customers expectations so
as to satisfy 2.1(a).
The Codes of Practice which incorporate earlier versions of the NPPs (including
the ADMA Direct Marketing Code mentioned above) and which are already being
followed by some organizations, are subject to the same limitations and ambiguities
in relation to NPP 2.1(c) as the Act itself. The best that can be said is that
NPP 2.1(c) wherever it appears only partially provides the protection envisaged
by Article 14 of the EU Directive.
Security
Principle
NPP 4 is a comprehensive security principle which is consistent with Articles
16 & 17 of the EU Directive
Sensitive
Data
National Privacy Principle 12 only limits
collection of the sensitive
data categories. There are no special restrictions or conditions on the use
or disclosure of sensitive data - other than health data, for which there are
some modifications to NPP 2. The Act therefore allows most sensitive information
which has been collected for a legitimate purpose to be used for other purposes
subject only to the normal restrictions in NPP2.
There is considerable debate about whether the special health information provisions
actually provide a higher level of protection, or have the opposite effect of
authorizing a wider range of uses and disclosures than would otherwise be the
case
[96]. Health consumer groups
are generally opposed to the provisions for health privacy, and are campaigning
for separate tougher legislation with more emphasis on patient consent - along
the lines of the existing ACT legislation.
[97]
As already noted, the Victorian government has already decided to legislate
separately and has introduced a Health Records Bill to cover not only state
agencies but any organizations funded by the State.
The proposed private sector privacy regime does not generally provide equivalent
protection for sensitive data to that envisaged in Article 8 of the EU Directive.
Onward
Transfers
NPP9 is a principle dedicated expressly to the regulation of transfers of personal
information to foreign countries. The principle is modeled on Article 25 &
26 of the EU Directive and seeks to achieve the same objective - ensuring as
far as possible continued and adequate privacy protection for 'exported' data.
Unlike the earlier versions of this principle, which dealt with 'other jurisdictions'
rather than foreign countries, NPP9 does not now provide any protection where
personal information is transferred either to a State or Territory government
which is not subject to a privacy law or to one of the large number of private
sector organizations which will be exempt from the Commonwealth regime (see
above).
The principle itself, in its application to 'foreign' transfers, differs in
some significant respects from the terms of Articles 25 & 26.
- Under the Commonwealth Act, consent for transfer does not have to be 'unambiguous',
and organizations are allowed to make an assumption about the likelihood of
consent where it is impracticable to obtain it.[98]
- Organisations are allowed to make their own assessment of whether there
is 'adequate protection' in the destination country.[99]
- The exception where 'the organization has taken reasonable steps to ensure
that the information ...will not be held, used or disclosed inconsistently
with the NPPs'[100] is much weaker
than the nearest equivalent in Article 26(2) in that it addresses only standards
and not safeguards and the exercise of rights.
- There is no equivalent in NPP9 to the public interest, legal claims, or
vital interests derogations in Article 26, although it is assumed that the
government intends to provide for these in some other way - otherwise a range
of important cross border transfers - including for law enforcement or major
emergencies - would be prohibited.
While the intention of NPP 9 is to provide an equivalent to Articles 25 &
26, it appears to fall short of those provisions in a number of key respects,
while in other respects being more restrictive.
Independent
investigation and adjudication of complaints
Complaint handling and enforcement under the proposed general private sector
privacy regime is complicated by the provision for these matters to be dealt
with, at least partially, in Codes of Practice.
Private sector organizations can develop a Code of Practice and submit it to
the Privacy Commissioner for approval. A Code may contain a customized version
of the National Privacy Principles (provided they are at least equivalent) and
may also contain procedures for making and dealing with complaints (which have
to meet prescribed standards - some set out in the Act
[101]
and some in a government benchmark.
[102]
A Code of Practice could establish a Code Adjudicator body which would fulfil
some of the functions of the Privacy Commissioner.
For organizations not subject to an approved Code, the default provisions of
the Act will apply. These include most of the complaint handling and enforcement
provisions that apply to public sector agencies under the pre-existing Act.
As already noted above, these appear at first sight to meet the standards envisaged
in Articles 22-24 and 28 of the EU Directive, in respect of judicial remedies,
compensation, sanctions and supervision.
However, critics of the private sector amendments pointed out an inequity and
defect in the enforcement provisions.
[103]
The Act provides for determinations of Code Adjudicators to be enforced by the
Federal Court or Magistrates Court (after a de novo hearing) in the same way
as determinations of the Privacy Commissioner; Code Adjudicators, like the Commissioner,
are also subject to judicial review on points of law. But there was no provision
for complainants to appeal against an adverse decision by the Commissioner or
a Code Adjudicator. This effectively meant that while a respondent organization
has a right of appeal on the merits of a complaint (by refusing to comply with
a determination and having their case re-heard in court); a complainant can
only appeal against a procedural defect.
While this flaw has also applied to the public sector regime which has been
in operation for 12 years, critics suggest that it only becomes a serious matter
with the extension of the law to the private sector. Public sector agencies
are less likely to refuse to comply with determinations (it has not happened
yet, although there have only been a handful of determinations), whereas experience
in other rights tribunals suggests that many private sector respondents may
resist. The government accepted this argument and made a last-minute change
to the legislation to provide a right of appeal from decisions of Code Adjudicators
to the Privacy Commissioner.
[104]
While Code Adjudicators will not have the same powers as the Privacy Commissioner
- to investigate, call witnesses, require the provision of information etc,
their ability to refer complaints to the Commissioner
[105],
and more importantly the right of appeal should prevent this from being a major
weakness.
It is not clear from the Act whether Code Adjudicators will be required to publish
their determinations, as the Commissioner is required to do. At least one critic
has suggested that this is a serious lack of transparency and hinder public
scrutiny of the effectiveness of Codes of Practice.
[106]
Of the existing voluntary Codes of Practice that incorporate earlier versions
of the National Privacy Principles, only the ADMA Direct Marketing Code and
the General Insurance Industry Privacy Principles have established and theoretically
functioning complaint bodies. However the Insurance Privacy Compliance Committee
has yet to receive any complaints, and there is no information publicly available
about the operation of the ADMA scheme. Both have been criticized by consumer
groups for not meeting all of the standards for independent complaint handling
which are proposed as the minimum under the Act as amended
[107].
They certainly do not meet all of the EU Directive standards in relation to
judicial remedies, compensation, sanctions and supervision.
[108]
*************************************
Nigel Waters, Pacific Privacy Pty Ltd
02 4981 0828 or 0407 230 342
nigelwaters@primus.com.au
*************************************
[1] most recently Recommendation
1/2000 on the Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC and
Opinion
1/2001 on the Draft Commission Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses for
the transfer of Personal Data to third countries under Article 26(4) of Directive
95/46 for both see <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm>
[2] The EU Commission has already
issued adequacy assessments of Hungary, Switzerland and the US
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/news/safeharbor.htm
, while the Article 29 Working Party has issued an opinion on Canada see
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm>
[3] See
http://www.privacy.gov.au/
[4] See
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/pc
[5] The exemptions are to be found
partly in the definitions in s.6 and partly in Schedules to the Freedom of Information
Act which are 'imported' by reference in s.7.
[6] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.41(4).
7 Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14 - IPPs 1,10 & 11; Privacy and
Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.8,17 & 18; Information
Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPPs 1.1 and 2.
8 Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14 - IPPs 3 & 8; Privacy and Personal
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.11 & 16; Information Privacy Act
2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPPs 3.
9 Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14 - IPP 4; Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.12(a); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule
1, IPP 4.2.
10 Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14 - IPP 4; Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.12(a); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule
1, IPP 4.2.
11 Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14 - IPP 2; Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s.10; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule
1, IPPs 1.3 & 1.5.
12 Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.6
[13] see Submission to House of Representatives
Committee on the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000, s.6.2.
[14] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.41(4).
[15] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) Pt VI.
[16] As at February 2001, the Minister
had approved ten Codes, covering health, police, local government, housing,
Legal Aid Commission, Dept of Fair Trading, Bureau of Crime statistics, workforce
profiling, the DPP, and law enforcement and investigative agency access to public
registers. A further eight codes were listed by Privacy NSW as submitted, proposed
or released for consultation
[17] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14
- IPPs 1,10 & 11; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW),
ss.8,17 & 18; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPPs 1.1 and
2.
[18] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14
- IPPs 3 & 8; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW),
ss.11 & 16; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPPs 3.
[19] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14
- IPP 4; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.12(a);
Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPP 4.2.
[20] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14
- IPP 4; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.12(a);
Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPP 4.2.
[21] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14
- IPP 2; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s.10; Information
Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPPs 1.3 & 1.5.
[22] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.27(1)(g);
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s.40.
[23] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14,
IPPs 6 & 7; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW),
ss.14 & 15; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPP 6.
[24] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.41(4).
[25] Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss 57-59
[26] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14,
IPP 4; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s.12; Information
Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Schedule 1, IPP 4.
[27] Crimes Act 1914, Part VIIC.
[28] National Health Act 1953 s.135AA.
[29] Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s.19(1).
[30] IPP2
[31] Information Privacy Act 2000
(Vic), Schedule 1, IPP 7.
[32] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14,
IPP4
[33] Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), s.19(2)-(5).
[34] Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), ss.23-28.
[35] Information Privacy Act 2000
(Vic), Schedule 1, IPP 9.
[36] Information Privacy Act 2000
(Vic), s.58(f)
[37] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), Part
V; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), Part 4 Division
3.
[38] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), Part
IV Division 1; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), Schedule
1; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), Part 7.
[39] Information Privacy Act 2000
(Vic), Part 7 and
[40] The Federal Court or Magistracy;
the NSW Adminstrative Decisions Tribunal and the Victorian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal.
[41] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.18K.
[42] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) ss.18L,
18N.
[43] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.18G.
[44] Credit Reporting Code of Conduct
1996, 1.3-1.5
[45] see Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth)
s.18E(8)(c).
[46] see Credit Reporting Advice
Summaries, Part 8.
[47] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.18H.
[48] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.18L(c).
[49] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.18G.
[50] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.18E(2).
[51] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth) s.18G(c).
[52] see the section on public sector
privacy, and the Privacy Commissioner's web site at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/
[53] being a breach of ss.18J, 18L,
18N, 18P or 18Q of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth).
[54] Privacy act 1988 (Cwth) s.18R.
[55] Privacy act 1988 (Cwth) ss.18S
and 18T.
[56] see
http://www.aca.gov.au
[57] Telecommunications Act 1997
(Cwth), Part 13.
[58] The same NPPs which now form
the core of the proposed 'private sector' amendments to the Commonwealth Privacy
Act 1988.
[59] Industry Code
Protection
of Personal Information of Customers of Telecommunications Providers, developed
by the Australian Communications Industry Forum and registered by the Australian
Communications Authority on 1 May 2000.
[60] Industry Code
Calling Number
Display, developed by the Australian Communications Industry Forum and registered
by the Australian Communications Authority on 1 July 2000
[61] Rule 6.1(c).
[62] see
http://www.tio.com.au
[63] See Explanatory Memorandum
on the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000, paras 383-385.
[64] House of Representatives Legal
& Constitutional Affairs Committee Advisory Report on the Privacy Amendment
(Private Sector) Bill 2000, July 2000 (HoR Report) - available on line at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/Privacybill/contents.htm
[65] Senate Standing Committee on
Legal & Constitutional Affairs - report on the Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Bill 2000 at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/privacy/index.htm
; and Select Committee on Information Technologies inquiry into e-Privacy
no final report.
[66] Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Act 2000, s.3(b)(i).
[67] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.5B.
[68] Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Act 2000, Schedule 1, s.l.14 .
[69] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.16C.
[70] Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Act 2000, s.2.
[71] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.16D.
[72] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.6C(1)(3) &(4).
[73] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000 s.6C(1) and 6D.
[74] HoR Report, p11.
[75] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, new s.6EA.
[76] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.13B
[77] HoR Report, Chapter 9.
[78] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.7B(3).
[79] HoR Report, Chapter 3.
[80] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.7B(4)
[81] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.7C
[82] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.7B(1)
[83] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.7B(5)
[84] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000s .7B(2)
[85] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.18BB.
[86] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Part VI Division 2.
[87] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP1.1 & 1.2
[88] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP2
[89] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP2.1 and 2.1(a).
[90] in particular, Article 7(c)
and (e).
[91] Privacy Act 1988 (Cwth), s.14
- IPP3(c).
[92] Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s.11.
[93] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP1.3.
[94] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.41(4).
[95] being alternative bases for
use in NPP 2.1 and 2.1(a).
[96] HoR Report, Chapters 6 &
7
[97] Health Records (Access and
Privacy) Act (ACT) 1997
[98] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP9(b) and (e).
[99] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP9(a).
[100] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, Schedule 3, NPP9(f).
[101] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.18BB(3).
[102] Benchmarks for Industry-Based
Customer Dispute Resolution Schemes published by the Consumer Affairs Division
of what was then known as the Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (August
1997).
[103] HoR Report, Chapter 10.
[104] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.18BI
[105] Privacy Act 1988, as amended
in 2000, s.40(1B).
[106] Submission to the HoR Committee
by Professor Graham Greenleaf, University of New South Wales.
[107] Benchmarks for Industry-Based
Customer Dispute Resolution Schemes See footnote 85
[108] Articles 22-24 and 28
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