Netherlands - Annex to State Party Report [2013] UNCERDSPR 38; INT/CERD/ADR/NLD/18933 (17 November 2013)

The number of discrimination incidents reported to antidiscrimination bureaus and online is greater than the number reported to the police for criminal investigation and the number referred to the Public Prosecution Service for prosecution. Over the next year, all figures on reports and criminal complaints will be collected and presented in a uniform manner, so that trends and developments can be assessed more effectively.

Figures for police investigations show that an increasing number of cases are being investigated. Most concern discrimination on the grounds of origin or ethnicity (41%) or sexual orientation (26%). Religion is a ground for discrimination in around four per cent of cases.

	Home \| Databases \| WorldLII \| Search \| Feedback United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination - States Parties Reports

Grounds	2008		2009		2010
Grounds	n	%	n	%	n	%
Sexual orientation	380	15,7	428	18,7	660	24,8
Origin/ethnicity	898	37,1	762	33,2	774	29,1
Anti-Semitism	141	5,8	209	9,1	286	10,8
Religion/belief	184	7,6	118	5,2	108	4,1
Sex/gender	9	0,4	10	0,4	17	0,6
Political views	85	3,5	113	4,9	139	5,2
Disability	0	0	5	0,2	7	0,3
Other grounds*	723	29,9	649	28,3	668	25,1
Total	2,420	100	2,294	100	2,659	100

The table below gives an overview of discrimination offences.^[2] Each instance of a charge brought under the discrimination provisions of the Criminal Code (art. 137c to 137g and 429 quater) is counted as a discrimination offence. The number of discrimination offences does not correspond to the number of cases, since a single case may involve numerous discrimination offences. After all, a single suspect may be responsible for multiple offences of this kind that must be counted separately.^[3] There may also be a combination of discrimination offences and other offences in a single case.

Reports per article	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
137c	166	168	119	126	116	77%	72%	74%	74%	69%
137d	27	24	26	22	23	13%	10%	16%	13%	14%
137e	7	19	8	11	19	3%	8%	5%	6%	11%
137f	0	1	0	0	0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
137g	16	15	7	8	7	7%	6%	4%	5%	4%
429 quater	0	5	0	3	4	0%	2%	0%	2%	2%
Total	216	232	160	170	169	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Disposal by OM per article	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
137c	172	217	148	125	134	83%	74%	76%	73%	78%
137d	18	34	24	21	13	9%	12%	12%	12%	8%
137e	8	23	13	12	13	4%	8%	7%	7%	8%
137f	0	0	1	0	0	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
137g	8	18	6	9	8	4%	6%	3%	5%	5%
429 quater	1	0	4	4	4	0%	0%	2%	2%	2%
Total	207	292	196	171	172	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Disposal by OM	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Writs of summons	140	173	137	121	89	70%	59%	71%	71%	54%
Settlement penalty	29	48	20	17	14	14%	16%	10%	10%	8%
Conditional decision not to prosecute	4	3	3	1	10	2%	1%	2%	1%	6%
Decision not to prosecute	28	67	34	31	52	14%	23%	18%	18%	32%
Total	201	291	194	170	165*	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Unlike the tables above, the table below lists cases rather than offences, since court judgments relate to complete cases and not just individual offences. It should also be noted that the cases listed below may have also involved other offences entirely separate from the discrimination offence in question. As a consequence, the court’s decisions regarding the various charges may have differed.

Disposal by the courts	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Conviction	89	114	135	90	57	83%	75%	84%	75%	69%
Acquittal	13	27	16	21	22	12%	18%	10%	18%	27%
Summons invalid	1	0	2	1	0	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%
OM’s case inadmissible	0	0	1	0	1	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Acquittal on a point of law	0	0	0	0	2	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Conviction without imposition of a penalty	1	0	0	5	1	1%	0%	0%	4%	1%
Referral to another body	1	0	0	0	0	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Unknown	2	12	7	3	0	2%	8%	4%	3%	0%
Total	107	153	161	120	83*	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* A possible reason for the relatively low number of cases disposed of by the courts in 2011 could be the lower number of discrimination offences in 2009, 2010 and 2011 compared with the years preceding this period.

On 29 May 2012 the Supreme Court overturned a decision by Arnhem court of appeal,^[4] which had dismissed an application for daggers bearing Nazi symbols to be withdrawn from circulation. The defendant had imported a large number of Nazi daggers, which displayed swastikas, SS symbols and Third Reich slogans. He said he had planned to sell them. It had been decided not to prosecute the defendant but the Public Prosecution Service applied to have the daggers withdrawn from circulation. The Supreme Court recalled that the symbols on the daggers were intended to propagate National Socialist ideology. Arnhem court of appeal is to give a new decision on withdrawing the daggers from circulation.

On 10 May 2012 The Hague court of appeal acquitted a defendant of joint perpetration of insulting a group of persons. The appeal court held that the utterances cited in the charges were insulting to Jews: “Jewish rats”; “It’s a good thing that Hitler killed all the Jews” and “It’s a good thing he put the Jews in a concentration camp, because they’re not the real Jews”. The principal defendant displayed these utterances on a board and spoke out those words. The principal defendant was convicted by Rotterdam district court; this conviction is final. It was very doubtful whether the co-defendant on trial in this case understood what the principal defendant was doing since the co-defendant is profoundly deaf and his reading skills are poor.^[5] The district court therefore found that in his case criminal intent could not be proved with respect to joint perpetration of insulting a group of persons.

On 27 March 2012 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for distributing a cartoon.^[6] The conviction is therefore final. On 19 August 2010 Arnhem court of appeal had convicted an organisation (which had earlier been acquitted by the district court) of posting an anti-Semitic cartoon on its website.^[7] The cartoon depicted two Jews examining bodies in Auschwitz. One says: “I don’t think they are Jews.” The other replies: “We have to get to the 6,000,000 somehow.” The organisation was sentenced to a fine of €2,500, of which €1,500 was suspended. The chairman of the organisation was also prosecuted, but Arnhem court of appeal held that the Public Prosecution Service had led him to believe that he would not be prosecuted, and declared the prosecution’s case inadmissible.^[8]

On 9 February 2012 Amsterdam court of appeal acquitted a man of inciting hatred and inciting discrimination. He was however convicted of insulting Surinamese and Antillean people as a group. He had shouted: “I have nothing at all to do with all these niggers here. These niggers murdered and raped my family. So I don’t need to pay any attention to all these niggers here.” And “I have nothing at all to do with all these corrupt niggers here. All these niggers should go back to their own country.” And “All these corrupt niggers– including that Sweet – who are partying here should all go back to their own country. I don’t pay any attention to these Surinamese and Antilleans. All these niggers should be put down.” The appeal court ruled that these utterances were made within a relatively short space of time and stemmed from frustration, so that it could not be satisfactorily established that the defendant’s intent was to incite discrimination. An order for 50 hours’ community service, 20 hours of which were suspended, was imposed for insulting a group of persons.^[9]

On 19 January 2012 a defendant was convicted of sending dozens of offensive emails to a large number of individuals and media outlets. Many of the emails contained insulting utterances about Jews, such as the one which said: “Deprogram yourself and stop buying from Jews, spit on them and let them know they disgust us.” At the hearing the defendant relied on the claim that he had sent the emails as a way of triggering a public debate. However, the district court held that the defendant’s utterances were in no way a contribution to any public debate and certainly did not serve any such discourse. Even if the court were to believe the defendant’s statement that his aim was to trigger public and political debate, the language, expressions and tone of the emails were such that the court was of the opinion that no connection with this aim could reasonably be established.^[10] The district court imposed an order for 60 hours’ community service and a suspended prison sentence of two weeks. However, the defendant was acquitted of making a habit of discriminatory utterances. Both the defendant and the Public Prosecution Service lodged an appeal.

On 8 December 2011 Amsterdam district court imposed a 40-hour community service order on a defendant who had written articles on his website containing insulting utterances such as: “why weren’t all the Jews gassed during the war when it was still possible”, “it makes you want to see the Holocaust done all over again” and “maybe Jews should have a star pinned on them again to remind them of how unpleasant it is to be repudiated”. The defendant was acquitted in respect of a number of other utterances, which the district court held were intended to be satirical. Both the defendant and the Public Prosecution Service lodged an appeal.^[11]

On 29 November 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of a columnist who had made insulting statements about Jews in one of his columns. For example, he had written: “Since the Nazi era it has not been cool to say negative things about Jews but sometimes I can really see how things got to that point in 1937.” This statement was held to be insulting to Jews but when considered in its context and the content of the column as a whole it was not held to constitute a criminal offence.^[12] This judgment rendered the defendant’s acquittal final.

On 9 November 2011 The Hague district court acquitted a defendant of sending a large number of discriminatory utterances about Muslims by email to a large group of recipients. The court held that in most cases it had not been satisfactorily proved that the defendant had sent the emails. Where the court found that it had been proved that the defendant was responsible for sending the utterances, it held that they did not constitute a criminal offence. This acquittal is now final.

On 20 October 2011 The Hague district court convicted a defendant of distributing music that was insulting and intended to incite hatred, by means of a peer-to-peer network which enables people to download each other’s music files. The music in question consisted of a large number of racist songs with titles such as “Nigger out” and “Ruhm und Ehre”, in which “Sieg Heil” and other slogans were chanted. The lyrics were aimed at Jews, people of colour, non-Western immigrants and gypsies. Many of the songs propagated National Socialist ideology. The district court imposed an order for 60 hours’ community service.

On 20 September 2011 Amsterdam court of appeal ruled that a defendant had been proved to have incited violence against the property of others (namely a church) on account of their religion. The defendant had displayed various images in the window of his home, including a poster depicting a church surrounded by flames and bearing the words “burn the”. There was also a picture of a Christian cross with an “equals” sign followed by a swastika. Two of the images consisted of the “no” symbol superimposed on a Christian cross, with the caption “Bad Religion”.^[13] The defendant was sentenced to a fine of €250 (suspended).

On 23 June 2011 Amsterdam district court acquitted MP Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party, of insulting a group of persons, namely Muslims, and of inciting hatred of and discrimination against Muslims, Moroccans and non-Western immigrants. The public prosecutor took the view that the defendant’s utterances did not constitute a criminal offence and recommended acquittal. The defendant had been charged with a large number of utterances he had made in interviews, columns, articles and the film Fitna. The district court concluded that most of them were critical of Islam as a religion and were not aimed at Muslims as such, and were therefore not covered by the Criminal Code’s provisions on discrimination. In the case of certain utterances, which perhaps could have been regarded as inciting hatred, the district court held that they had been made in the context of the public debate and that they therefore did not constitute criminal offences.^[14] The acquittal is final.

On 10 June 2011, The Hague court of appeal sentenced a man to a fine of €250 for insulting a group of persons, namely Jews, Muslims and people of colour. He was on his way to a right-wing extremist party and his jacket bore a number of discriminatory images.^[15] He had previously been acquitted by The Hague court of appeal but the acquittal was overturned by the Supreme Court. The conviction is final.

On 12 May 2011 The Hague district court convicted one defendant and acquitted another of publishing discriminatory statements on the right-wing extremist website Holland Hardcore.^[16] The first defendant was acquitted because it had not been established that he, as the moderator, had seen the discriminatory statements on the website. The second defendant was found guilty of insulting and inciting hatred of various groups on account of their race and/or belief. His statements were aimed at people of Moroccan and Antillean descent, Jews, Muslims, LGBTs, gypsies, people of colour and foreigners in general. The defendant personally posted discriminatory utterances on the website, allowed discriminatory utterances by others to remain on the website and had in his possession a CD containing racist lyrics with the intention of distributing it. The court imposed a 36-hour community service order.

On 11 January 2011 Utrecht district court convicted a defendant of insulting Jews as a group and of inciting hatred of and discrimination against Jews, on account of anti-Semitic statements he made while being filmed by a news website’s camera. He said: “The Jews must be wiped out”, “I want to stick them right now, I’ve got a scriber”, “I hate Israeli Jews”, and “When I see a Jew with a skullcap I want to stick him right away”. The defendant was also convicted of theft. The court imposed an order for 80 hours of community service, of which 40 hours were suspended, and ordered the defendant to perform 16 of the hours at the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam.

On 23 November 2010 the Supreme Court overturned the acquittal of a defendant charged with possessing T-shirts bearing the words “Combat 18” and “Whatever it takes” with the intention of distributing them.^[17] Combat 18 is a violent neo-Nazi organisation. The figure 18 refers to the first and eighth letters of the alphabet: A and H, Adolf Hitler’s initials. The Hague court of appeal is to give judgment again in this case.

On 22 November 2010 the Public Prosecution Service brought a number of cases involving charges of discrimination before Amsterdam district court. During this theme session the court heard the facts of three cases involving racial discrimination.^[18] They ranged from the chanting of anti-Semitic slogans at football matches to a confrontation in which a member of the public verbally abused a police officer on account of his ethnicity.

The first case concerned a car driver who verbally abused and spat at a woman traffic warden of colour, when she was about to fine him because he had not bought a parking ticket. He shouted at her, using offensive expressions relating to her colour, for example: “Filthy fucking black monkey” and “Stinking whore, go pick bananas you monkey”. Then he spat at her. In line with the Public Prosecution Service’s required sanction, the district court sentenced the defendant to a fine of €550.^[19]

The second case was the trial of three football supporters, who had violently attacked riot squad officers before a football match. One of the defendants was also convicted of giving intentional public expression to views insulting to Jews (art. 137c of the Criminal Code) by chanting with others “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas”. The court imposed a suspended sentence of one month’s imprisonment on all three, with an operational period of two years, during which time a stadium banning order was also imposed. The defendants were also subjected to community service orders ranging from 60 to 150 hours.^[20]

The third case involved a police officer of Moroccan descent. Following a complaint about noise, the officer and a colleague went to a street in Amsterdam. After they had talked to the defendant, he said to one of the police officers in a very loud voice: “You must be another Moroccan! You’re a fucking Moroccan like them!” (looking at a man and a woman who was wearing a headscarf). The defendant also said: “You’re a fucking Moroccan. Go back to Morocco. I’m proud of being a European. You Moroccans are all the same. You Moroccans are ruining this place.” Following these utterances the defendant was arrested. He resisted and kicked at the officer. The defendant was sentenced to perform 240 hours’ community service, 80 of which were suspended.^[21]

On 11 October 2010, The Hague district court sentenced three branch managers and a personnel officer of a supermarket chain to a fine of €1,250, all suspended.^[22] They were charged with having in the conduct of their profession intentionally discriminated against persons of Moroccan descent on account of their race (art. 137g of the Criminal Code).

The three branch managers had informed the personnel officer by email that they wanted no more job applicants of Moroccan descent. The investigation into the case revealed that for at least two weeks the personnel manager complied with the branch managers’ request and sent no applicants of Moroccan descent to the branches in question. The convictions are final.

On 11 October 2010, Amsterdam court of appeal convicted a man of posting discriminatory utterances about Muslims and immigrants on the Internet.^[23] The court also found that it had been proved that the defendant had made a habit of this practice. A more severe maximum penalty therefore applied. The defendant was sentenced to a fine of €1,000, €500 of which was suspended. He had previously been acquitted by the district court. The utterances in question were as follows:

On 21 September 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man who had displayed a swastika flag in his window.^[24] The alternative sanction of 40 hours thus became final.

On 16 February 2010, in accordance with the public prosecutor’s required sanction, Den Bosch district court sentenced a defendant, the proprietor of a bar, to 60 hours’ community service and a suspended term of imprisonment of two weeks, with an operational period of two years. In addition the court ordered her to pay damages of €250 to the injured party in the second offence.^[25]

The defendant was prosecuted for discrimination on account of race in the conduct of her profession as the proprietor of the Gompie bar in Den Bosch. In two joined cases, she was charged principally with a violation of article 137g of the Criminal Code (discrimination on account of race) and alternatively with contravening article 429 quater of the Criminal Code (discrimination on account of race, the minor offence version of article 137g).

The primary offence was having five young immigrants men removed from the bar and subsequently refusing to allow them to enter on several occasions. The doorman, who knew some of them from another establishment and knew that they were not troublemakers, referred them to the local antidiscrimination bureau. Four of them filed a criminal complaint of discrimination. The bar owner was also charged with having refused to sell a ticket for a carnival party in the bar to a young man of colour. The conviction is final.

On 1 February 2010 Amsterdam district court convicted a defendant of insulting individuals, shoplifting and insulting police officers. The insults were aimed at three young men who were standing outside a synagogue in Amstelveen to provide security. As one was wearing a yarmulke, he could be identified as Jewish. The defendant shouted insults such as: “Fucking Jew”, “Fucking Jew, we’ll kill you”, and “Allah Akbar, we’ll come back and kill you all”. The defendant was sentenced to 80 hours’ community service and a suspended two-week term of imprisonment.

An overview of statistics on discrimination registered with the Public Prosecution Service in the period 2006-2010

Summary of the findings of the report “Statistics on Discrimination: 2010”

A marked improvement in the position of ethnic-minority workers on the labour market, both men and women, took place over an extended period of time. The economic crisis that began in 2008 has, however, made inroads into these gains. The 2011 average net labour participation of ethnic-minority workers was 67.2%, 0.1% higher than in 2010 and 3.5% higher than the year average for 2005 (63.7%), the year the previous recession bottomed out.

(Graph: Jaarrapport Integratie 2011, Netherlands Institute for Social Research)

The bar chart below was taken from the 2011 annual report on integration (Jaarrapport Integratie 2011) published by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research. It depicts net labour participation for men and women, by ethnic origin, over a 10-year period.

These days, the subject of integration is broached with mixed feelings. European countries are faced with the intractable results of decades of migration to, and within, Europe by large groups of people, often from non-Western countries. Various politicians in the Netherlands, and heads of government of neighbouring countries, have recently spoken out against a society in which people live in separate communities. They have in particular questioned the prospects of the multicultural society. Their conclusion is that multiculturalism has failed because in the last few decades, contrary to expectations, the different ethnic and cultural groups that make up European societies have not come together as one. Cultural diversity has in fact, in their eyes, led to division or, at best, benign mutual neglect.

The government shares this dissatisfaction with the multicultural society. The intractable nature of integration problems underscores the impression that the model of a multicultural society has not resolved the dilemma of a diverse society. Integration does of course take place, and many migrants have successfully found their way in the economic, cultural, political and academic worlds. However, concerns regarding the migrants who have not achieved an independent existence overshadow this. Too many children grow up in poorly functioning families in an environment in which unemployment, debt, school dropout and criminal behaviour are commonplace. Added to that is the growing concern that sociocultural integration is also lagging, and that divergences are becoming more ingrained and hardened. Time and again we hear that many Dutch people do not see the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Netherlands as an enrichment, but as a threat. For nearly 20 years now around half of all Dutch people have been saying that too many foreigners are living in the Netherlands.^[26]

In recent years integration policy has developed in interaction with changing social and political perceptions, and with an eye for people’s concerns and needs. The result is an integration policy with greater emphasis on the importance of a common basis and recognisable foundations.^[27] Following naturally on from this, more demanding elements have been introduced for newcomers, including civic integration, testing knowledge of the Dutch language and society, and renunciation of a non-Dutch nationality in return for naturalisation. Integration and social cohesion are still under pressure, and further steps need to be taken in the interests of social continuity and stability.

Moreover, the government advocates an approach in which the influx of immigrants without prospects is reduced, while people who wish to settle here will be expected to work, keep to the rules and ensure their own civic integration. The government is aware of the negative effects of immigration and inadequate integration, and is combating them with a palette of measures and coming down hard on transgressive behaviour. However, integration policy is more than just enforcing aliens legislation and criminal law. The government wants to go further than simply tackling and combating the current symptoms and their knock-on effects. Social tensions can be eliminated not by combating symptoms alone, but by encouraging development that allows people to cooperate productively and live together despite their differences. A demanding integration policy targeting the mechanisms of housing, work and education is the product of broader policy aimed at mutual involvement and continuity in Dutch society and the values on which it is based. Freedom, equality, tolerance and solidarity are values which have traditionally underlain Dutch society. The government expects everybody to make an effort to safeguard these values now and in the future. Rules and requirements that apply to everyone, involvement, responsibility and self-reliance form the basis of the social solidarity that we expect of everyone.

This memorandum expands on this stance, these principles and their implications for policy, meeting the House’s request to formulate principles for integration policy.^[28] We will first reflect on the current integration situation before looking in greater detail at this government’s policy plans and principles and the implications for integration policy. Given that this government’s integration policy must be seen in the light of broader policy on encouraging people to take responsibility for their own lives and living environment, the memorandum will be rounded off with the implications of this government’s principles for fleshing out policy on citizenship and redistributing tasks between the government and citizens.

A society without external influences is as unthinkable for the Netherlands as for any other country. For centuries, the economic and cultural life of European societies has been determined by migration flows within Europe, trade with the colonies and outward emigration flows. The end of the Second World War faced European governments with the colossal task of receiving and resettling the millions of people uprooted and displaced by war. That movement was followed by the migration triggered by decolonisation, the recruitment of large groups of migrant workers from North Africa and the Mediterranean and – in the decades that followed – by growing numbers of asylum seekers from the world over.

Half a century of migration means that a considerable proportion of the Dutch population has non-Dutch roots. In the Netherlands there are 1.5 million non-indigenous people of Western origin and 1.8 million people of non-Western origin; in total 9% and 11% respectively of the total population. Two-thirds of the latter category are Dutch people of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Caribbean origin (Antillean/Aruban). A further 11% of people of non-Western origin are from China, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran or Somalia.^[29] The majority of current immigrants are knowledge workers, or EU residents travelling to the Netherlands for a short or longer period thanks to the free movement of persons and workers. Most are migrant workers from the EU coming to the Netherlands to work. In 2009 it was calculated that some 165,000 people from Central and Eastern Europe were living in the Netherlands.^[30]

The ongoing debate on immigration and criticism of the multicultural society tend to incorrectly suggest that integration is not happening at all. The reality is different. Figures and data show that progress is being made. However, behind this general picture there is a great deal of diversity between and within groups. For example, there is a fundamental difference in integration between the first and subsequent generations.^[31] Moreover, positive developments and successes achieved do not change the fact that there are still many problems and drawbacks. The settlement of sometimes poorly educated migrants from different parts of the world has resulted in a very varied population with behaviour and views that can clash head on.

From the perspective of public safety, the over-representation of migrants and their children in crime figures is an ongoing cause for concern. In the Netherlands in 2008, 1.5% of the population aged 12 years and over had been suspected of a criminal offence. For Dutch people of non-Western origin, the figure was 4.3%. The percentage is significantly higher for specific groups, at up to 7%. Although age was also a factor, it is troubling that in almost all ethnic groups percentages were higher for the second generation (up to 10%) than for the first. Figures compiled in 2009 by Frank Bovenkerk, a criminologist associated with the University of Utrecht, suggest the problem is even more serious. He concluded that no less than 54.7% of young men of Moroccan origin in Rotterdam had had at least one brush with the law. The figure was 40% for those of Antillean and Surinamese origin and 36% for those of Turkish origin, compared with 18.4% of ethnically Dutch young men.

Early school leaving and unemployment are also persistent, complex problems with a serious social impact. In the 2009-2010 session, the dropout rates among young Dutch people of Moroccan and Antillean origin were 5.6% and 6.8% respectively, a considerable higher figure than for ethnically Dutch young people (2.4%).^[32] A quarter of young people from the first two groups are unemployed, while an estimated 10% (five times as many as ethnically Dutch young people) are suspected of involvement in crime. The integration of refugee groups – Somalis in particular – is also very problematic. Somalis are generally very poorly educated. More than half (58%) have never attended school, or received primary education only. Net participation in the labour market (i.e. the percentage of the working age population – 15 to 64 – with a paid job) is also shockingly low for refugee groups, not only in comparison with the ethnically Dutch (69%), but also in comparison with the four main non-Western groups. Only 29% of Dutch people of Somali origin are in paid work. The figures for the equivalent Iraqi and Afghan groups are 35% and 36% respectively, while those for Dutch people of Turkish and Moroccan origin are 54% and 50%.^[33]

The general picture is that migrants and their children are still over-represented in the lowest socioeconomic classes. Although the labour market participation of Dutch people of Turkish and Moroccan origin has sharply increased over the last 15 years, it is still 10% to 12% lower than that of Dutch people of Surinamese and Antillean origin. There is still a large gap in labour market participation between Dutch people of non-Western origin and the ethnically Dutch (69% compared to 53% in 2010).^[34] This low labour market participation is reflected in a high dependence on benefit payments although figures are dropping, in 2009 10.7% of Dutch people of non-Western origin were still dependent on social assistance benefit while 2.9% received unemployment benefit (compared to 1.6% and 1.9% respectively of the ethnically Dutch). The over-representation in dependence on social assistance benefit applied to older migrants in particular. In contrast to social assistance benefit and unemployment benefit, Dutch people of non-Western origin receive incapacity benefit less often than the ethnically Dutch (6.4% compared to 7.1%).^[35]

There is also concern about mutual involvement and social cohesion. There is little sign of progress, and little public support, only mutual distrust and feelings of unfair treatment. As many as 61% of the population feel there are tensions between ethnic minorities and the ethnically Dutch, while 41% of the ethnically Dutch believe that the Western way of life and an Islamic way of life do not mix.^[36] In 2009 between 35% and 40% of people agreed that the Netherlands would be a more pleasant country if there were fewer immigrants living here. Positive and negative views on the presence of non-Western migrants in Dutch society go hand in hand, as in the same year a similar proportion of people said that the presence of different cultures benefited our society.

People with only primary or secondary education are much more averse to the presence of migrants than the more highly educated.^[37] Researchers have suggested that negative views on non-Western migrants on the part of the less well educated may be due to competing with them on the labour market. The less well educated are also more often confronted with problems caused by poor integration. Between 2008 and 2010, 49% to 57% of the less well educated said that the Netherlands would be a better country if there were fewer non-Western migrants living here. The equivalent figure for those more highly educated was 19% to 29%. Appreciation of different cultures is much higher among the more highly educated (56% to 67%) than among the less well educated (15% to 29%). In turn, more highly educated Muslims feel more negative about social attitudes towards Muslims than less well educated Muslims.^[38]

One striking aspect of the integration issue today is developments in the Islamic and Arabic world. Dutch concerns about international developments are linked to concerns about the Netherlands. Reports of attacks and other acts of violence committed by organisations claiming to represent ‘Islam’ feed uncertainties about cultural differences between the Western and Islamic worlds, and concerns that not only the cultural distinctiveness, but also the core values of Dutch society are at stake. For example, 41% of the ethnically Dutch believe that Islamic and Western ways of life do not mix.^[39]

Integration is a long-term process, in which persistent problems and positive developments go hand in hand. This is borne out by figures and statistics. Despite their difficult position and ongoing problems with criminality, in other areas the second and subsequent generations are doing better than their parents or grandparents. In recent years young people from the second generation have come a tremendous way in catching up in terms of education. More and more children of migrant families are going on to senior general secondary education (HAVO) and pre-university education (VWO). For example, Chinese pupils more often continue to HAVO or VWO than ethnically Dutch pupils. There are also more non-Western ethnic minority women in higher education. In fact, Dutch girls of Surinamese and Antillean origin more often continue to higher education than ethnically Dutch girls (with percentages respectively at 65%, 80% and 61%). The fact that non-Western migrants are more becoming more highly educated is reflected by their occupying higher level occupations. This is particularly visible in the second generation. There is also more self-employment, with more and more migrant entrepreneurs in a range of fields.^[40]

Progress is also being made in other areas. Although a large proportion of parents of Moroccan or Turkish origin talk to their children in their mother tongue, more and more families are speaking Dutch (the proportion of children of Turkish origin talking to their parents in Turkish has fallen from c. 80% to 60%). Children of Moroccan origin, in particular, are talking to their parents less and less in their parents’ mother tongue. Over a period of 11 years the proportion of Dutch young people of Moroccan origin speaking Arabic or Berber with their mother or father has fallen from nearly 70% to just over 30%.^[41] That is not strange, because Dutch is the first language of almost all young people of ethnic minority origin. Second-generation young people of Moroccan and Antillean origin speak the Dutch language as well as Dutch people of Surinamese origin, who have very few problems with the language. Young people of Turkish origin still have problems with Dutch.^[42]

In sociocultural respects as well, young people differ more and more from their parents. This group is typified by the ease with which they combine an orientation towards the Netherlands, or an identification with a particular city or neighbourhood, with a feeling of connection to their country of origin. The generational difference is particularly marked for those of Turkish or Moroccan origin. Some 15% and 20% respectively of first-generation people of Turkish and Moroccan origin consider themselves Dutch. The proportion is considerably higher for the second generation, at 45% and 55% respectively. Although this shows clear progress, there is still cause for concern: half of younger people of Turkish and Moroccan do not feel wholly or predominantly Dutch.^[43]

3. Secure, stable and committed: Dutch society as the basis for integration and citizenship

The government’s aim with this policy is to safeguard and promote security, prosperity and well-being in a changing world. The goal is a Dutch society in which everyone who is eligible to settle here can create a home for themselves by contributing to society. The government emphatically rejects the relativism implied in the concept of a multicultural society, envisaging a society which may be changing, partly due to the migrants settling here, but is not interchangeable with any other. The foundations of social life in the Netherlands are historically shaped landmarks, shared by many Dutch people, which cannot be relinquished. That applies not only to the attainments and core values that underlie the rule of law in the Netherlands, but also to more historically or culturally determined landmarks such as the Dutch language, historic monuments or architectural features, or the unwritten folkways and codes of behaviour that have developed over the course of history and which come to the fore as required by the situation.

Integration means integration into Dutch society. A society which has been shaped by the efforts, expectations and convictions of generations of those who went before us, on which foundations it will continue to develop through the efforts, expectations and convictions of everyone who wishes to settle in our society. Despite all the indisputable social changes and cultural development, society is based on a fundamental continuity of values, views, institutions and customs that constitute the prevailing culture in Dutch society and help make it distinctive. This is reflected in legislation and in social contacts. That does not imply a closed society or culture. Its geographical location, economy, culture and traditions make the Netherlands an open society. Openness is also a characteristic value of Dutch society.

Dutch society, in all its diversity, is the society in which anyone who settles in the Netherlands must learn to live, to which they must adapt and in which they must fit. That may seem like asking a tremendous lot of migrants, but it is not. Anyone who leaves their own country to go and live in another expects to encounter things that were missing so much in their country of origin that they were prepared to take the major step of building a new life elsewhere. Refugees, in particular, are well aware from their own experience of what happens when basic human rights are trampled underfoot. The climate of freedom and responsibility for which this government stands is based on the core values and freedoms on which the rule of law in the Netherlands is based.

An important element of that climate of freedom and responsibility has always been freedom of religion. This freedom embraces all religions and beliefs, including Islam. That does not alter the fact that the government is aware that Islam, which as the faith of many immigrants has within a short period become one of the most widespread religions in the Netherlands, is a cause of concern for some sections of the population because of its distinctive traditions and beliefs and because they associate it with violence and radicalism elsewhere in the world and in the Netherlands. They feel it may pose a threat to the achievements of our democracy and the rule of law. The government recognises that these concerns exist and sees it as its task to dispel them, where possible, as they threaten social cohesion; but not by infringing on Muslims’ freedom of religion or adopting a general attitude of suspicion towards Islam. However, freedom of religion must not offer protection for radicalisation or behaviour that is anti-democratic or contrary to the fundamental principles of Dutch society. The Muslim community itself and Muslims clerics have a role to play in making it clear, e.g. by distancing themselves from such comments, that radicalisation and utterances against integration and democracy are not inherent to Islam. Democracy and the rule of law are, and will remain, the only basic premises of Dutch society.

Migrants can be expected to have to acquire the skills they need to participate in Dutch society and to contribute to the best of their ability to its development. That requires them not only to master the Dutch language and to support themselves through income from employment, but also to respect and share the core values of the rule of law: freedom, responsibility, equality, tolerance and solidarity. These core values are based on respect for the dignity and equality of every person. Sharing them is no less important for cohesion and harmony in society than knowledge of our language and customs. That does not mean that the aim of integration is assimilation or a uniform identity. Scope for diversity is one of the achievements of Dutch society expressed in the Constitution. The individual freedom to live as one wishes, within commonly defined limits, is highly prized. People who chose to build a life in the Netherlands are accordingly not asked to give up their identity or faith, but are asked to integrate. One characteristic of integration is that people see their own future and identity interlinked with the community of which they are part.

A society in which everyone who lives or settles here can create a home for themselves does not come about by itself, and is not automatically the result if everyone goes their own way. A more demanding integration policy is required and justified, as otherwise society will gradually grow apart, people will live in separate communities, and in the end no-one will feel at home any more in the Netherlands. People who wish to settle in the Netherlands are expected to contribute to strengthening social cohesion and to get involved and show civic responsibility. Imposing requirements on immigrants who settle in our society is justified because society demands the same from Dutch citizens. A more demanding integration policy therefore implies a more general effort to strengthen social cohesion, promote citizenship and validate Dutch society. Integration and strengthening solidarity and citizenship are closely related, and together reflect a society with which people want to identify. This presupposes a foundation of shared values and norms.

However, increasing diversity means that a foundation of shared values and norms is not a matter of course. All of us who live here need to be proactive and involved if we wish to continue living in harmony in this time of growing diversity and individualism. Commonality and mutual solidarity are, therefore, a challenge for everyone. Government, legislation and policy are no substitute for this, but can provide a framework, support and something to hold on to. Our starting point should be trusting in the power of society to uphold in everyday social interaction the core and character of the Dutch social order. However, when faced with conditions threatening social cohesion and stability, government intervention can be justified.

Mutual involvement that is not limited to one’s own circle and social stability are the essential social conditions that the government is working towards and for which people are themselves responsible. More is at stake than simply the position and involvement of migrants. Government policy to protect social stability and reaffirm the character of Dutch society affects everyone in the Netherlands. Everyone need to make an effort and get involved if they want to be an active part of what is in many respects a diverse society. The government expects everyone in the Netherlands to participate and be involved in Dutch society, and a sense of belonging. We expect everyone to equip themselves to participate in the life of society and the labour market. Common rules and requirements form the foundation for the social solidarity expected between citizens.

This memorandum and these principles have implications for the government’s policy on aliens and integration. Aliens policy will be amended in the coming years. We start from the principle that the immigration of people who have little or no opportunity for, or prospect of, participating and having a self-reliant existence in Dutch society should be prevented. For this reason requirements will be imposed, on admission, regarding knowledge of the Dutch language and customs. Admission policy will in this way contribute to the integration of aliens in our society and therefore constitute an essential precondition. The government has outlined its proposed policy on aliens and immigration on a previous occasion.^[44]

Integration policy concerns migrants admitted to the Netherlands with a view to settling here. The first guideline is that integration is the responsibility not of government, but of those who settle here. Civic integration and acquisition of the knowledge necessary to build a life in the Netherlands are the individual’s responsibility. This follows from the demands placed on every Dutch citizen; everyone can be expected to contribute to society and to be self-reliant , depending on their capacity to do so. This applies equally to people born here and to those who come to the Netherlands later in life.

The second guideline is that people’s future is what counts, not their origin. Accordingly, policy will no longer be origin-specific; integration will no longer be achieved through specific policy, aimed at specific groups, but by general measures based on the responsibility of the person in question and of social institutions. Transgressive and criminal behaviour will be tackled, regardless of ethnic origin. Moreover, experience shows that measures targeting specific ethnic groups confine people in groups and only emphasise the dividing lines between them, which is at odds with the goal of shared citizenship.

Integration is not achieved by turning a blind eye to the abuses and excesses resulting from a lack of integration. Integration is achieved if migrants make an effort to integrate and are helped to do so. This can be facilitated by mechanisms for social integration. This implies a third guideline. Regular policy on the labour market, education and housing should enable everyone to create an independent life for themselves, in line with their ability. This may require assistance from family or their immediate circle. Policy needs to work for all groups in society. If it does not, general policy will be adjusted rather than turning to specific instruments.

Everyone is responsible for creating an independent life and participating in society. This begins with investing in the knowledge and skills required to do so. The government believes that having a working knowledge of the Dutch language and society is an essential precondition for being able to actively participate in society. However, active participation also requires that people continue to develop, perhaps with the assistance of family, friends, neighbours, societies or churches. We are examining whether the concept of compulsory education for all ages could serve as a broader basis for social security and the fight against illiteracy.

The government’s call on people to continue to develop is not optional and will be imposed if people apply for social security benefits. If people apply for social security benefits, the government expects them to actively work towards reintegration in the labour market. People without a working knowledge of the Dutch language, or an insufficient knowledge of it to find paid work, will be expected to learn it at their own expense. Not meeting this requirement will result in their social assistance benefit being reduced or terminated. A number of measures are being taken to reduce migrants’ reliance on social security benefits, so that the latter will not be a factor attracting migration.

Civic integration is the first step to an independent life for people who settle in the Netherlands. The concept of civic integration is based on the idea that Dutch society is not a random collection of people who live here, but a community of citizens with a common language, values and ideas. Anyone who wants to come to the Netherlands to settle here can be expected, as a minimum, to keep to the rules, participate in everyday social life and invest in the skills required to do this. This expectation of self-reliance will be incorporated into the amended Civic Integration Act, making clear that migrants themselves are responsible for achieving the required level of knowledge of the Dutch language and society. If they require a course to achieve this, they will have to pay for it themselves. Only people who are unable to cover the costs themselves can use the safety net of a system of loans.

In amending the Civic Integration Act we need to remember that, in today’s society, more and more is required of people if they want to keep up. Those who are able should be given an opportunity immediately on arrival here to take a course that does justice to their abilities and ambitions. The civic integration examination required for admission is suited primarily to uneducated people or people with only primary education. That is why the government emphasises in the amended Civic Integration Act that the civic integration diploma is not the only way to fulfil the integration requirement and that, given the demands made by society, people who can function at a higher level should do so. Accordingly, there will be stricter integration requirements for a permanent residence permit. The government’s premise is that failure to pass the civic integration examination, unless there are exceptional circumstances, will result in the participant’s temporary regular residence permit being revoked. Proposals to this effect will be made when amending the Civic Integration Act. Revocation of the residence permit will not of course apply to holders of an asylum residence permit, or in cases in which revocation would be contrary to international law.

The position of some migrants – mostly young women – who come to the Netherlands to form a family or for family reunification is cause for concern. The continuous stream of new family migrants who are insufficiently prepared for entrance to our society is holding back the integration process. Some marriage and family migrants end up in an acutely dependent position. Some are faced with honour violence, polygamy and forced marriage, all of which are unacceptable in a democracy governed by the rule of law like the Netherlands. Family migrants will have to fulfil new admission requirements: they must have independent accommodation and medical insurance. Poor language skills, a low level of education and unfamiliarity with Dutch institutions pose a risk for both equal opportunities and general future prospects for these migrants and their children. To encourage this group to be self-reliant in Dutch society, as part of the general civic integration obligation, various requirements including command of the language will be imposed on this group of migrants. The civic integration examination abroad will help with the integration of family migrants who come to the Netherlands.^[46]

Migrants from the European Union constitute a separate category. As EU citizens they are entitled to live and work in the Netherlands. However, the influx of temporary migrants from Central and Eastern Europe is currently overburdening certain old urban neighbourhoods in Rotterdam and The Hague. People often live in poor housing, do not speak Dutch and only expect to be in the Netherlands for a short time. In practice, a growing number of them end up settling in the Netherlands. We therefore need to prevent new groups of disadvantaged people forming in the Netherlands in the coming years. This requires a delicate balance with the free movement of European citizens. The government has already sent the House a summary of measures designed to manage labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe effectively.^[47] The measures touch on areas including information and registration, work, social services, language, integration and education, and departure and return. Labour migrants, too, are responsible for their own integration. This issue also affects other countries within the EU. Given the high level of migration within the EU, establishing a good starting position for economic and social self-reliance benefits not only the Netherlands but also Europe as a whole, because of the free movement of persons. It is therefore important that EU countries establish a comparable approach to encouraging the integration of migrants from within the EU.

First-generation migrants who end up in a dead-end situation in the Netherlands, dependent on benefits and without prospect of participating fully in society, and wish to return to their country of origin are offered a way out by the Repatriation Act (Remigratiewet). Given the importance that the government attaches to universal participation, we are keen to limit the Repatriation Act to the first generation of people, who genuinely need it. With a view to this, the Act will be amended and slimmed down.

In a committed community what binds us is important, not what divides us. Accordingly, it is important that we do not pursue policy based on origin, but rather offer targeted solutions within general policy where necessary. Integration is a dynamic process with several main strategic features: good education, neighbourhoods in which people live happily side by side, good physical and mental health and long-term employment. The government’s approach is that regular policy should reach all groups where these areas are concerned.

Regular services and policy should enable everyone to create an independent life, perhaps with the support of family or those in the direct vicinity. Accordingly, policy and its implementation need to be designed so they are effective in tackling specific social problems. Specific problems should be tackled by regular institutions and regular measures, whether the goal be increasing labour participation, improving knowledge of the Dutch language or reducing school dropout, anti-social behaviour and crime. The same applies to ongoing problems with anti-social behaviour, safety and the approach to young delinquents. Generic policy provides a range of measures the government can call on in dealing with these issues.

Existing specific measures for tackling problems that are particularly common among certain groups will be anchored in regular policy in the coming months. As a consequence, grants for the integration of specific groups will end. The specific approach to young people of Antillean and Moroccan origin will be subsumed in the general approach to delinquent youth groups and nuisance youths. On 18 May the government submitted the action plan on criminal youth gangs to the House of Representatives, stating that in the next two years all known delinquent youth groups will be tackled by the police, the Public Prosecution Service and the municipalities. So as to offer young people in the Netherlands better prospects, the government is working to make good basic vocational education available to young people, and will continue to target school dropout. The aim is to halve the number of new cases of dropout to a maximum of 35,000 in 2012, reducing the figure further to a maximum of 25,000 in 2016. The increasing problems concerning the use of and trade in qat in certain groups of migrants, particularly the Somali community, is reason to consider whether qat should be classed as a controlled substance. Over the next six months we will be examining the options and the scope of the problem. This autumn the government will decide what measures are needed, based on the research results. The House was recently informed to this effect.

If regular policy is to work, thorough knowledge is required of the specific problems and the background to them, the effects of and possible obstacles to regular policy, and successful interventions and methods. In the interests of supporting local policy the government will make public information on the position of various groups in Dutch society, and develop and make available effective interventions, encouraging regular institutions to make use of them. Knowledge and experience, including those gained as part of the Diversity in Youth Policy programme and in the approach to young Dutch people of Moroccan and Antillean origin, will be drawn on to give generic institutions the knowledge and capacity to effectively tackle specific problems related to certain migrants under regular policy. Integration policy is largely made at local level; this requires every municipality and town in the Netherlands to devise appropriate answers to the problems caused by insufficient integration among residents. Mutual coordination between municipalities, and the involvement of central government, are key to this.

An effective approach to the issue of integration through regular policy requires close contact with key figures and organisations with knowledge of, and a broad network within, migrant communities. This makes it possible to keep a finger on the pulse of society and to assess whether regular policy is achieving the desired results. These contacts can also be used to influence policy.

Integration policy is part of wider policy intended to strengthen social cohesion and citizenship. In the coming years the Netherlands will inevitably be faced with tensions, given the economic power shifts in the world and increased competition for primary energy sources, food and water. At the same time, social cohesion and solidarity may also be put to the test by more intensive international contacts and the globalisation of markets. Parallel to this, government will also need to call far more on people to get involved in tackling and solving social problems, as there will be less funding and fewer human resources available. These developments, taken together, require the government to actively focus on social cohesion.

Securing social cohesion, mutual involvement and social stability mainly requires active individual efforts. In a diverse society, in which traditional social bonds have weakened and – certainly in urban areas – there are often major differences between people’s ways of life and ideas, trust, solidarity and concern for each other cannot be taken for granted. Nor are social codes for coexistence the same, or equally applicable, everywhere. Policy designed to encourage increased involvement needs to take this into account. The diversity of Dutch society requires a fundamental commitment to citizenship that recognises and respects differences in origin, ways of thinking and religion, but which at the same time assumes that we share individual and joint responsibility, in word and in deed, for society as a whole.

Citizenship begins with the participation of each citizen: by creating an independent life, by being self-reliant, and by being aware of and applying the rules of Dutch society. Accordingly, citizenship is based on active participation in all relevant areas of society – the labour market, education, and one’s local neighbourhood and living environment – through protecting and upholding democracy and the rule of law, by bringing children up to be responsible citizens, and by showing concern for fellow citizens and respecting their rights.

A working knowledge of Dutch is an essential condition for active participation in society. And an essential condition for citizenship is to feel part of society, identify with society, feel responsible for it and want to belong to it. Society in the Netherlands is based on solidarity. However, the trust required for this does not develop automatically. It implies that fundamental social values are shared: core values that arise from respect for the dignity and equality of every individual, a sense of community and respect for the demands posed by life in a diverse society. This is a matter not of abstractions, but of values expressed in social interaction, in rules of personal conduct, and in the objectives and methods of organisations such as businesses, schools, families, public administration etc. This implies that people can be called to account for their behaviour, that they are responsible for their actions, and that this can be assumed to apply to everyone; that people are given the opportunity to live up to their responsibilities for themselves and their society. If identification with these core values and their crystallisation in daily life is missing, there will be consequences for participation and social cohesion.

Cohesion is primarily a goal for people to reach together. Nonetheless, the government can promote it through services and incentives and sometimes by setting standards, e.g. through education. The essence of citizenship is a feeling of social responsibility for solving issues that affect everyone, rather than mere compliance with statutory obligations. The government can help by reminding people and civil society organisations – including churches – of this. If people’s behaviour is undermining the foundations of society and it is no longer enough to appeal to their sense of responsibility, statutory measures may be required. The rule of law should provide everyone with security and legal certainty in equal measure; that forms the basis for interaction both between the public and government and among individuals. The authorities will enforce the law when the limits imposed by the rule of law are breached.

However, in the current situation the state needs to do more. In a world in which national states were comparatively disconnected, as used to be the case, government could adopt a more relative and neutral approach in its domestic approach to views and social behaviour, while promoting and protecting selected national interests and views to the outside world. In today’s world, in which the domestic and outside worlds are increasingly interwoven, government needs to adopt a clear position on the domestic front, too, on what is in the interests of living side-by-side in one society and on the values on which this coexistence depends. Government will need to confront people about behaviour that is contrary to its vision of cohesion and citizenship and, where necessary, back this up with legal obligations.

Exclusion and discrimination in particular constitute a threat to trust and involvement in society. Discrimination affects people deeply and stands in the way of commitment to society. In a democracy governed by the rule of law we need to stand up for the human dignity of all, without distinction. Each discriminatory act or form of treatment should be forcefully combated. The government will therefore continue to fight to protect the principle of equality of treatment enshrined in article 1 of our Constitution, and will be presenting an augmented anti-discrimination action programme.

Exclusion and discrimination are also important ingredients for social unease. This may require the legislator to impose norms. In the government’s view, this is notably the case with wearing face-covering clothing. Dutch society is based on the openness of shared public life; anyone who withdraws from this by hiding their identity in the public arena, except in exceptional circumstances such as carnival or a skating competition, incites feelings of danger and aggression because it prevents people communicating. The principle is one of public policy; if it is no longer self-evident why this is important, it may be necessary to protect that principle by law. A comparable principle of public policy is that in the Netherlands we do not discriminate on the grounds of ethnic origin, nationality, religion or other grounds that infringe people’s equality.

In the coming years the government will strengthen and broaden committed citizenship. The aim is to achieve a turnaround in social trends which, in recent decades with the development of the welfare state, has seen responsibilities taken out of the hands of the public, professionals and civil society organisations and taken over by government services. The limits on available government funding and human resources now and in the foreseeable future mean these trends are no longer sustainable. Quite apart from this, it must be observed that this trend has contributed to the increasing tendency to see people as consumers or clients of public services rather than committed and accountable members of society. This is feeding a climate in which people look to government to solve all their problems and, consequently, are wasting their own creativity, commitment and ability to solve problems, or are expressing themselves only by criticising government. This situation cannot continue.

At least three different government policy areas are implicated in strengthening and extending committed citizenship, namely: 1) aspiring to compact government, 2) mobilising public commitment to, and accountability for, a liveable environment, and 3) looking to maintain individual involvement even as scaling up takes place. The aim of each of these policy developments is to explore new forms of commitment to and accountability for their environment by the public and civil society organisations which genuinely go further than the traditional forms of public consultations. Achieving compact government is not so much a matter of traditional government withdrawal, but rather of finding structures and solutions in which general interests can be promoted and public tasks carried out without involving official agencies and administrative decision-making. Mobilising the public and civil society organisations calls for forms of self-management of public services in neighbourhoods and villages or in designing public space. We will also look at applying in the Netherlands models used for example in the United Kingdom, such as parish councils, in particular the plans of David Cameron’s government for a Localism Bill in the framework of the Big Society.

The Dutch are already highly committed to tackling issues in their immediate surroundings. Many are socially active, for example in societies, foundations and religious organisations. Experience in neighbourhoods in various cities indicates that many people are perfectly capable of bringing changes about at that level. They know what is happening in their own area and want to be involved. There tends to be insufficient awareness of what this implies for policy and government action. The attitude of office-holders, public servants and local professionals who provide facilities for local residents or work with them is essential. The challenge they face is to enable people to take responsibility and initiatives. This is particularly true where the distance between the municipality and the public has been made greater by changes in the administrative system, such as municipal boundary reform and increases in scale. It requires genuine withdrawal and accepting the outcome of decision-making by the people directly affected, even when office-holders fear that the wrong choices are being made. Government should limit itself to its core tasks, focusing on the public good, education, safety and public order, while in other fields trusting committed individuals more and allowing them more responsibility. The government recognises the importance of volunteers. We support and facilitate voluntary work by providing training and coaching and through tax incentives (volunteer’s allowance (vrijwilligersaftrek)).

The Strong Communities Action Plan policy review committee will soon be presenting its report. The end report may include important action points for a collective agenda for modern-day citizenship, primarily filled with projects, proposals and agreements with municipalities, civil society organisations and the public.^[49] Religious institutions also have a valuable contribution to make. Experience gained from the Strong Communities Action Plan and the Social Support Act (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning) will be drawn on in compiling this agenda.

Integration policy is entering a new phase, and the government is keen to follow a new course based on the forces that bind people. A socially stable society is our main priority: a society in which people can live together in freedom, with a shared sense of responsibility, in which the future is what counts, not someone’s origin. The government will continue to make changes that previous governments set in motion. The key concepts are citizenship, involvement and self-reliance. The idea is that each individual makes a contribution to Dutch society by taking responsibility for his or her own life and environment and for society as a whole. Civic integration should enable people wishing and eligible to settle here to find their place in Dutch society. Those who do settle here will need to shoulder their own responsibility for this process. The government is contributing to this by helping to shape a Dutch society in which anyone who settles here can make a life for themselves through active participation. By taking this change in direction the government is endorsing the social norm that self-reliance and taking responsibility for oneself is the priority, that the Netherlands’ historically formed cultural foundations and the core values of the rule of law form the framework for integration, and that strengthening ties and social cohesion can assist in integration.

This edition of the Annual Integration Report concentrates on the structural integration of non-Western migrants into Dutch society. The emphasis in structural integration is on education, employment, income, housing and crime. The Report deals mainly with the four largest non-Western migrant groups in the Netherlands, namely people of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin. These groups make up almost two-thirds of all non-Western migrants in the Netherlands.

We address three main questions in this Report. The first is concerned with the size of the differences between and within migrant groups in various domains of integration and the width of the gap between the migrant and native Dutch populations. We then turn to the question of developments over time: how has the position of non-Western migrants developed in the short, medium and long term? Has their distance from the native Dutch population reduced? The third question is how far non-Western migrants are from a position of ‘proportionality’. Proportionality here means that non-Western migrants and their descendants occupy the same position in society as a relevant comparable category of native Dutch citizens. Minority groups differ from the native Dutch in terms of characteristics that determine their social position, such as education level and parental origin. A direct comparison of, say, the unemployment rate of migrant groups and the native Dutch ignores differences such as these. Using decomposition analyses, we corrected for differences in such characteristics, enabling us to see how far non-Western migrants are removed from a position of proportionality.

Over 11% of the Dutch population are of non-Western origin (1.9 million persons). Two thirds of non-Western migrants and their descendants belong to one of the four largest origin groups cited above. Migrants of Turkish origin form the biggest group (389,000), followed by people of Moroccan origin (356,000) and people of Surinamese origin (345,000). The group of Antillean origin is substantially smaller (141,000). The other non-Western migrants are of very diverse origin.

Between 42% and 53% of the four main non-Western groups belong to the second generation. The size of the four main non-Western groups has increased by 250,000 persons since 2000, and 80% of this increase is accounted for by the growth in the second generation.

Natural growth (the balance of births and deaths) has been the main determinant of this increase, rather than immigration. This is not because migrants have lots of children on average – that is almost no longer the case – but primarily because many migrants are in the age group when they are likely to have children.

Immigration to the Netherlands fell sharply from 2001 onwards, but has been increasing again since 2006, albeit at a slower pace than previously. Although the pace of growth has slowed somewhat in the last two years due to the economic crisis, the number of immigrants continues to rise. This is due almost entirely to immigration from member states of the European Union (especially Poland).

The proportion of second-generation marriages with someone from the same country of origin who was already living in the Netherlands before the marriage has increased in recent years. This has taken place at the expense of the proportion of migration marriages, which has fallen among migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin from around 50% in 2001 to some 15% in 2010.

Mixed marriages involving a native Dutch partner are most common among migrants of Antillean and Surinamese origin (40% and 30%, respectively). Mixed relationships are still relatively rare among those of Turkish and Moroccan origin (9% and 12%, respectively).

Average number of children of migrants coming closer to that of native population The average number of children born to non-Western women fell in the period 1996-2010, in contrast to the trend among native Dutch women. This reduction was substantial among first-generation women of Turkish and Moroccan origin. The average number of children born to second-generation women of Turkish and Moroccan descent is approaching that of native Dutch women. The average number of children born to women of Surinamese and Antillean has for many years been virtually the same as for native Dutch women.

It has been mandatory since 1998 for new migrants wishing to settle in the Netherlands to undergo a civic integration programme. The civic integration policy has changed considerably in recent years, for example with the introduction in 2007 of the Civic Integration Act (Wet inburgering), which extended the civic integration duty to all migrants in the Netherlands, including those who had already been living there for some time. New policy changes have recently been announced which are scheduled to come into force on 1 January 2013. This will make migrants entirely responsible for their own civic integration process, and the government will then no longer play a role in the provision of civic integration programmes.

After a slow start following the introduction of the new Act in 2007, the number of migrants enrolling in civic integration programmes increased steadily. In the first three years after the introduction of the Act, more than 158,000 people began an integration programme; by way of comparison, some 250,000 people followed a civic integration course throughout the entire period 1998-2006.

Local authorities have been relatively successful in reaching integrators: at the end of 2009, roughly two-thirds of the 220,000 “oldcomers” (migrants already living in the Netherlands for some time) took part in the process by enrolling in a civic integration programme offered or enforced by the local authority, after which they are responsible for continuing the programme themselves. The majority of oldcomers required to go through a civic integration programme are likely to have been reached before the new legislative changes come into force. More than 70% of newcomers had embarked on a civic integration programme at the end of 2009. In addition to those for whom a civic integration programme is mandatory, the policy also focuses on migrants with a language disadvantage who have become naturalised Dutch citizens or who for some other reason are not required by law to participate in a civic integration programme. This group of so called ‘voluntary integrators’ comprises around 319,000 persons. At the end of 2009, only a very limited proportion of this group had begun an integration course.

This is partly because many local authorities began actively offering civic integration programmes to this target group later; moreover, it is not always easy to reach this group of migrants and to persuade them to take part.

At the end of 2009, a quarter of those participating in civic integration programmes had taken the civic integration exam. The number doing so increased sharply in 2010. Almost three-quarters of examination candidates pass at the first attempt. Passing the exam shows that candidates meet a minimum standard of language proficiency. This is a positive development compared with the mandatory civic integration process in the period 19982006, when candidates were merely obliged to make best efforts, not to achieve a particular result.

Those who take part in civic integration programmes are generally positive about the process, stressing the contribution it makes to their Dutch language proficiency, their self-confidence and the building of social networks. Quantitative research also confirms that civic integration has a positive effect on Dutch language proficiency.

Previous Integration Reports have made clear that there were some issues associated with the implementation of this policy in the past. The policy is now operating more effectively; a high proportion of those who are required to undergo civic integration programmes are reached and the pass rates are relatively high. The picture that emerges from this Report is a moderately positive one: the organisation by local authorities is reasonably in order, the number of participants in civic integration programmes is high, participants are satisfied and civic integration contributes to improving their proficiency in the Dutch language. Viewed from this perspective, there appears little reason to change the policy. Nonetheless, that is what the present government intends to do. In particular, the intention to reduce the role of local authorities and to place responsibility for paying for civic integration with migrants themselves is likely to bring the risk that people will simply not begin a civic integration programme at all.

The difference in education level between the four largest migrant groups and the native Dutch population is still considerable if we look at people who have already left the education system. Of the Turkish group in the Netherlands, 35% have completed no more than primary education, and this applies for as many as 40% of the Moroccan group.

A substantial proportion of first-generation female migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin have never been to school or have completed a maximum of primary education. Those of Surinamese and Antillean origin are substantially better educated, but still do not attain the level of the native population. Despite this, the education level of migrants is rising gradually, and more quickly than among the native Dutch population.

Their educational disadvantage is thus diminishing. This is of course closely connected to the growing second generation, whose education level is much higher than the first generation. The education level of the Moroccan group in the Netherlands, in particular, is rising quickly: the percentage of the lowest educated (maximum primary education) has more than halved within the space of 20 years.

Learning disadvantage in primary school diminishing, but language disadvantage

Non-Western pupils at primary school still lag a considerable way behind their native counterparts, especially in language proficiency. Pupils of Turkish origin have the greatest language disadvantage, while those of Surinamese origin perform the best of the four main migrant groups. Language performance has improved in recent years, but it is a relatively slow process. The advances in arithmetic are much faster; pupils of Moroccan and Turkish origin have halved their disadvantage in arithmetic relative to native pupils within around 15 years. Pupils of Antillean origin have made little progress in primary education. This is related to the number of disadvantaged migrants coming from the Netherlands Antilles (chiefly from Curaçao), whose children are now at Dutch primary schools.

The percentage of students of non-Western origin in the senior tracks of secondary education is gradually increasing; a quarter of students with a Turkish or Moroccan background are now in senior general secondary (havo) or pre-university (vwo) education, and the same applies for around 30% of students with a Surinamese or Antillean background.

The proportion of students of Turkish and Moroccan origin in these highest tracks of secondary education has increased by 4 - 5 percentage points since 2003; the increase among students with a Surinamese or Antillean background is around 2 percentage points. As the proportion of native Dutch students in these senior tracks of secondary education is also increasing (up 3 percentage points), however, the gap is barely narrowing.

Almost half of native Dutch students are now in senior general secondary or pre-university education. The biggest gains have been made at the lower end of the secondary education system, in pre-vocational secondary education (vmbo), where the number of pupils of non-Western origin in the lowest tracks has reduced sharply.

The number of students of non-Western origin leaving the education system prematurely has reduced sharply in recent years. While the gap compared with native Dutch students in terms of school dropout has narrowed in general secondary education, however, in senior secondary vocational education (mbo) the differences are still considerable, partly because the dropout rates among native Dutch students have also reduced.

Students of non-Western origin make frequent use of the opportunity to accumulate qualifications, not only in secondary education (especially progressing from the theoretical track of pre-vocational secondary education to senior general secondary education), but also in senior secondary vocational education (mbo), where they often (more often than native Dutch students) transfer to a programme at a higher level.

The number of students of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin entering higher education has risen sharply since the middle of the 1990s. This is thanks largely to the increased numbers transferring from senior secondary vocational (mbo) to higher professional (hbo) education and from higher professional to university education, which means that far more young people from these groups ultimately enter higher education than might be imagined from the numbers following the more “traditional” route via senior general secondary (havo) and pre-university (vwo) education. The flipside of this is that the study careers of students with a non-Western background are less successful.

Students of non-Western origin are significantly lower achievers across the entire further education spectrum (secondary, senior secondary vocational and higher education) than their native Dutch counterparts. This is evident from data in which the same group of students was tracked over time. After six years in secondary education, non-Western students have attained a secondary education (havo/vwo) qualification much less often than their native Dutch counterparts and also much more often leave school without any qualifications at all. Their achievement in senior secondary vocational education (mbo) is also substantially lower; almost 30% of all non-Western students leave the system without an initial qualification, compared with 18% of native Dutch students. The same picture is found in higher education, where the percentage who have not obtained a degree after seven years is some 15 percentage points higher among students of non-Western origin than among native Dutch students.

Some 53% of non-Western migrants have a paid job, compared with 69% of the native Dutch population. 4.5% of the native Dutch labour force were unemployed in 2010, compared with 12.6% of non-Western migrants. Almost twice as many non-Western migrants as native Dutch workers have a flexible employment contract (17% versus 9%). The net participation rate of non-Western migrants has fallen more sharply since 2008, and the unemployment rate has risen more steeply than among Dutch natives. In other words, the gap has widened again in the last few years.

The labour market position of non-Western migrants has advanced in some areas compared with ten years ago. The net participation rate is higher and migrants are increasingly succeeding in climbing higher up the occupational ladder. The latter applies particularly for the second generation, the proportion of whom in senior positions has risen from 19% to 25% in the course of ten years.

Migrants of Surinamese origin perform the best of all migrant groups in many areas. By contrast, the traditionally strong labour market position of migrants of Antillean origin continues to weaken. Unemployment is rising fastest in this group, and those in work are increasingly found at the bottom end of the labour market. This is due to the changed composition of the Antillean group in the wake of the influx of disadvantaged Antilleans over the last ten years. However, the labour market position of migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin is even worse. The unemployment rate is high among those of Moroccan origin, and they have a paid job less often than any other group (48%). Those who do work more often have a low-level job.

The position of young people remains exceedingly precarious. Youth unemployment is high: almost a quarter of non-Western migrants aged between 15 and 25 years are unemployed, the highest level for many years. The problem is particularly acute among young people of Moroccan and Surinamese origin, of whom 28% and 27%, respectively, are without work. In addition, almost half of 15-24 year-old migrants who are in work have a flexible employment contract.

Migrant women, especially those of Turkish and Moroccan origin, increasingly have a paid job. On the other hand, the proportion of women from these groups with jobs is still low: 39% of women of Turkish origin and 37% of women with a Moroccan background have a paid job (for 12 hours or more per week), compared with 62% of native Dutch women. In 2000, these percentages were 26% for women of Turkish origin and 19% for women of Moroccan origin. Women of Surinamese origin are in work almost as often as native Dutch women (58%). In line with the increase in labour force participation, the economic independence of migrant women is also increasing.

The income position of non-Western migrants is much weaker than that of Dutch natives. Non-Western migrants are more often dependent on benefits, have a lower average income, are more often poor and have far fewer assets than the native Dutch. The economic recession has weakened the income position of all groups, both native Dutch and non-Western.

At the end of 2010, 12% of non-Western migrants were in receipt of social assistance benefit, six times as many as in the native Dutch population. Women, older people and members of the first generation are more dependent on social assistance benefit in all migrant groups. Although the proportion of people on social assistance benefit has fallen sharply over the period as a whole (2000 -2010), the number of benefits has been rising again since 2009.

The average annual income of native Dutch persons in 2009 was eur 25,200, compared with eur 18,200 for non-Western migrants. Even more striking is the wide difference in poverty rates. The risk of falling below the poverty line is almost four times as high for non-Western migrants (18%) as in the native population. The positive long-term trend in income position has come under pressure as a result of the economic downturn.

The differential between Dutch natives and non-Western migrants has remained unchanged in relative terms: the income of Dutch natives was more than a third higher than that of non-Western migrants in both 2000 and 2009. In absolute terms (stated in euros), the incomes of natives and non-Western migrants have however moved further apart over the last decade.

The assets of Dutch natives in 2010 were more than six times higher than those of non-Western migrants (eur 186,000 and eur 27,000, respectively).

Migrants of Moroccan origin are in the weakest income position. Their average annual income is low (eur 16,600), partly because of the high proportion of social assistance benefit recipients (14%). They are also virtually unable to build up any assets. Households where lots of children of Moroccan origin of growing up often have great difficulty making ends meet. People of Surinamese origin are in the most favourable position of all migrant groups, mainly due to the high level of economic independence among Surinamese women and the relatively low poverty rate. Despite this, the gap relative to Dutch natives is still wide.

Growing ethnic concentration in peripheral municipalities around the major cities

Over the last ten years, Dutch citizens of non-Western origin have increasingly moved to municipalities on the periphery of the four largest Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht), and this process seems set to continue. Those engaged in this exodus from the major cities are not just migrants of Surinamese and Antillean origin, but also the other migrant groups. Just as in the cities from which they have come, geographical concentrations of non-Western groups are arising in these peripheral municipalities, albeit to a less marked degree than in the cities themselves. One in four Dutch persons of non-Western origin now live in a neighbourhood where more than half the population are of non-Western origin.

Second generation live in increasingly high-quality homes; single-parent families lag behind

Non-Western migrants have been closing the housing quality gap in recent years. Home ownership, and thus overall housing quality (home size, type, usable area), is increasing rapidly among the second generation of Turkish, Moroccan and other non-Western migrants. Members of the second generation who live independently, though still young, already have better homes than their parents. The difference between the first and second generations is particularly marked among those of Moroccan origin.

5% of native Dutch (two-parent) families live in a flat, compared with between a third and over half of families of non-Western origin. Single-parent families, especially those of Surinamese origin, much more often live in flats: more than 70% compared with 20% of native Dutch single-parent families. Surinamese single-parent families are the most dissatisfied with their home, followed by Moroccan (two-parent) families with children, who also often live in homes that are too small.

Migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin less satisfied with residential setting

The improvement in housing quality is not reflected in an increase in satisfaction with the residential setting. In fact, satisfaction with the residential environment among migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin has fallen further behind compared with Dutch natives in recent years (2006-2009). Those of Turkish origin are the most critical, especially the second generation. Growing dissatisfaction with non-Western population concentrations and steadily declining perceived social cohesion in the neighbourhood appear to be the reasons for this. Nuisance and physical decay are not increasing, either subjectively or objectively.

Non-Western migrants continue to be heavily overrepresented in the suspect figures. In 2009, 1% of all native Dutch citizens were suspects of committing an offence, compared with 3.8% of non-Western migrants. The ranking of the four main migrant groups has remained unchanged in the last ten years: migrants of Antillean origin are most often suspects (6.0%), followed by those of Moroccan (5.3%), Surinamese (4.1%) and Turkish (3.1%) origin. Men of Antillean origin stand out, with 9.4% being suspects, closely followed by men of Moroccan origin (8.8%). Women are much less often crime suspects than men, but women of Antillean origin are strikingly often suspects (3.6%), even more often than native Dutch men. Criminality persists until a late age among migrants of Antillean origin.

Two out of three men of Moroccan origin have been crime suspects in their youth

Young adult men (18-24 years) and boys (12-17 years) of Moroccan and Antillean origin stand out as problem groups. Young adult men of Moroccan origin top the suspect rankings, with almost 20% being suspects of committing an offence, followed by young men of Antillean origin (13%). Almost 13% of boys of Moroccan origin are suspects at some time; this applies for 10% of boys of Antillean origin.

The picture becomes really alarming when we look at cohort data. 65% of all boys of Moroccan origin aged between 12 and 23 years have been detained at some time; the figure among all boys of Antillean origin is 55%, while among boys from other non-Western groups the figure is close to 50%. Among the native Dutch population, 25% of boys have at some time been suspected of committing an offence.

People of non-Western origin report being victims of crime more often than Dutch natives. This is because they are younger on average and more often live in an urban setting. Women, older persons and people with a lower education level also more often report having been victims of crime, and especially women of Moroccan origin.

Non-Western migrants, especially those of Turkish and Moroccan origin, also feel less safe than the native Dutch. A quarter of Dutch natives sometimes or often feel unsafe, compared with four out of ten non-Western migrants.

This Report shows how the position of non-Western migrants has developed in recent years in a large number of domains. Which way is integration going in a general sense? And, the most important question of all, is the gap relative to the native Dutch population shrinking over time, in other words are non-Western migrants making up some of their disadvantage?

Viewed over the longer term, a number of positive developments can be observed. Parents of children from migrant groups are becoming ever better educated, which in turn means that their children perform better at primary school. Also encouraging is the increasing number of non-Western migrants entering higher education. Overall, non-Western migrants are closing the education gap relative to the native Dutch population, and in this respect, things are moving slowly but surely in the right direction. We also see a similar catching-up exercise in the long-term trends on the labour market, where the occupational level of non-Western migrants is slowly but surely rising. Despite the recent downturn, over the long term benefit dependency and poverty are reducing among non-Western households. The increase in the proportion of migrant women who are in work is also positive, though they still lag a long way behind their native Dutch counterparts, especially women of Turkish and Moroccan origin. Non-Western migrants are definitely catching up on the housing market: they are more often buying their own homes and also live in larger homes. This is increasingly accompanied by an exodus of non-Western migrants from the large cities to the peripheral municipalities. The growth of the second generation has a positive impact on all these developments, and it is clear that the progress is being driven mainly by this younger second generation.

On the other hand, the vulnerability of migrant groups on the labour market is still clear to see. The current economic downturn is for example hitting migrant groups harder than the native Dutch population. This is reflected directly in the unemployment figures, which have immediately risen much faster among non-Western migrants than in the native population. Young people are especially badly affected. An exacerbating factor here is that many young non-Western migrants are insufficiently qualified for the Dutch labour market. Their overrepresentation in flexible jobs also contributes to their vulnerable position. Aside from the unfavourable economic climate, several other developments can be observed which are anything but positive. There is considerable housing segregation, which is if anything increasing rather than decreasing. The catching-up exercise by migrant pupils in education is slow; there is progress, but if it continues at its present pace it will take many years before the gaps have been closed. The main reason for this is the considerable language disadvantage of non-Western migrants. The stubborn prominence of non-Western migrant groups in the crime suspect figures is also not helpful.

This general picture masks a very diverse reality. Although developments in all groups are generally moving in the same direction, the pace at which they are taking place differs.

In education, children of Turkish origin, in particular, face considerable problems. They have the biggest language difficulties in primary school, more often have to repeat years at secondary school and have the lowest exam pass rates. On the other hand, their participation in higher education is increasing substantially. Their labour market position has strengthened over the longer term, though has suffered in recent years because of the weak economic climate.

On a positive note, migrants of Turkish origin, especially the second generation, are increasingly escaping from the bottom end of the occupational ladder and are increasingly attaining the most senior levels. In addition, many migrants of Turkish origin own their own businesses.

In education, in particular, things are moving relatively more quickly in the Moroccan origin group than among those of Turkish origin. They are making up much of the gap relative to native Dutch pupils, especially in language, and are increasingly entering the higher levels of secondary education (senior general secondary/pre-university). As in the Turkish origin group, the number entering higher education is also rising. A further positive development is the rise in the occupational level of second-generation migrants of Moroccan origin. They also increasingly frequently have permanent jobs. On the other hand, they are also the most often unemployed compared with the other three major non-Western groups and are more often in receipt of social assistance benefit. It is therefore not surprising that the income position of the Moroccan group is particularly weak.

Many of them have a low income, the poverty rate is high and they are virtually unable to build up any assets. Moreover, after migrants of Antillean origin, those in the Moroccan group are also the most frequently recorded in the crime suspect figures, especially boys below the age of 18 years.

In earlier Integration Reports we have noted that the Antillean origin group has two faces. Those who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time are doing very well, and so are their children. More problematic is the position of Antillean migrants who have come to the Netherlands more recently. Unemployment is high in this group, as is benefit dependency, and they are enormously overrepresented in the crime statistics, and continue to be so until much later in life. Their primary school achievements are also modest. The changing profile of this group means they are becoming an increasingly disadvantaged section of the population.

Of the four main non-Western groups, those of Surinamese origin are in the most favourable position. The unemployment rate is relatively low, they are often in paid work and their economic independence is high. Yet they still lag a long way behind the native Dutch in many areas. This is reflected in their higher benefit dependency, low incomes and educational disadvantage. Moreover, in some areas the position of the Surinamese origin group is developing less favourably than other groups, for example when it comes to primary school achievement and improvements in their occupational level. The Surinamese group are generally regarded as being the best integrated, but this is not an entirely accurate picture.

Our third research question is how far non-Western migrants are from a situation of proportionality. Proportionality still lies at the basis of the Dutch government’s integration policy, albeit perhaps less explicitly than in the past. It is logical that migrants, with their less favourable background characteristics, will not be on an equal footing with the native population. But does the disadvantage disappear when we correct for those less favourable background characteristics? If so, we can say that there is de facto proportionality, and migrants will then be in the same position as a comparable category of native Dutch citizens.

In order to determine whether this proportionality has been achieved, we used decomposition analyses for four key integration domains, viz. education, employment, housing and crime.

These analyses enable us to determine where the disadvantage is most stubborn and which factors play a role.

For those who no longer go to school, the difference in education level ultimately attained can be explained entirely from differences in characteristics between Dutch natives and migrant groups. Two characteristics are found to be crucial, namely the education level of the parents and whether or not the person in question went to school in the Netherlands. There is no difference in education level between migrants and Dutch natives who completed their education in the Netherlands and whose parents have an equivalent education level.

As regards primary school achievement levels, we also found that a large part of the disadvantage of migrant pupils can be explained by their less favourable starting position. Once again, the parental education level plays a central role; children of non-Western origin much more often have lower-educated parents than native Dutch children. The weak language proficiency of some parents is also significant.

There is still an unexplained discrepancy, however, particularly in language performance. Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that children of non-Western origin speak little Dutch in their free time, which is detrimental to their Dutch language proficiency.

Strikingly, pupils from migrant groups actually perform slightly better than comparable native pupils in arithmetic. One factor that could play a role here is that these children often attend schools with a high proportion of migrant pupils, which devote a great deal of attention to core subjects. This could produce the desired result in arithmetic especially, because this is a subject that is less dependent on factors outside the school, such as language use in non-school time.

Labour market position: proportionality gap greatest for chance of (permanent) work; smaller difference in occupational level

When it comes to the labour market, migrants with the same characteristics as natives are less often in work. Across all non-Western groups, 30% of their higher unemployment rate remains unexplained. The differential between those of Moroccan origin, in particular, and the native population is large (50%). The gap is also wide when it comes to the chance of finding a permanent job: more than half the discrepancy remains unexplained.

Here, the unexplained differential is greatest among those of Turkish origin (65%). The characteristics included in the analysis are therefore only partially responsible for the observed differences. A substantial portion (roughly half) of the discrepancy in occupational level (proportion of lower-level jobs) also remains unexplained. The gap is particularly wide in the Turkish, Moroccan and Antillean origin groups; the discrepancy in job level between the Surinamese group and the native Dutch is by contrast largely explained.

These findings relate to the entire group of non-Western migrants, i.e. including the first generation, who often have a poor command of Dutch and were frequently educated in the country of origin. No allowance was made for these factors in this analysis, but they do help to determine the magnitude of the unexplained difference. The analyses were therefore repeated for the second generation (who have a good command of Dutch and have been educated in the Netherlands). In the second generation, too, it was found that the difference in unemployment rate and the proportion of flexible jobs cannot be fully explained by the characteristics included in the analysis. This is by contrast the case for occupational level, where the differences compared with natives are almost entirely explained by the characteristics analysed. Employees of Surinamese and Moroccan origin who were born in the Netherlands are in fact slightly ahead of their native Dutch counterparts in terms of occupational level.

The reasons for the disadvantage of migrant groups vary depending on the labour market indicator considered. Work experience and unemployment history are found to be relevant for the differences in unemployment rates; non-Western migrants have less work experience and have been unemployed for longer in the past. This partly explains why their risk of being unemployed is greater. When it comes to the differences in the proportion of flexible jobs, length of time spent working for an employer is the most important explanatory factor. Migrants have on average worked for their employer for a shorter period of time and therefore less often have a permanent employment contract.

As stated, however, in the analysis these factors explain only part of the difference between migrant groups and natives, and least of all for the Moroccan group. Other research has shown that discrimination on the labour market is one of the factors influencing disadvantage on the labour market, particularly for the Moroccan group. Other causes may lie in the job-seeking behaviour and in the structure of social networks.

Unfortunately, the research on the work ethic and job-seeking behaviour of migrant groups is fairly dated. However, we can at least establish that there is an insufficient match between supply and demand. Differences in human capital and employment history cannot explain the wide difference in unemployment rates.

The position is different for those in work. There appears to be much more proportionality here, especially for the second generation. This also explains why first-generation Surinamese migrants enjoy a high degree of proportionality in terms of job level. They are the least ‘hindered’ by migration-specific factors, if only because they have a good command of Dutch. Education level is far and away the most important factor in explaining differences in occupational level. The obstacles thus appear to lie primarily in the intake phase (pre-entry) and less with those who have already been taken on (post entry).

The regulations on recruitment and job grading could be an important reason for this; job and remuneration levels are often linked to education and work experience, reducing the scope for unequal treatment.

Housing position: wide gap in terms of spatial concentration and home ownership; smaller gap for housing quality

At least half the difference in home ownership between migrants of Moroccan origin and the native Dutch can be explained by household and housing market characteristics; the same applies for more than three-quarters of the Surinamese origin group. Individual differences in age and income position are of particular importance here. The fact that non-Western migrants less often own their own home is due among other things to the fact that they are relatively young and more often have a low income. The local and regional housing supply also plays a role; non-Western migrants frequently live in old urban renewal areas and early post-war districts in the large cities with a relatively high proportion of small rented homes in multiple occupancy buildings.

A proportion of migrants of Moroccan and Turkish origin, in particular, do not buy their own home even though their income is sufficient to do so. The question then is which factors are important here. Earlier research has shown that migrants are strongly focused on the rental sector; they are used to renting and may encourage their children to do the same. Income insecurity probably also plays a role, and having a temporary job moreover makes it more difficult to obtain a mortgage. Another motive discouraging them from wanting to buy a home in the Netherlands may be a desire to invest in a home in the country of origin: this applies especially for the first generation. Financial transfers to the country of origin can also be important. A further factor is that, strictly speaking, Muslims are not permitted to pay interest on a mortgage loan; this plays a role for some Dutch Muslims in deciding whether or not to buy a home, but we do not know for how many this is the case and whether they also face other obstacles, such as income insecurity. There are few indications that unequal treatment blocks access to the owner-occupier housing market. The (sparse) research carried out to date (dating from before the banking crisis) suggests a degree of reticence on the part of banks to finance the purchase of homes in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, but in most cases buyers were able to raise the necessary finance through an alternative provider.

Differences between non-Western migrants and Dutch natives in relation to housing can be explained only partly by characteristics of the household, the home and the neighbourhood. The difference is least well explained for Turkish-origin migrants, followed by those of Moroccan and Surinamese origin. Most of the difference remains unexplained. This is related to the preference of some migrants to stay living in the same neighbourhood as family and friends, in other words in ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods.

Quantitative research suggests that family networks hold people in the old neighbourhoods for longer. Those who do move outside the city often choose a neighbourhood where there is already a high proportion of residents of non-Western origin, giving rise to new ethnic concentrations in the peripheral municipalities. The reason for this is that members of migrant groups do not always feel welcome in (predominantly) white neighbourhoods.

The characteristics of the household and the neighbourhood are by contrast very important in explaining the differences in housing quality. The difference is not always explained fully by these characteristics, but they do carry more weight than in the analyses of spatial concentration and home ownership. The gap in housing quality is especially small between tenants from the different groups. The way in which housing is allocated probably plays an important role here; objective characteristics such as income, household composition and length of time spent on the housing waiting list largely determine the home for which someone is eligible. This reduces the risk of unequal treatment and also the influence of personal preferences.

The number of people suspected of committing crimes is higher among non-Western migrant groups than in the native Dutch population. Men, youths, the low-educated, the less well-off and those living in cities are more often suspects, and non-Western migrants are overrepresented in many of these categories. Even after correcting for these important background characteristics, however, the difference in the criminality figures remains, though the degree to which these characteristics explain the difference varies widely between the different non-Western groups. We investigated this for young people aged 1224 years. In the groups where the difference was not very large, namely the Turkish and other (smaller) non-Western origin groups, these characteristics explain 50-70% of the difference. By contrast, between a quarter and less than a fifth of the difference is explained in the groups with higher suspect percentages, i.e. young people of Surinamese, Antillean and Moroccan origin.

The income position of the household to which young people belong makes the biggest contribution to explaining the difference, but the education level of young people themselves and the degree of urbanisation are also important factors. However, these factors explain only a small part of the much higher crime figures found for young people of Moroccan and Antillean origin. To some extent this is because some important facts are missing from the analysis, such as information on school dropout, broken families, living in a deprived neighbourhood and parental education level. However, migration-specific and group-specific factors also seem to play a role, because we find wide differences in the unexplained portion between the origin groups. Explanations are often sought in the culture within some migrant groups, such as norms for acceptable behaviour, or in the conflict between cultures. The suggestion then is that criminal behavior stems from identity conflicts if the culture of origin is difficult to reconcile with Dutch culture: living in ‘two worlds’. This could also explain why psychological problems occur more commonly among young people of Moroccan origin. Differences in the degree of social control (within families and within people’s own ethnic community) are also regarded as an important factor in explaining differences in criminality.

Below we draw a number of conclusions based on the proportionality analyses carried out for the position of migrants and the challenges for government policy.

Non-Western migrants are close to proportionality as regards education level and achievement. In other words, pupils from migrant groups perform at roughly the same level as Dutch natives with the same characteristics. These findings suggest that there are no processes which put migrant children at an additional disadvantage. Schools also bring out roughly as much from migrant children as from native Dutch children. This is a positive signal. At the same time, we see that integration in education will be a long process: the child’s background is an important factor, and the education level of their parents is changing only gradually. Given the generally low education level of Turkish and Moroccan parents, in particular, the educational achievement of these children is relatively low.

When it comes to the language achievement of primary school children, not all of the disadvantage can be explained by their less favourable starting position. There is clear scope for policy here, especially given that this language disadvantage continues throughout their school career. Both the language performance of migrant children and the language disadvantage of their parents are ripe for policy intervention. The civic integration policy is intended to improve the Dutch language proficiency of migrants, and it is achieving some success in this, as also stated in this Report. Against this backdrop, it is regrettable that Turkish migrants, the group with the greatest language disadvantage, are no longer required to follow civic integration courses.

Non-Western migrants face all manner of obstacles in their quest for (permanent) employment. Their lower education level and more unstable employment history (interspersed with periods of unemployment) greatly increase their risk of unemployment.

Investments in education and training are important, so that people are given more opportunities in segments of the labour market where they can build up more stable careers. Given the extent of (youth) unemployment and the anticipated rapid increase during the present period of economic downturn, additional policy efforts are justified.

The government has reduced the policy interventions specifically targeting minority groups in recent years. Specific policy inevitably has a stigmatising character and has by no means always proved effective. On the other hand, the position of migrants on the labour market is worrying. The proportionality analyses make clear that general factors that explain disadvantage do not tell the whole story. Seen from this perspective, there is a certain risk in relying on the operation of general policy. Is such policy effective enough, and do members of migrant groups benefit from it to an equal degree? These are important questions. If it transpires that migrant groups lag behind, this could signal a need for a more focused and more specific policy.

Proportionality is still a long way away when it comes to home ownership and geographical concentration. It is however questionable whether this is a policy problem, as long as there is no unequal treatment by institutions. The differences appear to be attributable mainly to differences in preferences between natives and non-Western migrants, and when it comes to home ownership possibly to a lack of information among children of migrants who have always rented. A strong focus on the social rented sector need not stand in the way of good housing quality; homes in the social rented sector in the Netherlands are generally of reasonable quality and access to those homes has improved greatly over the years.

The focus on the rental market does influence the degree of spatial concentration. This is something of a chicken and egg situation: do people choose to rent and therefore continue to live in the old neighbourhood, or do they choose a neighbourhood and accept the fact that this means they will have to rent? The interest in owner-occupier homes in urban regeneration neighbourhoods suggests that the latter option is certainly important.

The spatial concentration of migrants can be regarded as a policy problem. Those concerned are highly critical of their residential environment and also of the population profile; many lament the fact that almost all the Dutch natives have moved out of a neighbourhood. There are also clear indications of a relationship between living in such neighbourhoods and socio-cultural integration (especially interethnic contact). On the other hand, the ‘neighbourhood effect’ is relatively small. If the aim is to promote people’s socio-cultural position, a policy of mixed neighbourhoods does not deserve the greatest priority; more beneficial would be better investment in education and work.

Indigenous and migrant households with the same characteristics broadly have homes of the same quality. Proportionality has thus been achieved here, at least in the rented sector. We see a parallel here with the outcomes for occupational level. In both cases there is an institutionalised market, where regulations greatly influence the outcomes; a given set of resources leads to a ‘known’ outcome (in terms of occupational level, income or housing quality). Regulation can thus play a role in achieving proportional outcomes for migrant groups.

Together with the high and rising (youth) unemployment, the high proportion of migrants figuring among crime suspects is the biggest worry as regards integration. Suspects are often premature school-leavers and have little connection to the mainstream labour market. Groups with high criminality figures, such as migrants of Antillean and Moroccan origin, also suffer from a poor image. Research shows that employers are least inclined to recruit members of these groups. Criminality thus causes great harm: for the individual, for the group and for society as a whole. Although the number of suspects appears to be falling slightly, it has been high for many years among young men from migrant groups. This is a stubborn problem which is not easily resolved, despite many interventions often directed specifically at migrant groups. Nonetheless, it would seem wise to continue these policies, provided they are effective. Reducing criminality is an important enough goal to justify this, both for individual integration and in the light of the negative impact that ensues for the migrant groups themselves.

The regional police forces collect data on incidents involving discrimination on the basis of a “national uniform case form” in order to monitor and analyse the crime pattern for discrimination in the Netherlands. The data are also incorporated into discussions of incidents involving discrimination in the regional forum on discrimination (RDO), the aim being to reach agreement on where action needs to be taken.

This final chapter begins with a discussion of each individual conclusion that can be drawn from the incidents involving discrimination as registered by the police. It also makes recommendations on optimising data collection in order to monitor incidents involving discrimination in the Netherlands. The data that serve as the basis for the 2011 Poldis Report, like those underpinning the reports for 2009 and 2010 (De Wit & Sombekke, 2011; De Wit & Sombekke, 2010) display an extremely varied picture regarding the current state of affairs in relation to incidents involving discrimination in the Netherlands.

In discussing the data presented here, we must bear in mind that this report deals with incidents involving discrimination that have been registered by the police. This does not give a comprehensive picture of the actual state of affairs in connection with discrimination in the Netherlands, partly because many victims of such incidents do not report them, and partly because priorities may differ from one police force to the next, leading to variations in the proportion of such incidents that are registered. So this Poldis report presents a picture of incidents involving discrimination as registered by regional police forces. The subdivision into incidents of a discriminatory nature and incidents that only involve discriminatory utterances is a change with respect to previous Poldis reports.

A major recommendation continues to be, on the basis of this and earlier reports, that the introduction of a uniform mode of registration in all regions would be an enormous improvement. On the basis of regional differences that once again come to the fore in this report, the Police Diversity Expertise Centre (LECD) has already decided to make a number of improvements, in order to obtain a uniform picture from all regions in the future. For instance, in 2011 a new, improved case form was developed in collaboration with the regional police forces and introduced nationwide at the end of that year. The regions are now submitting the registered incidents in accordance with this national format. In addition, a manual has been prepared with guidelines for filling in the new form. The improved case form is the first step in the proposed improvement process. Another major improvement relates to the update of the search enquiry that is used to filter incidents involving discrimination from police records. As things stand, this search enquiry is not considered a useful aid by all regional forces. For this reason, extra attention is being paid in 2012 to the modes of analysis used by regional forces to filter these incidents from the Basic Law Enforcement Database (BVH). Proposals to this effect will be presented in the autumn of 2012. Eventually, this is intended to produce a search enquiry that can be entered in all regions in the same way, thus generating standardised data nationwide.

There are different reasons why people migrate, but the main reasons all over the world are economically based, to improve living conditions and to reunite the family. Aruba is known for its diverse population. Data from the Census 2010 show that the population of Aruba consists of individuals born on 133 different countries with 92 different nationalities. In this article we focus on the foreign-born population. Most data used in this article are derived from the Fifth Population and Housing census held on Aruba in 2010, from September 29^th up to October 6^th. The reference date was September 29^th in 2010. This article describes the foreign-born population in relation to the total population and the Aruban-born population. The foreign-born population is described using variables such as sex, age, country of birth, nationality, period of settlement, marital status and language.

In 2010, the total population of Aruba consisted of 101,484 individuals (Census 2010). The foreign-born population represented 34% (34,432 individuals) of the total population living on Aruba. In 2010, there were 4,328 more foreign-born persons living on Aruba than in the year 2000. The total foreign-born population in 2000 was 30,104, which represented 33% of the total population (90,506 individuals). From 1991 to 2000 the foreign-born population increased with 14,194 individuals, which was a larger number than the increases between the other decades. It seems that the increase of the foreign-born population, as observed during the period 1981 to 2000 came to a halt after 2000 (see figure 1 and table 1).

The increase in the foreign-born population in the period of 1981 to 2000 was related to several events after the closure of the oil refinery LAGO in 1985 and after Aruba obtained its Status Aparte^[50] in 1986. After the closure of LAGO, people were prompted to leave the island due to the unfavorable economic situation. According to the results of the Aruba Migration and Integration Study (AMIS) in 2003, the total population of Aruba (62,229) in mid-1983 dropped to 59,154 by 1987. “In the late 1980’s, the plan of the government of Aruba was to make Aruba a prime tourist destination. Hotels were expanded and new ones were constructed. Therefore, the construction sector experienced an enormous boom. Wages went up and there was a great demand for workers” (Double or Quits, 2004), which prompted a boom in migration of foreign-born individuals.

Sex and age are two important demographic characteristics which help describe the population of Aruba. The sex distribution of the population of Aruba by country of birth over the years 1981, 1991, 2000 and 2010 are depicted in figure 2.

The number of foreign-born females exceeded the foreign-born males for the years 1981 to 2010. As for the Aruban-born, there were more males than females in 1991, but for 1981, 2000 and 2010 the number of Aruban-born females exceeded the number of Aruban-born males.

The total population in 2010 consisted of 48,241 (47.5%) males and 53,243 (52.5%) females. Of which, 33.137 (32.7%) were Aruban-born males and 15,060 (14.8%) were foreign-born males, 33,835 (33%) were Aruban-born females and 19,372 (19.1%) were foreign-born females.

The sex ratio of the total population in 2010 was 90 males for every 100 females. This was lower than the sex ratio in 2000, which were 92 males for every 100 females. Thus, there were fewer males and more females in 2010 than in 2000. The sex ratio among the foreign-born population on Aruba is shown in table 2.

Table 2: Sex ratios among the foreign-born population of Aruba by age, 1981-2010

According to the results of the AMIS as published in Double or Quits, “The sex ratio of the foreign-born population increased considerably between 1981 and 1991, from 64.5 to 82.7. The boom in the construction sector during the late 1980’s contributed to this increase”. The sex ratio of the foreign-born population in 2000 decreased from 82.7 to 81.6, and continued decreasing to 77.7 in 2010. Different age categories were used in table 2 to show the different sex ratio per age group. In 2000 and in 2010, the sex ratio decreased with increasing age.

The age categories of the total population in 2010 with the largest number of individuals were those between 5 and 20 years of age and between 40 and 55 years (fig. 3). There were fewer people between the ages of 20 and 35, which could have an effect on the number of children born in the coming years.

Figure 3 shows the foreign-born population by age category. The percentage of foreign-born youngsters of age 0-14 years was small compared to the same group of Aruban-born. However, more than half of the Aruban-born 0-14 years old had at least one foreign-born parent. These are the children of foreign-born persons who come to Aruba in their reproductive years and working age to make a living here on Aruba. More than half of the Aruban-born population of 0-4, 5-9 and 10-14 years had a foreign-born parent, 3,444 (56.4%), 3,661 (59.2) and 3,218 (51.6%) respectively. Of the total Aruban-born persons, there were 22,830 (34.3%) with at least one foreign-born parent. More in depth analyses on the Aruban-born children with at least one foreign-born parent will be conducted in another paper.

Of the foreign-born individuals, the ones in their thirties and forties were the largest groups (46%), which was quite significant compared to the Aruban-born persons with the same age (23%). Additionally, between the ages thirty and forty five, there were 1,250 more foreign-born women than Aruban-born women present. Of the total population, 10.4% were individuals with age 65 and over.

In conclusion, there are relatively few young and old foreign-born persons (table 3). Of the total foreign-born population, 8.7% were above 65 years of age. This was 0.6% higher than in 2000. An increase in the mean age of a population is also a reflection of ageing. The mean age of the total foreign-born in 2010 is 41.5, which was higher than the mean age of the Aruban-born population which was 35 years. Foreign-born females had a higher mean age (42.4) than the foreign-born males (40.2) (Population projections Aruba 2010-2030).

As mentioned before in 2010, the foreign-born population consisted of persons born in 133 different countries. These countries are presented in a table in appendix A. Besides the country of birth, the nationality also determines the diversity of Aruba’s population. In 2010, there were persons with 92 different nationalities living on Aruba. The largest group of foreign-born persons on Aruba originated from regions of South America and the Caribbean. Figure 4 shows for 1991, 2000 and 2010, the top ten countries of birth for the foreign-born population.

The majority of the foreign-born population residing on Aruba in 2010 was born in Colombia (9,279) and represented 26.9% of the total foreign-born population. The second largest group of foreign-born persons was born in the Netherlands, and represented 12.7% of the total foreign-born population. This adds up to half of the group of persons born in Colombia. The third largest group was born in the Dominican Republic, which represented 11.9% of the foreign-born population, totalling 4,113 individuals. Two other Caribbean islands in the top ten countries of birth of the foreign-born population, where the most persons residing on Aruba were born, were Curaçao and Haiti, with respectively 6.5% and 4.5% of the total foreign-born population. Besides Colombia, other South American countries which had large representation on Aruba were Venezuela (9.4%), Suriname (3.7%) and Peru (3.1%). The ninth and tenth largest group of foreign-born persons on Aruba was born in China and the Philippines with respectively 3.1% and 2.8%.

Over the years there have been some differences in the country of birth of the foreign-born population on Aruba. Persons born in Colombia represented 26.9% of the total foreign-born population which is a large increase, when compared to 1991. In 1991, the majority of foreign-born persons were born in The Netherlands (14.4%) and the Dominican Republic (14.1%). Moreover, the group of foreign-born persons born in Curaçao was one of the largest in 1991, with 12.1%.

Figure 4 shows a decrease in percentage over the years for the foreign-born persons born in Curaçao. However, there was not a big difference in the number of individuals born in Curaçao residing on Aruba in 2000 and 2010. The percentages of the persons born in Peru, China and Philippines were relatively low, but it was remarkable that there was an increase in the number of persons born in Peru, China and Philippines from 1991 to 2010. Among the persons born in China alone there was an increase of 361 persons between 1991 and 2000 and of 434 persons between 2000 and 2010.

As there are people who migrate to Aruba for different reasons e.g.: a better living, for work or just for the great weather, it is interesting to know the economy level of the countries people come from. Countries can be categorized by the level of economy (table 4). The list of the World Bank uses 5 categories: 1. Low-income economy, 2. Lower-middle-income economy, 3. Upper-middle-income economy, 4. High-income economy; Non-OECD member. 5. High-income economy; OECD member. OECD is the abbreviation for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world” (www.oecd.org).

Appendix B shows the countries categorized by the level of the economy. More than half of the foreign-born persons (60.4%) on Aruba were born in an “upper-middle-income economy”. Of the total foreign-born population, 16% was born in a “high income economy-OECD country”, while 10.6% was born in a “high- income economy non- OECD country”. Aruba was categorized as a high income: non-OECD country on the World Bank list of economies. Thus, a large group of foreign-born persons residing on Aruba migrated from an upper middle income economy country to Aruba, which is considered to be a High-income: non-OECD country.

The country of birth alone does not describe the diversity of the people living on Aruba. In the following section the nationality of the population on Aruba will be discussed. Aruba together with the Netherlands and the former Netherlands Antilles formed the Kingdom of the Netherlands, whose citizens share a single nationality (Dutch). The Netherlands Antilles dissolved on 10 October 2010, resulting in two new constituent countries, Curaçao and St. Maarten. The other islands joined the Netherlands as “Special municipalities”, officially public bodies.

The top ten nationalities for the Aruban- and the foreign-born population in 2010 are shown in table 5. About half of the foreign-born population reported having the Dutch nationality (52.1%). Foreign-born individuals with the Colombian nationality were the 2nd largest group, representing 18% of the foreign-population. Venezuela, Dominican Republic and Haiti were in the top 5 nationalities with respectively 6.5%, 6.0% and 3.0% of the foreign-born population. As expected in 2010 most Aruban-born persons were Dutch (97.7%). The percentage of Aruban-born persons with a nationality other than Dutch was very low.

There are foreign-born persons who obtained the Dutch nationality from birth, others who obtained the Dutch nationality by marrying an Aruban-born with Dutch nationality and other through naturalization. Foreign-born who obtain the Dutch nationality on Aruba have less difficulty on Aruba as they no longer need to renew their residence and work permits yearly. Moreover, the Dutch passport entitles migrants to travel and reside in any country of the European Union.

A very small percentage of individuals residing on Aruba and born in Aruba, the Netherlands or Curaçao had a nationality other than Dutch. Table 6 shows the number and percentage of the persons by their nationality, their country of birth’s nationality or another nationality. Persons who did not report their persons residing in Aruba and born in Colombia, about two thirds (6,144) had the Colombian nationality, while about one third (3,058) had the Dutch nationality. Almost this same ratio 2:1 was shown for Venezuela, Haiti, China and Peru.

It is remarkable that about half of the population of Aruba born in the Dominican Republic had the Dutch nationality. The population of Aruba, born in the Philippines was very small and only 20.6% had the Dutch nationality, while 79.1% had the Philippine nationality. The Dutch nationality can be obtained if at least one parent has the Dutch nationality or by means of naturalization. Table 7 shows the number of naturalizations and requests for the years 2004 to 2008. The topic of naturalization and integration will be discussed in a following paper.

There could be different reasons why people migrate to Aruba. Figure 5 shows the period of settlement of the foreign-born persons who were born in Colombia, the Netherlands, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Curaçao; the top 5 countries of birth of the foreign-born population of Aruba. The period of settlement is a reflection of periods in which important events took place regarding labor market on Aruba. In the late 1980’s, there was an increase in the number of persons by settlements on Aruba. The construction sector experienced an enormous boom in this period as the focus on Aruba was to expand hotels and new ones were constructed. Wages went up and there was a great demand for workers. During the beginning of the new millennium the immigration was severely reduced due to a more stringent admission policy.

There are different reasons why people marry; love, need to have a family, need for belongingness, to get financial security, for acceptance in society, avoid loneliness.

During Census 2010, the marital status was asked for individuals 14 years of age and over. However, in this paper analyses conducted on marital status involved persons aged 15 years and over in order to compare internationally. Table 8 shows that not even half (43.8%) of the total population 15 years and over were married in 2010. Where foreign-born individuals were concerned, there were more married foreign-born individuals (49.1%) than never-married ones (35.4%). In comparison, among the total Aruban-born population, there were more never-married individuals (41.5%) than married ones (40.3%).

It is interesting to analyze how many married couples were indeed living together. Table 9 depicts the data regarding the married couples living with each other. Of the 20,623 couples living together 16,162 (78.4%) were married to each other. Most of the married couples living together were both Aruban-born (42.6%). There were more Aruban-born males married and living together with a foreign-born female (19.2%) than there were Aruban-born females married and living with a foreign-born male (9.8%).

Foreign-born females married to and living together with an Aruban-born male were from different countries: Dominican Republic (13.7%), Venezuela (12.9), the Netherlands (7.7%) and Curaçao (6.2%). The majority (39.7%) of the foreign-born females married to and living together with an Aruban-born male was born in Colombia. Of the 1,589 foreign-born males married to and living together with an Aruban-born woman, 21.5% was born in Curaçao and 16.9% born in the Netherlands. These results show that the Aruban-born males tend to marry a Latin-American females more frequently than the Aruban-born females tend to marry a Latin American male. There were 4,556 (28.2%) foreign-born couples who were married and living together. The majority (17.8%) of the foreign-born couples consisted of partners who were born in Colombia.

Besides married couples living together, there were 4,461 couples living together and not married to each other. Of these couples, 41.9% were Aruban-born and about one third were foreign born couples living with each other. The mixed couples (Aruban- and foreign-born) consisted of females living together with an Aruban-born male (13.5%) and foreign-born males living together with an Aruban-born female (11.5%).

Figure 7 shows the marital status for the Aruban-borns and the foreign-borns over the years, 1991, 2000 and 2010. Over the years, there was an increase in the percentage of divorced or legally separated foreign-born persons. The percentage of married foreign-born individuals showed a small decline. When compared to the Aruban-born individuals, the percentage married foreign-born were larger than the married Aruban-borns.

The combination of Aruban-born persons living together with foreign-born persons brings us to the question of the language mostly spoken in these households.

Language is an important factor contributing to the integration in a country. During the 2010 Census the language mostly spoken in the household was asked. In this section an overview is given of the total population and the language mostly spoken in the household. The focus is on the foreign-born population and the language they mostly speak in the household. Figure 9 shows the percentage foreign- and Aruban-born persons by the language mostly spoken in the household.

Of the total population, 68.6% spoke Papiamento in the household. Of the Papiamento speaking population, 17.5% were foreign-born and 82.5% were Aruban-born. Spanish is the foreign language spoken mostly in the households on Aruba (13.6%). Of the Spanish speaking population, 86% were foreign-born individuals, while only 14% were Aruban-born (fig. 8).

Figure 9 shows the most spoken languages in the household for the foreign-born persons in 1991, 2000 and 2010. Portuguese was not a category in the 2010 Census questionnaire, but was replaced by Chinese. Less people spoke Portuguese in the household in 2010 compared to 1991. However, in 2010 there were 3.1% foreign-born persons who spoke mostly Chinese in the household. It is noteworthy that in 2010 the percentage of Papiamento speaking foreign-born population was more than in 2000. The percentage of foreign-born persons who spoke mostly Spanish in the household did not differ much from the percentage of Papiamento speaking foreign-born persons in both 2010 and 2000. Dutch and English are two important languages on Aruba. The education on Aruba is in Dutch and after high school, a relatively large group of students migrate to the Netherlands to continue with their studies. English is the most spoken language internationally. Although these languages are important, they were not mostly spoken in the household by Aruban-born individuals. Language is a form of communication and thus very important in daily life, education and work.

The foreign-born population is a significant part of the population of Aruba. This article shows some characteristics of the foreign-born individuals on Aruba, which in 2010 were about one third of the total population. The percentage foreign-born persons in 2010 did not differ much from the percentage foreign-born population in 2000. The percentage foreign-born age 0-14 years decreased in 2010, while the foreign-born population age 65+ increased in 2010. Most foreign-born residing on Aruba, were born in Colombia. The most common nationality among the Aruban- and the foreign-borns, was Dutch and the second most common was Colombian. The majority of the persons (11,790) who spoke Spanish in the household in 2010 were foreign-born persons. However, a substantial number of foreign-born persons (12,167) spoke Papiamento in the household.

Subsequent papers will discuss other relevant factors concerning the foreign-born population of Aruba. An interesting topic that will be discussed more in depth is the characteristics of the second generation foreign-born persons.

1. Central Bureau of Statistics (2004). Double or Quits: a study on recent migration to Aruba 1993-2003. Oranjestad, Aruba.

2. Central Bureau of Statistics (2012). Fifth Population and Housing Census 2010: Selected Tables. Oranjestad, Aruba.

3. Central Bureau of Statistics (2001). Fourth Population and Housing Census 2000: Selected Tables. Oranjestad, Aruba.

4. Central Bureau of Statistics (1992). Third Population and Housing Census 1992: Selected Tables. Oranjestad, Aruba.

5. Central Bureau of Statistics (1983). Second Population and Housing Census 1981: Selected Tables. Oranjestad, Aruba.

6. Frank Eelens (in preparation). Population Projections Aruba 2010-2030. Central Bureau of Statistics, Oranjestad, Aruba.

^[2] A discrimination offence is an offence defined in articles 137c to 137g and 429 quater of the Criminal Code.

^[3] For example when a case involves utterances insulting to a group of persons (art. 137c) and utterances that incite hatred of or discrimination against other persons (art. 137d).

^[22] The Hague district court 11 October 010, LJN: BN9971; BN9983; BO0019; BO0022.

^[27] In 1998, a new appreciation of the importance of a sense of solidarity and community in society resulted in the Civic Integration (Newcomers) Act (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers). In 2003 the need was recognised for a common basis and recognisable foundations for integration policy

(Letter to the House of Representatives on new-style integration policy, Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004 session, 29203, no. 1).

^[28] Promised during the parliamentary debate on the BZK 2011 budget (House of Representatives, 20102011 session, 32 500 VII, no. 83).

^[30] 5 A. Weltevrede, J. de Boom, S. Rezai, L. Zuiderwijk and G. Engbersen, Arbeidsmigranten uit Midden- en Oost-Europa; een profielschets van recente arbeidsmigranten uit de MOE-landen (“Migrant workers from Central and Eastern Europe: a profile of recent labour migrants”) (Rotterdam: Risbo), 2009. See also the letter to parliament on measures on labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe (House of Representatives, 2010-2011 session, 29 407, no. 118).

^[31] For recent figures, see 2010 Annual Report on Integration, op.cit., and Edith Dourleijn and Jaco Dagevos (eds.), Vluchtelingengroepen in Nederland: Over de integratie van Afghaanse, Iraakse, Iraanse en Somalische migranten (“Refugee Groups in the Netherlands: On the Integration of Afghan, Iraqi, Iranian and Somali Migrants” (The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 2011).

^[32] Provisional figures for 2009-2010, taken from the 2010 letter to parliament on school dropouts (House of Representatives, 2010-2011 session, no. 32356, 20).

^[36] Quarterly Report 1010/1, Netherlands Institute for Social Research; 2009 Annual Report.

^[37] Paul Dekker and Josje den Ridder (eds.), Stemming onbestemd (“Attitude Indefinable”) (The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2011); 2009 Annual Report; W. de Koster, P. Achterberg, D. Houtman, & J. van der Waal, Van God Los: Post-Christelijk cultureel conflict in Nederland’ (“Forsaking God: Post-Christian cultural conflict in the Netherlands”), Sociologie 6.3, 2010.

^[45] See letter to parliament on Central and Eastern European labour migration, House of Representatives, 2010-2011 session, 29 407, no. 118.

^[46] According to the most recent Civic Integration Examination Abroad Monitor (MIEB) (see annexe), in 2010 90% of the 8850 candidates passed the first examination, with similar success rates for men and women. This is an increase of 3% compared to 2009, and the difference in success rates between men and women has narrowed. People with only primary education have been achieving higher success rates (81%), meaning that the difference between people of different educational levels has decreased.

^[47] See the letter to parliament on Central and Eastern European labour migration, op.cit.

^[48] The amendments were initiated by the Van Toorenburg motion, House of Representatives, 2008-2009 session, 31700 XVIII, no. 20 and the Dibi motion, House of Representatives, 2010-2011 session, 32500 VII, no. 39.

^[49] See the letter to parliament on liveability, 28 January 2011, Parliamentary Papers,

^[50] Status Aparte: the status of an autonomous state within the kingdom of the Netherlands.

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination - States Parties Reports

Netherlands - Annex to State Party Report [2013] UNCERDSPR 38; INT/CERD/ADR/NLD/18933 (17 November 2013)