

Resolution No.	Title	Item	Date of adoption	Page
39/159	Inadmissibility of the policy of State terrorism and any actions by States aimed at undermining the socio-political system in other sovereign States (A/39/761)	143	17 December 1984	99
39/160	Relationship between disarmament and development (A/39/745)	55	17 December 1984	99

39/51. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981, 37/71 of 9 December 1982 and 38/61 of 15 December 1983 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),²

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling that three of those States — the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America — became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. *Deplors* that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. *Once more urges* France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/51 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

97th plenary meeting
12 December 1984

39/52. Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted nearly fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the

United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that the existing means of verification are adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear-test ban and that the alleged absence of such means of verification is nothing but an excuse for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground-test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Bearing in mind that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water³ in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament, after four years of trilateral negotiations, stated, *inter alia*, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions in all environments will have" as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems", adding furthermore that they were determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence "to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion",⁴

Taking into account that the same three nuclear-weapon States undertook twenty years ago, in the above-mentioned Treaty, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁵ article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind the growing negative influence that the total lack of compliance with those undertakings had on both the first and the second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

⁴ See CD/139/Appendix II/vol. II, document CD/130.

⁵ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.