

Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XIV

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XV

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

DONE in triplicate, at, this day of,

2827 (XXVI). Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, its resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, and in particular its resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 in which it stressed that the prospects for international peace and security, as well as the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, would be enhanced if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war were to end and if those agents were eliminated from all military arsenals, and commended the following basic approach for reaching an effective solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare:

(a) It is urgent and important to reach agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

(b) Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States,

(c) The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,¹³ in particular its work on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and its efforts towards reaching early agreement also on the elimination of chemical weapons,

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is a first possible step towards the achievement of early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the elimination of such weapons from military arsenals of all States, and determined to continue negotiations to this end,

Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,¹⁴

Noting that the Convention provides for the parties to reaffirm their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and to call upon all States to comply strictly with them,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains an affirmation of the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes;

2. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, its negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the develop-

¹³ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971, document DC/234.

¹⁴ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

ment, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

3. *Also requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take into account in its further work:

(a) The elements contained in the joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted on 28 September 1971 to the Conference by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia;¹⁵

(b) Other proposals, suggestions, working papers and expert views put forward in the Conference and in the First Committee;

4. *Urges* Governments to take all steps that may contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and that could facilitate early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the elimination of such weapons from the arsenals of all States;

5. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

6. *Invites* all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol;

7. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the First Committee relating to questions connected with the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare.

*2022nd plenary meeting,
16 December 1971.*

B

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction,

Believing that it is most desirable that some measures of a preliminary nature be adopted immediately,

Urges all States to undertake, pending agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which, because of their degree of toxicity, have the highest lethal effects and are not usable for peaceful purposes.

*2022nd plenary meeting,
16 December 1971.*

2828 (XXVI). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests

A

The General Assembly,

Viewing with the utmost apprehension the harmful consequences of nuclear weapon tests for the acceleration of the arms race and for the health of present and future generations of mankind,

Fully conscious that world opinion has, over the years, demanded the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments,

Recalling that the item on the question of a comprehensive test ban has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly every year since 1957,

Deploring the fact that the General Assembly has not yet succeeded in its aim of achieving a comprehensive test ban, despite eighteen successive resolutions on the subject,

Noting with regret that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,¹⁶

Deploring the fact that the determination expressed by the original parties to that Treaty to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time has not so far produced the desired results,

Noting with special concern that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere is a source of growing pollution and that the number and magnitude of underground tests have increased at an alarming rate since 1963,

Having considered the special report submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament¹⁷ in response to General Assembly resolution 2663 B (XXV) of 7 December 1970,

Recalling its resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November 1962, whereby all nuclear weapon tests, without exception, were condemned,

Convinced that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban of the nature contemplated in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,

1. *Reiterates solemnly and most emphatically* its condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests;

2. *Urges* the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session of any measures they have taken to implement it.

*2022nd plenary meeting,
16 December 1971.*

¹⁶United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

¹⁷Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971, document DC/234, sect. III.

¹⁵Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971, document DC/234, annex C, sect. 33.