

6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

7. Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets would require that all parties to such negotiations have accepted and implemented transparency and comparability. The elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems would be required. To this end States should utilize the reporting system adopted by the General Assembly in 1980.<sup>40</sup>

8. Armaments and military activities that would be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to reduce military expenditures will be identified by every State party to such agreements.

9. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate and efficient measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. The specific methods of verification or other compliance procedure should be agreed upon in the process of negotiation depending upon the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

10. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

11. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate conducive to the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Conversely, the freezing and reduction of military expenditures could contribute to the increase of confidence among States.

12. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization and among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

13. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

14. The agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets should be viewed in a broader perspective, including respect for and implementation of the security system of the United Nations, and be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

15. The adoption of the above principles should be regarded as a means of facilitating meaningful negotiations on concrete agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

## B

### MILITARY BUDGETS

*The General Assembly,*

*Welcoming* the encouraging progress achieved in arms limitations and disarmament,

*Noting* that further progress in disarmament negotiations could also lead to reductions in military expenditures,

*Stressing* that increased information on military matters is an important prerequisite for achieving agreements on the reduction of armed forces,

*Recalling* that an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures<sup>40</sup> has been intro-

duced in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that national reports on military expenditures have been received from a number of Member States belonging to different geographic regions and having different budgeting and accounting systems.

*Convinced* that more transparency and comparability could be reached through broader participation in the standardized system of the United Nations for reporting military expenditures,

1. *Considers* that transparency requires also agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems;

2. *Accordingly calls upon* all States to make use of the reporting system adopted by the General Assembly;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session an item entitled "Transparency and reduction of military budgets".

*81st plenary meeting  
15 December 1989*

### 44/115. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

#### A

#### CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

*Reaffirming* the urgent necessity, particularly following recent United Nations reports, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,<sup>41</sup>

*Welcoming* the broad participation in and the positive results of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States on the prohibition of chemical weapons, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, and noting with satisfaction the resulting additional accession of States to the 1925 Protocol,

*Endorsing* the Final Declaration<sup>42</sup> adopted at the Paris Conference as an important contribution to the aim of the total elimination of chemical weapons,

*Recognizing* that the effectiveness of a convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and for their destruction will benefit from the support and co-operation of the chemical industry,

*Commending*, in that regard, the initiative of the Government of Australia to strengthen and expand the co-operation of the chemical industry with Governments<sup>43</sup> by convening at Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989 a Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons,

<sup>40</sup> See *Reduction of Military Budgets: International reporting of military expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9), para. 98.

<sup>41</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

<sup>42</sup> A/44/88, annex.

<sup>43</sup> See A/C.1/44/4 and A/C.1/44/5.

*Reaffirming* the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,<sup>44</sup>

*Taking note* of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986,<sup>45</sup> and, in particular, of article IX of the Final Declaration of the Conference,<sup>46</sup>

*Having considered* the report of the Conference on Disarmament,<sup>47</sup> which incorporates, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons,<sup>48</sup> and noting that, following the precedents set over the past five years, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiation,

*Convinced* of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

*Emphasizing* the importance of the widest possible participation of States in the negotiations on the draft convention in order to ensure universal adherence on its conclusion,

*Conscious* of the need to share data relevant to the negotiations on a future convention banning all chemical weapons on a global basis and of the fact that the provision of such data would be an important confidence-building measure,

*Noting* the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,

*Noting with appreciation* the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to contribute directly to that goal.

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1989 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and, in particular, appreciates the progress in the work of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report;

2. *Notes*, while regretting that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded, that there exists an ever-growing will to resolve the pending problems at the earliest possible date;

3. *Again urges* the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1990 session, which will be of pivotal importance, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce its efforts further by,

*inter alia*, increasing the time that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1990 session;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to use the political momentum generated by the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, and the recognition by that conference that a global ban on chemical weapons is of universal concern and interest, to achieve the conclusion at the earliest possible date of such a convention;

5. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the results of its negotiations;

6. *Calls upon* all States to abide by the commitments undertaken in the Final Declaration adopted at the Paris Conference;

7. *Welcomes* the renewed declarations of commitment by Governments represented at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons to conclude and implement a convention at the earliest possible date, and welcomes also the first collective statement by representatives of the chemical industry of their commitment to cooperate with Governments to that end,<sup>49</sup>

8. *Recognizes* that constructive proposals were discussed at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons that could contribute momentum to the Geneva negotiations and assist in the conclusion and early implementation of such a convention;

9. *Recognizes also* the importance of declarations made by States on whether or not they possess chemical weapons and of further international exchanges of data in connection with the negotiations on such a convention;

10. *Encourages* Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement on, and universal adherence to, such a convention.

*81st plenary meeting*  
15 December 1989

## B

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS:  
MEASURES TO UPHOLD THE AUTHORITY OF THE 1925  
GENEVA PROTOCOL AND TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION  
OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions, and those adopted by the Security Council, on the use of chemical weapons,

*Recalling also* the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,<sup>41</sup> and of other rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,

<sup>44</sup> Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex

<sup>45</sup> BWC/CONF.11/13.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, part II.

<sup>47</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27)*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 87

<sup>49</sup> A/C.1/44/4, annex II

*Welcoming* in that regard the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration<sup>42</sup> of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, of the importance and the continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol,

*Recalling further* the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,<sup>44</sup>

*Expressing deep dismay* at the use and the risk of use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread,

*Acknowledging* that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons will further enhance the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General<sup>50</sup> on the proposals of the group of qualified experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987,<sup>51</sup> concerning technical guidelines and procedures available to the Secretary-General for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons,

*Noting* that, upon conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, these guidelines and procedures should be adapted in the light of the obligations under the convention,

1. *Renews its call* to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns vigorously all actions that violate that obligation;

2. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;

5. *Welcomes*, in that regard, the proposals of the group of qualified experts concerning technical guidelines and procedures to guide the Secretary-General in the conduct of timely and efficient investigation of the reports of use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;<sup>51</sup>

6. *Calls upon* all States to consider the implementation of those guidelines and procedures for investigation, *inter alia*, by putting at the disposal of the Secretary-General qualified experts and/or consultants as well as laboratories for analysis;

7. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Security Council decided to consider immediately, taking into account the investigations of the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;<sup>52</sup>

8. *Urges* all States to exercise restraint and to act responsibly in accordance with the need for the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".

81st plenary meeting  
15 December 1989

### C

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,<sup>44</sup>

*Recalling also* that the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986 in order to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble to and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized,

*Taking note* of the confidence-building measures agreed upon by the Second Review Conference for further strengthening the authority of the Convention and for enhancing confidence among States,

*Acknowledging* that the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference<sup>46</sup> expressed the need to give further consideration to, *inter alia*, the implementation of the Convention in all its aspects,

*Confirming* the common interest in strengthening the authority and the effectiveness of the Convention to promote confidence and co-operation among Member States as well as the necessity to comply with the obligations set forth in the Convention,

1. *Notes with appreciation* that, in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, an *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987, which adopted by consensus a report<sup>53</sup> finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure;

<sup>50</sup> A/44/561 and Add.1 and 2.

<sup>51</sup> A/44/561, annex.

<sup>52</sup> Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

<sup>53</sup> BWC/CONF.II/EX/2.

2. *Calls upon* all States parties to the Convention to provide such information and data to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and not later than 15 April;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the relevant parts of the Final Declaration;

4. *Notes* that the Second Review Conference decided, in its Final Declaration, that a Third Review Conference should be held at Geneva at the request of a majority of States parties not later than 1991;

5. *Recalls* in that regard the decision that the Third Review Conference should consider, *inter alia*, the issues set out in article XII of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to circulate to the States parties to the Convention not later than four months prior to the convening of the Third Review Conference a report on the implementation of the confidence-building measures agreed upon by the *Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts* from States parties;

7. *Welcomes* the fact that there are more than one hundred States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, and that since the holding of the Second Review Conference four more States have forwarded their instruments of ratification of the Convention, two more States have declared their accession to the Convention and one State has withdrawn its reservations to it;

8. *Calls upon* all States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to the strengthening of international confidence.

81st plenary meeting  
15 December 1989

#### 44/116. General and complete disarmament

##### A

#### PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 37/99 C of 13 December 1982, 38/188 D of 20 December 1983, 39/151 J of 17 December 1984, 40/94 D of 12 December 1985, 41/59 A and I of 3 December 1986, 42/38 F of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 J of 7 December 1988 on, *inter alia*, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 43/75 J,<sup>54</sup>

*Gravely concerned* that armed attacks against nuclear facilities, though carried out with conventional weapons, could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons,

*Recalling also* that Additional Protocol I of 1977<sup>55</sup> to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949<sup>56</sup> prohibits attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations,

*Deeply concerned* that the destruction of nuclear facilities by conventional weapons causes the release into the environment of huge amounts of dangerous radioactive material, which results in serious radioactive contamination,

*Firmly convinced* that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to international peace and security,

*Recalling further* resolutions GC(XXVII)/RES/407 and GC(XXVII)/RES/409, adopted in 1983 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,<sup>57</sup> in which the Conference urged all member States to support actions in international forums to reach an international agreement that prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes.

1. *Reaffirms* that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, owing to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released;

2. *Requests once again* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities;

3. *Requests again* the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide the Conference on Disarmament with the technical studies that could facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

81st plenary meeting  
15 December 1989

##### B

#### BILATERAL NUCLEAR-ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth,<sup>58</sup>

*Noting* the progress reflected in the joint statement issued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America following their meetings in Washington and Wyoming from 21 to 23 September 1989,<sup>11</sup>

*Noting also* that, since their meetings in Moscow from 29 May to 1 June 1988,<sup>59</sup> bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations have been intensified,

*Noting further* the importance of the verification procedures contained in the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles<sup>14</sup> as an example of the high standards of verification that are now achievable in arms control agreements, both bilateral and multilateral,

<sup>54</sup> A/44/621.

<sup>55</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

<sup>57</sup> See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Twenty-seventh Regular Session*, 10-14 October 1983.

<sup>58</sup> See A/40/1070, annex.

<sup>59</sup> See A. S-15/28, annex.